



## PHD

### **Conflict, Power and Wealth: Organised Crime as an Everyday Phenomenon. A case Study of Greece**

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# **Conflict, Power and Wealth: Organised Crime as an Everyday Phenomenon. A case Study of Greece**

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Bath

Department of European Studies and Modern Languages

November 2010

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## **Abstract**

Research has shown that organised crime (OC) is a powerful and wealthy enterprise with strong ties to politics, businesses and the civil society. A significant portion of organised crime remains invisible to the public, law enforcement and the criminal justice system. Evidently, it is in the interests of political scientists to investigate if this portion of OC that remains invisible (or the portion that becomes exposed) is related to any power structures, bureaucratic predispositions and inequalities. This thesis tackles the following question: Is the visibility of organized crime determined by the social power of the groups and actors that participate in illegal activities? To answer this question, we investigate three criminal networks from Greece.

First, we examine a network of cocaine smugglers (Cocaine Barons), who belong to the shipping community, with high social power and very low visibility. Second, we examine a case study of a group that participates in protection rackets, drug trafficking, smuggling and murders (Godfathers of the night). This group is linked to the Athenian nightlife community and has an average level of social power and visibility. Finally, we have selected to examine the Greek Urban Guerrilla movement as an example with low level of social power and high level of visibility. Although, crimes committed by Urban Guerrilla groups have in most instances political motives, Greek penal law regards such groups as ‘criminal organisations’. We focus our investigation in Greece, because of a very interesting paradox. Although the political, economic and socio-cultural environments in Greece indicate that the country should face similar levels of OC as in Italy, Latin America and the Balkans, the public discourse about the problem of organised crime in Greece is inexistent and politically driven. Our comparative analysis indicates a strong relationship between power, visibility, origin, organisational structure and the degree of symbiosis of the criminal groups with the polity.

# Chapter 1: The Greek paradox

‘Sicilians are Greeks, and have most of the vices of the Greek character, and among these chiefly that of an exaggerated individualism, and indifference to the general good so long as the individual advantage is found nearer at hand, and none of their Governments, down to the Garibaldian, had any higher idea of government than to make use of the vices of the people to keep them under’.

(The New York Times, 1891)

## 1.1 Introduction

Criminologists and other experts have a trained tendency to underplay the political nature of organised crime by exaggerating the economic and rational motives of the actors involved in criminal networks. The present research attempts to contribute to the sparse body of knowledge that focuses explicitly on the politicised facets of organised crime. The aim of this thesis is to examine the political nature of OC in Greece by focusing on the notions of conflict, power and visibility. But, first we need to deal with some conceptual issues at hand. What do we mean when we talk about Greek organised crime? What is Greek organised crime? How do we know that Greek organised crime exists and how can we study it?

The answer to these questions is ambivalent. On the one hand, the deficit of publicly available sources and the lack of public discourse, suggests that Greek organised crime has very low ‘visibility’ in both Greece and Europe. On the other hand, the situational environment in the country indicates that a serious native organised crime problem must exist. It is exactly this

paradoxical lack of ‘visibility’ that has captured our attention and has motivated this research. Greece is a country where organised crime should flourish, but it does not. Is there a political agenda? Is organised crime in Greece protected? These are valid concerns that emerge when looking at the evidence at hand.

Before the 2001 terrorist attacks in United States, and the subsequent internationalisation of organised crime and terrorism as ‘security problems’, the public debate in Greece seldom perceived organised crime and terrorism as security issues (Hellenic Parliament 2001: 1; Lambropoulou, 2005: 211; Xenakis, 2004). Furthermore, the absence of well known and reputable Greek criminal organisations in the annual reports on organised crime produced by the Greek and European law enforcement authorities, also exposes the invisibility of Greek organised crime (see for example Europol annual reports on organised crime from 1990 to 2005; MPO from 2000 to 2006, OCTA-SEE, 2009; OCTA-Hellenic Contribution, 2009). Evidently, native Greek organised crime is virtually absent from the parliamentary reports and discussions that took place throughout Europe in the last two decades (HAC, 1995, 2008; Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004). Moreover, information from secondary sources is also scarce. Less than a dozen of academic and newspaper articles have been published in the English literature on this topic (Lambropoulou, 2005; Xenakis, 2004; Antonopoulos, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2010; Antonopoulos and Winterdyx 2006, Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010). The fact that native organised crime in Greece has such a low visibility, in our view, constitutes an anomaly or a paradox. Indeed, a comparative investigation across countries with similar cultural, political and economic context with Greece reveals an *anomaly* in the explanations in which native organised crime can emerge (Williams and Godson, 2002; Gambetta, 1993: 75-99). This ‘Greek paradox’ is well captured in a number of contradictions.

First, it seems fairly contradictory that despite the strong geographical, cultural, political and historical connections that Greece has with other

countries/regions with an internationally recognised native organised crime problem, such as Southern Europe, Latin America, the Balkans and the wider Mediterranean region, Greek organised crime rarely appears in the public discourse (Legg and Roberts, 1997: 3, see also: Braudel, 1995a, 1995b). Second, corruption in Greece is perceived to be systematic and endemic at all levels of the government, the public sector as well as in private businesses. Latest data, for instance, shows that Greece ranks fifth in the EU corruption perception index for the year 2008 (Transparency International, 2009: 338-43). Third, the underground economy in Greece has always been thriving. According to a number of studies, it is estimated that Greece (like Italy) has an 'underground economy almost one third as large as the officially measured GNP' (Katsiotis, 2006: 67). Fourth, Greece has one of the strongest left-wing terrorist movements and a rich history of para-state organisations in Europe, indicating a social reality within the country that may nurture other forms of organised deviance, namely organised crime (Europol TE SAT, 2007: 13). Fifth, the geographical location of the country, with the largest coastline and shipping industry in Europe, is also suggestive that illegal trade and smuggling could flourish. Finally, the Greek Diaspora and entrepreneurial networks have been one of the largest and prosperous communities throughout the world that could facilitate the establishment of transnational ties (Panagakos, 2004; Clogg, 1999; Pepelasis-Minoglou, 2005; Harlaftis, 2005). Hence, Greek criminal groups are apparently mostly noticeable in foreign countries, namely in the USA, Canada and Australia, where Greek Diaspora communities are particularly affluent (US v. Iodice, 525 F. 3d 179, 2008: 182; US v. Philip A. Chance, 306 F.3d 356 [6th Cir. 2002]; US v. Anthony Disalvo, US v. Robert F. Simone, 34 F.3d 1204 [3rd Cir. 1994] Pappas: 2009; Moor, 2007).

Consequently, all these contradictions, in our view, create a 'Greek paradox' that logically leads us to pose the following questions: Is there a native organised crime in Greece? If so, why does it remain invisible? What are its causes and manifestations?

The short answer would be that there is native organised crime in Greece and that the reason it remains invisible is because it constitutes a *normal* phenomenon, an obvious part of everyday life. That is to say, it is embedded into the everyday functioning of society and culture as well as in the infrastructure of the economy and the state, and therefore, it is not considered to be a problem. In other words, it is as Greek as the feta cheese, and as normal as olive oil dressing in a Greek salad. However, that is not to say that Greece is a crime-free society. Cases of what can be defined as ‘native organised crime’ emerge in the public domain when excessive violence is employed and/or when Greek authorities receive requests for International cooperation from foreign police forces (mainly from America and the EU). Additionally, when core societal norms are undermined, the role of the media and local communities is central in exposing the workings of native criminal groups (Kyriakopoulos, 2010). This explanation draws on several criminological theories that perceive deviance as a normal behaviour that emerges from everyday routines and practices (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Also, our account is influenced by the work of cultural criminologists, like Sutherland (1941; 1945; 1983) and Sellin (1938), who stress the role of power and cultural conflict in understanding crime and criminality.

The fact that Greek organised crime is ‘invisible’ does not mean that it does not exist. Here, we put forward a holistic explanation suggesting that this lack of visibility is related to the nature and manifestation of OC as an everyday, normal phenomenon. Before moving on, we will first look at how organised crime is defined and discuss a number of competing explanations that may apply in the case of Greece. This information will help us put the research problem we are trying to address, in a more theoretical and conceptual context.

## 1.2 What is organised crime?

### 1.2.1 An essentially contested concept

Any meaningful discussion about the definition of organised crime, should foremost acknowledge that organised crime is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie, 1956). There might be a widespread agreement that organised crime exists, but the way this problem is defined depends heavily on individual and professional predispositions, norms, ideology and motivations that prompted the need for such definition in the first instance. Suffice to say that ‘where one comes out, depends on where one goes in’ (Smith, 1991: 135).

Professor W.B. Gallie originally formulated the notion of ‘essentially contest concepts’, in a lecture given to the Aristotelian Society in 1956 (Gray, 1977: 332). According to Gallie (1956), essentially contested concepts are ‘concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’ (p. 169). Taking as examples the terms ‘work or art’, ‘democracy’ and ‘Christian doctrine’, Gallie shows that these concepts ‘subserve different [...] functions for different schools or movements of artists and critics, for different political groups and parties, for different religious communities and sects’ (p. 168). Disputes about the ‘proper’ use of an ‘essentially contested concept’ cannot be resolved because each party will maintain that their *own* interpretation ‘is the correct or proper or primary, or the only important, function which the term in question can plainly be said to fulfil’ (p. 168). Consequently, ‘disputes over contested concepts, are disputes which in their nature cannot be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone. They are disputes which if they are resolved rationally, must be conducted by a species of argument which has a distinctively philosophical-that is to say, metaphysical-character’ (Grey, 1977: 343).

Organised crime is an ‘essentially contested concept’ on the ground that ‘it has become commonplace to observe that the term “organised crime”, is frequently used but difficult to define’ (Levi, 1998: 335). Since the term was firstly introduced during the Prohibition era of the 1920s into the public discourse (Woodiwiss, 2001; Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009), its definition has sparked a heated debate in both academic and professional circles (Albanese, 2000; Albini, 1971; Block, 1983; Block and Chambliss, 1981; Halstead, 1998; Ianni and Ianni, 1972; Lupsha, 1996; Maltz, 1994, 1976; Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Naylor, 1997, 1993; Potter, 1994; Smith, 1975, 1980, 1978, 1994; Williams and Godson, 2002; Paoli, 2003, 2004). A significant part of the literature deals with the laborious task of defining organised crime. The explanations and rationales put forward regarding the need for a ‘clear’ definition are in our view, *prima facie* evidence of the essentially contested nature of organised crime. The remaining of this section will briefly review some of these explanations.

First, the social and political implications involved in the formation of new crime categories are tremendous, wide-reaching and could not be ignored. For instance, it has been argued that the conflicting images of ‘organised crime’ as proposed by legal scholars, politicians, law enforcement, sociologists, historians, criminologist and journalists, have contributed to a semantic confusion ‘which oscillates dangerously between self-serving myth and radical scepticism’ (Paoli, 2003:3). Moreover, the way organised crime is defined, determines to a great extent, how organised crime is studied and analysed as a phenomenon. Consequently, having a clear and precise definition of the problem ‘is essential to rigorous research, and thus, to clear understanding’ (Cressey 1972: 7). Second, there are also practical and policy related issues to consider. Halstead, for instance argues that ‘the model used by a particular agency, explicitly or implicitly, will be reflected in the work of analysts, whose efforts will determine, at least in part, operational and strategic responses and allocation of resources to addressing the phenomenon [organised crime]’ (1998: 1). Third, given that large sums of money are spent on combating OC, having a definition of the problem



indicates 'how resources should be allocated and how effective they have been expended in attacking it' (Maltz, 1994: 22). Fourth, with a clear definition of the problem, the penal and justice systems become able to distinguish between organised crimes that carry heavier sentences, and other types of organised criminality that are less serious, and therefore, require less severe sentencing (Cressey, 1972: 6-10; Naylor, 1997: 1-6). Similarly, Naylor (1997: 2) points out the necessity to develop typologies that can help us distinguish 'organised' from 'ordinary' criminality. Lastly, the agreement on one definition is vital for the harmonisation of legislation across territorial borders that will work most effectively for prosecuting OC; a problem that is usually cross-border in nature (Halstead, 1998: 1-2).

Consequently, it becomes apparent that definitions should not be taken at face value- they reflect a purpose, consciously or unconsciously, and they 'vary according to their source' (Wright, 2006: 3). For example, a US Justice Department report that reviewed the literature, in order to identify reoccurring problems related to the investigation and prosecution of organised crime, concludes that:

Most often, the content of the definition [of OC] reflects the perspective of the discipline or profession of the author, and different perspectives have led to different definitions. Definitions, too, reflect purpose. To meet varying needs, organized crime may, of course, be quite legitimately defined by members of the same profession in quite different fashions; for example, to limit or expand investigative jurisdiction, create special crimes, or to assess extra punishment for those who engage in certain kinds of criminal behaviour.

(Blakey, Goldstock, and Rogovin, 1978: 3)

Thus, the contestability of 'organised crime' derives primarily from the purpose and motivation that frames any definitional efforts. Having this at

the back of our mind, we now proceed to examine the conceptual struggle involved in the definition of ‘organised crime’. Afterwards, we will sift our attention to the ongoing academic efforts to develop theories and analytical models of organised crime in various parts of the world. Finally, before presenting our holistic model, we will try to expose the conceptual differences and limitations in explaining the Greek Paradox.

### **1.2.2. The problem with semantics: actor vs. activity**

Since the Second World War and following the overthrow of Communism, organised crime is represented in the political, bureaucratic and media discourses as a high priority security problem. There is a general consensus amongst researchers (Maltz, 1976; Halstead, 1998: 1; Levi, 1998: 335; Cohen, 1977: 98), that most definitions of organised crime focus either on the characteristics of a group (structures of association with a focus on offenders), or on the characteristics of the activities (structures of activities with a focus on illicit markets). A recent cross-national review of sixty six (N=66) scholarly publications further support this claim, concluding that: ‘one issue that runs as a common thread through the conceptual debate on organised crime is whether the focal concern should be on structures of activity or structures of association’ (Von Lampe et. al., 2006: 28).

Since the 1950s, the debate over the definition and the causes of ‘organised crime’ has triggered a fruitful theoretical discussion, especially between American academics. In particular, there is an ongoing tension between two schools of thought or paradigms, each one placing a greater emphasis on the *actor* or the *activity*, respectively (Halstead, 1998; Von Lampe et al., 2006; Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Paoli, 2003; Albanese, 2000: 412; Hagan, 2006: 129-31).<sup>1</sup> The point of departure for *actor based models* rests on the idea that the role of ‘foreign’ or ‘deviant’ organisation has a fundamental part in explaining organised crime (Ianni and Ianni, 1972; Albin, 1971,

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<sup>1</sup> Within this broad division there are further tendencies between scholars whose theoretical models place a greater emphasis on the role of culture, economics, politics and organisation.

1975). Within this paradigm, official and government circles have been strong exponents of OC as an ‘alien conspiracy’, imported into a host society by criminal structures originating from foreign lands. Correspondingly, *activity based models* that focus on the structure of activities, maintain that organised crime is a product of market forces. This approach emphasizes the entrepreneurial nature of organised crime and looks closer at its economic determinants (Smith, 1994, 1980, 1978, 1975; Schelling, 1967; Gambetta, 1993). Although the debate now seems to have shifted towards anticipating threats and harms caused by OC, the actors versus activity dilemma, remains relevant.

In addition, a number of scholars claim that the emergence and proliferation of OC definitions derive primarily from the semantic and normative difficulties involved in the process of labelling, categorising and distinguishing the nature or criminal behaviour as well as the severity of their punishment (Maltz, 1976: 339; Cressey, 1967: 106, Naylor, 1997: 2). According to Maltz (1976), the central problem in reaching to a commonly agreed definition is the way in which the idiom ‘organised crime’ has been used by the public and the professional and academic communities over the past years. The former mentioned academic notes that the word “crime” is most often associated with a specific behaviour or act. Besides, common sense suggests that ‘organised crime’ can refer to a specific set of behaviour or act. So, we could conclude that, “OC is a crime that is organized” (1976: 339). However, this definition is a *tautology*, regarded in formal logic as empty, or vacuous of any factual or empirical content (Tomassi, 1999: 142). Accordingly, it has no further analytical utility and therefore cannot serve as an empirical definition (Schelling, 1984: 180, Maltz, 1994: 25, Allum, 2006; Wright, 2006: 2-3). In order to eschew this tautology, ‘when we talk of organised crime in the generic sense we usually refer not to a set of behaviours but to an entity, a group of (unspecified) people, a disease, a bogeyman’ (Maltz, 1979: 339). This semantic problem has created tension, or an analytical dilemma, between the activities and the behaviours that should be defined as organised crime.

The characteristics of organised crime groups as recorded in the academic literature are shown in Table 1. The list below is indicative of the most commonly mentioned group characteristics included in ‘academic’ perspectives. Different legal systems have different characteristics that may define a criminal organisation.

**Table 1.1** Characteristics commonly cited in the English literature on OC

Characteristics	Number of Authors
Organized hierarchy	15
continuing	
Rational profit through	12
crime	
Use of force or threat	11
Corruption to maintain	11
immunity	
Public demand for	6
services	
Monopoly over particular	5
market	
Restricted membership	3
Non-ideological	3
Specialization	3
Code of Secrecy	3
Extensive planning	2

Source: Taken from Albanese, 2000: 412

Subsequently, the characteristics of the activities that define ‘organised crime’ are subject to a continuous revision and expansion from criminal law. Cybercrime, for one, is one example. A cross-national survey produced a list of the activities most commonly discussed by researchers in relation to ‘organised crime’. A summary of the illegal activities recorded in the literature is provided in Table 2.

**Table 1.2** Most commonly cited crime activities in the literature

<b>Types of Crime</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>%</b>
Drugs	53	80.3
Fraud: all	39	59.1
Fraud: private funds (incl. credit card fraud, investment fraud, insurance)	31	47
Fraud: public funds (incl. health care fraud, VAT fraud, subsidy fraud)	24	36.4
Extortion (incl. racketeering, kidnapping)	29	43.9
Property crimes (incl. theft, burglary, robbery)	25	37.9
Sex industry (incl. illegal prostitution, pimping, illegal pornography)	24	36.4
Money laundering	23	34.8
Cars (incl. theft, trafficking)	22	33.3
Smuggling (incl. alcohol, cigarettes, fuel, gold, currency, gemstones)	22	33.3
Human trafficking	21	31.8
Arms	18	27.3
Gambling	17	25.8
Economic crime (excl. fraud and money laund., illegal labour, price fixing)	16	24.2
Environment (incl. poaching, illegal waste management)	16	24.2
Alien smuggling	13	19.7
Counterfeiting	13	19.7
Product piracy	9	13.6
Fencing	8	12.1
False documents/forgery	7	10.6
Forgery	4	6.1
Load sharking	4	6.1
Art/cultural property	3	4.5
Bootlegging	3	4.5
Nuclear material	3	4.5
Steroids/hormones	3	4.5

Source: Lampe et al, 2006: 33-34.

Consequently, it appears that among the academic literature, a definition of ‘organised crime’, is very wide and captures a large number of activities and actors that may be involved in serious criminal activities. These activities and actors can be further expanded, including groups with political motives that nevertheless, participate in illegal activities. So, anything from white-

collar crime to state organised crime to terrorism could fit under the umbrella term ‘organised crime’.

As it was suggested in the previous section, organised crime is an essentially contested concept. The disputes that may arise over what consists organised crime and the opposite could not be solved by appeal to empirical evidence (Grey, 1997: 343). So the question remains: how can we best understand and study this phenomenon? The next section reviews the academic literature and offers a mental map of the major works based on the notion of *metaphors*. The logic behind our choice to categorise the literature according to metaphors is fairly simple. In our everyday life we use metaphors and analogies to explain, understand and gain new knowledge about complex ideas and processes. Here we will try to make sense of a fluid and contested concept such as “organised crime” by drawing metaphors with something more tangible, concrete and hopefully less contested concepts.

### 1.3 Competing metaphors

Organised crime can be interpreted through different prisms and theoretical lenses (Williams and Godson, 2002; Halstead, 1998; Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Potter, 1994). Overall, we have identified four core hypotheses/metaphors put forward by scholars to explain the various dimensions of organised crime and mafia phenomena. As it is demonstrated in Table 3, each thesis is composed by at least four different conceptual elements that are central in understanding organised crime: origin, structure, interaction and control.

First, the weak state thesis, suggest that weak and/or failed states provide safe heavens for the emergence of mafia-like groups that supply goods and services that the state is not capable of providing. When the state cannot or is not willing to provide goods and services, criminal groups tent to fill that

vacuum replacing the role of the State. We use the ‘organised crime as a state’ metaphor to better understand this situation.

**Table 1.3** Overview of theoretical concepts and metaphors

Theses	Origin	Structure	Systemic Cooperation	Systemic Conflict
<b>Metaphor 1</b> Organised crime as a state	Transformation; exchange; dispute settlement	Firms	Parasitic	State emancipation; formal control; law and order
<b>Metaphor 2</b> Illicit enterprise	Transformation; interconnectedness	Transnational Networks	Predatory	International regulation, prohibition and cooperation
<b>Metaphor 3</b> Dirty culture	Tradition; Archaic codes and culture; patronage	Families; clans; clientalist networks	Symbiotic	Civil Society; informal control
<b>Metaphor 4</b> State as organised crime	Capitalist economy	Systems	Fusion	Political agenda and interests

Source: Author’s own elaboration

Second, the globalist thesis, stresses the benefits and opportunities created for transnational criminal groups by the ever-expanding global trade and ever-increasing free flow of capital, goods, ideas and people. Third, a more socio-cultural perspective is provided by the ‘dirty culture’ thesis. Communities that are often defined by a general tendency towards lawlessness, host within their value system traces of dirty cultural underpinnings that provide an important incubator for the growth of criminal groups. Critical dimensions of ‘dirty culture’ thesis appear to be the archaic codes and the normative structure of the social system that facilitate the emergence of patron-client relations, family and kinship ties, as well as informal exchange networks. Additionally, issues of trust and suspicion of outsiders, and other codes of secrecy and revenge, are important dimension of this thesis. Fourth, the ‘enemy within’ thesis is a critical approach that looks at esoteric threats vested in the political economy of the capitalist system. Rather than perceiving organised crime as an alien entity or phenomenon, scholars from this tradition often take note of the symbiotic links between legality and illegality, arguing that the real threat is from within the advanced capitalist systems and the nation state. The

understanding of the crimes of the powerful, such as, white-collar crime and state organised crime is of crucial importance within this research tradition. The review of the four theses will add the notion of metaphors that we think improves the explanatory power of each thesis.

### **1.3.1 The ‘organised crime as a state’ metaphor**

Thomas Schelling’s (1967, 1984) approach to organised crime is considered by many scholars as the reference point in the subsequent development of the ‘weak state’ hypothesis (Allum and Sands, 2004: 134). The point of departure in Schelling’s analysis is the notion that organised crime, works on the same economic principles as legitimate enterprises. In particular, he argues that a distinction should be made between the large number of well-organised criminal organisations that operate within any illegal market, and the real ‘organised crime’, composed by firms that seek to govern, control, monopolize and protect that economic structure of the underworld. Acting like ‘criminal government’, mafia groups attempt to exert a monopoly over the provision of illegal protection, within a given territory (see also: Hill, 2003:8-10; Gambetta, 1993:31,226-8). It is worth noting that Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995) summarise the core assumptions in Schelling’s argument as follows:

Schelling’s argument is built in two distinct logical steps. First, it is argued that the very notion of organised crime brings in itself an idea of ‘exclusivity, or to use a more focused term, [of] monopoly’ [...] the very core of the business of criminal organisation is to acquire a rule-making role in a given area (be it geographical or economic) so as to levy taxes and impose regulations over legitimate and/or illicit businesses [...] Second, the rule-making role necessarily requires the organised use of violence, either through threat or actions [...] to impose a monopoly of violence over a given area.

(Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1995: 4)



Applying these economic principles to a broader and comparative empirical perspective, it has been argued that organised crime is more likely to develop in countries where the institutional environment is weak and corrupted. In such countries, criminal groupings or 'firms' will emerge to fill the 'protection vacuum' caused by the lack of an accountable hierarchical authority, and thereby establish favourable conditions for the subsequent development of serious organised crime (Thoumi, 1995; Gambetta, 1993; Varese, 2001; Hill, 2003; Tzvetkova, 2010). This thesis claims that the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism can be illustrated with the representative cases of Southern Italy, Japan and in parts of China. In particular, the model that Gambetta created to explain the Sicily mafia has been very influential. A major transformation of the economic structure in Sicily, at the beginning of the 19th century, created the supply of two commodities, private property and manpower. Adding to this, the absence of an institutional framework to deal with dispute settlement on one hand, and the excessive supply of *bravi* on the other, created fertile market conditions for an organisation to surface and 'sell' protection. Additionally, this economic theory has gained further empirical support and strength with the subsequent fading of the Communist ideology in Europe. In the cases of Russia, Albania and Bulgaria the need for extra legal protection that was met by a supplying apparatus has shown that the economic theory seems to match with the available evidence (Varese, 2001; Tzvetkova, 2010).

### **1.3.2 The 'illicit enterprise' metaphor**

By comparison, the illicit enterprise metaphor maintains that over the past years, the nature of mafias and organised crime has changed due to global changes in the political, economic and technological structures. Increasingly, organised crime is perceived as a lucrative global illicit enterprise, run by networked entrepreneurs who are motivated by both power and financial gains (Sterling, 1994; Freemantle, 1995; Saviano, 2007; Glenny, 2008). From this perspective, organised crime is often seen as 'the

continuation of business through illegal means (Williams, 2006: 195). Moreover, the growth of global financial infrastructures that ‘consist of a finance system that links nation-states, huge banks, and their correspondents (affiliates and subsidiaries) with brokerage houses, stock markets, and investment and currency portfolios in a system that operates twenty-four hours a day’, provide more opportunities for mixing dirty and clean money (Kelly et al., 2005: 7). Likewise, ‘ill’ gotten profits can be circulated all over the planet via the global financial system that afterwards, can be used with impunity. In short, globalisation had a tremendous impact in both the activities and the structure of groups that now operate as horizontal networks (Williams, 1998).

The nature of crime has changed significantly in a single generation. Just 20 years ago, crime was organized in a hierarchy of operations. It was “industrial” in that it contained the division of labour and the specialization of operations. This structure extended internationally, as organized crime mirrored the business world. Then, just as it happened in the business world, the vertical and horizontal hierarchies of organized crime dissolved into a large number of loosely connected networks. Each node within a network would be involved in any number of licit and illicit operations. Networked systems spanned the globe. An event in one place might have a significant impact on the other side of the world. In short, crime became globalized. Organized crime involves the illicit flow of goods and services in one direction and the flow of the proceeds of crime in the other. Just as the business world has benefited from globalization, so has organized crime.

(Aguilar-Millan et al., 2008:42)

### 1.3.3 The ‘dirty culture’ metaphor

According to Williams and Godson (2002), sociological explanations consider the cultural basis of organised crime and deal with the important notions of trust, bonding, social perceptions and attitudes in the formation of criminal networks. So, whereas the rational explanations proposed by the previous metaphors focus on the opportunities and market dynamics that empower criminal structures, socio-cultural explanations ‘focus on the grass-roots level, the cultural conditions that encourage and facilitate criminality, as well as the way in which crime is actually organized’ (2002: 328). Traditional cultural systems, such as those found in the Balkans and in the greater Mediterranean region, that put certain ‘codes of honour’ like omerta, revenge and turf protection above the law, are more likely to facilitate the growth of criminal organisations. Besides, family ties and clan relationships as well as patron-client networks have been central in exposing the socio-cultural origins and manifestations of organised crime (Ianni and Ianni, 1979). Block (1998), who draws his analysis of the Mafia from this approach, explains:

Formulated through patron-client cliques and coalitions, organised crime is a system composed of under- and underworld individuals in complicated relations of reciprocity. [...] The historical development of organized crime as a social system is fairly well known. In the United States it was created from the entrepreneurial politics of the nineteenth century, which through patronage, controlled criminal justice institutions; from the actions and activities of industrial “Robber Barons” fearful of labor agitators; and from the successful agitations of Temperance groups. Professional criminals provided services for politicians, particularly at election time, and for Robber Barons as “agent provocateurs” and strikbreakers. They also manufactured and/or distributed commodities outlawed by

moral reformers. Naturally they received protection from criminal justice, and often a great deal of money in return.

(Block, 1998: 4-5)

In simple terms, the cultural approach challenges the theory that views OC as a market by demonstrating the analytical relevance of institutions, interpersonal networks, tradition and learning (Allum and Sanders, 2004; Allum, 2005). It is indicative that societies known to have mafias, also have unique esoteric cultural codes and values, such as kinship trust, vendetta, revenge and a much wider leniency towards lawlessness. However, the cultural model fails to take into account the role of power within society. In such cases, controlling organised crime comes from grassroots movements as well as from the wider civil society, and often necessitates pioneering educational and cultural projects that will foster reformations against these well established, archaic cultural codes.

#### **1.3.4 The 'state as organised crime' metaphor**

Contrary to the belief that organised crime and/or the mafia is an external threat to society, the 'enemy within' thesis states that the real organised crime is the very same social, political and economic system that has set the anti- organised crime agenda; that is to say, the nation-state.

The nation state that has set the organized crime control agenda has a long history of protecting and sometimes even encouraging organized criminal activity [...] the systematic criminal activity of the powerful and the respectable - or those on their way to power and respectability-in those societies, both ancient and early modern, that we usually associate with the centre of 'civilized' development. From earliest times, landlords, merchants, and holders of administrative and executive power have used the relative immunity that their

status gave them to engage in or sponsor activity that today would be described as organized crime.

(Woodiwiss, 2001:6)

A central theme in this theoretical perspective is the notion that with the development of capitalist economies a large number of organised crime activities, such as piracy, smuggling, extortion, fraud, labour slave and murder, are part of the history of virtually every nation and empire'. Moreover, Charles Tilly (1985), tracing back the history and development of the nation states, provides similar assumptions regarding the links between the state and organised crime. Tilly notes that 'predation, coercion, piracy, banditry, and racketeering share a home with their upright cousins in responsible government' (1985: 175). More specifically, he explains that:

The uncertain, elastic line between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" violence appeared in the upper reaches of power. Early in the state-making process, many parties shared the right to use violence, its actual employment, or both at once. The long love-hate affair between aspiring state makers and pirates or bandits illustrates the division. "Behind piracy or the seas acted cities and city-states," writes Fernand Braudel of the sixteenth century. "Behind banditry, that terrestrial piracy, appeared the continual aid of lords." In times of war, indeed, the managers of full-fledged states often commissioned privateers, hired sometime bandits to raid their enemies, and encouraged their regular troops to take booty. In royal service, soldiers and sailors were often expected to provide for themselves by preying on the civilian population: commandeering, raping, looting, taking prizes. When demobilized, they commonly continued the same practices, but without the same royal protection; demobilized ships became pirate vessels, demobilized troops bandits.

(Tilly, 1985: 173)

The 'enemy within' thesis shares indeed, many similarities with the 'weak state' and the 'dirty culture' theses. In the past, it seems that political and economic elites engaged in mafia-like activities and shared many of the 'dirty' norms that are now perceived as backward and uncivil. The issue appears to be the protection of the political order, irrespectively of the ethical nature of that order. Moreover, Andreas and Nadelmann's (2006) historical evidence reveal that the formation of the first transnational policing networks, that began taking shape towards the second part of the nineteenth century in Europe, 'focused principally on the transnational mobility of professional criminals and anarchists (and other political agitators)' (p. 60). Therefore, what has now become a fight against the 'uncivil' society seems to boil down to a new kind of war with strong political goals.

Naylor (1995) argues that it is not clear that 'organised crime', in the form advocated by the state authorities, is the 'most pressing criminal problem facing the West' (p. 50). Nevertheless, he points out that the main threat against the social and economic fabric of western society may actually come from two different directions: white-collar crime and from a general deterioration of social attitudes.

Still, as a social threat, the seriousness of current crime is not in question [...]. However, what is in question is the precise nature of the threat and therefore the usefulness of some of the practical measures –criminalization of association, civil-law based asset forfeiture, expanded domestic intelligence, international paramilitary action ect – being advocated in many countries of the West in response to it. [...]. Granted sometimes 'organized crime' groups are involved in bank fraud, securities swindles and corporate embezzlement. But the vast majority of such instances, involving by far the greatest amount of financial losses, are the work of individuals or small groups with no

relationship whatsoever to traditional or emergent 'organized crime'. Mob-run penny stock swindles are pittance in comparison to the take from huge insider-trading schemes [...].

(Naylor, 1995:50-1)

The core issue in the 'enemy within' thesis is the moral relativity with which scholars have approached issues of legality and illegality. There is a plethora of empirical evidence suggesting that the lines between legal and illegal practices are blurring (Heyman, 1999).

However, are these explanations applicable in the case of Greece? The answer is ambivalent and contradictory. From one side, models that focus on the structure of organised crime, such as those presented here, are indeed relevant to the research question presented in the introduction of this thesis. Both the 'dirty culture' and the 'enemy within' (State as organised crime) theses have a tendency to view organised crime as a normal product of everyday life with strong political characteristics. Yet, they are both reductionist, in their scope and in their conception, of the human nature. Social interaction and organisation emerge from simple rules of behaviour related to symbolism, culture, norms, codes of conduct, and complex patterns of group behaviours, which cannot be condensed in their simple components in the same way a tree forest, cannot be reduced to a handful of seeds. There must be additional factors involved in the shaping of the final observed outcome that we define as 'organised crime'. On the other hand, economic models subscribe to the same reductionist logic. There is no doubt that organised crime is driven by market forces created by structural contradictions, asymmetries and conflicts (Passas, 1993; 1994; 1998). It makes sense to argue that organised crime is becoming more globalised, as the everyday context has also been changing. However, besides the rational economic logic that people may or may not follow, there are additional rules that actors adopt, and follow mechanically in the everyday context. This leads us back to the role of culture and social structure that until now, the economic models seem not to have addressed adequately. The proposed

thesis requires a more dialectical and complex analytical framework. More specifically, in order to capture the complexity of the everyday context, ideational, esoteric, cultural drives as well as exoteric, materialistic and systemic forces should also be taken into account. In the next section, we provide a holistic model that we think represents best our view of organised crime as an everyday politicised phenomenon.

## **1.4 A Holistic framework of analysis**

In our view, the lack of native organised crime in Greece constitutes a paradox. The aim of this project is to address this paradox and gain a better understanding of the phenomenon, both in Greece and in general. We do not attempt here to explicitly test an existing theory or evaluate an established definition, since research in Greece is practically non-existence. Nevertheless, there are some variables worth exploring in order to develop a meaningful answer to our research question (Diagram 1.1).

First, systemic forces linked to the establishment, formation and development of the Greek states are considered. Such forces have the power to create and instigate conflicts within society that and are critical for exposing the origins of organised crime in the country.

Second, emphasis is given to the role of structure, organisation and critical infrastructure that facilitates criminal activities. It is evident that despite the theoretical debate (or in the case of Greece the lack of it), organised crime is indeed ‘organised’. In order for a group of people to engage in activities broadly defined as ‘organised crime’, human resources, social, political and economic capital are required. In practical terms, we are seeking to identify the structures used by criminal groups and the nature of their interpersonal relations.

Third, the role of culture is considered. We have already argued that any meaningful analysis of social action should take into consideration the role of social structure as a set of rules that people follow, often mechanically. In




our case, we are interested in those rules that might trigger conflicts within society, especially in relation to state formation. Thus, in order to explore the role of norms and culture we will search for evidence suggesting that OC is 'acceptable' within the wider social system. In particular, we will look for data suggesting that the economic, social and political systems are cooperating with groups defined by law, as criminal organisations. Moreover, we will search for evidence supporting the opposite side of the coin. Official records indicate that the law enforcement authorities prosecute some organised crime groups. Here, the question is why them and not others.

Sociological research has shown that there is a positive correlation between social trust and deviant behaviour (Halpern, 2001). The issue of trust (or the lack of trust) has also been central to the development of organised crime theory (Gambetta, 1994; Veresse, 2005: 23, 187; Veresse, 2010; Denton and O'Malley, 1999; Von Lampe and Johansen, 2004; Kleemans and Van De Bunt, 1999; Maltz, 1976; 1994). Overall, lack of interpersonal trust and stagnation of social capital indicates a negative attitude towards society that in turn, may weaken the moral strength and compromise society's organisation against crime (Shaw and McKay, 1942). It could be that low levels of interpersonal and institutional trust, lead to low social capital, force people to act in accordance to their personal needs, motives and interests whilst employing all available harmful, anti-social, illegal means in order to achieve these individualistic ends. Societies and communities that experience this condition may tend to tolerate illegal and anti-social behaviour and therefore, undermine important mechanisms of informal social control. Hence, deviant behaviour and a general disregard of rules, laws and regulations might become the norm. Coleman (1998: 98) notes that: 'Social capital is defined by its functions. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspects of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors whether persons or corporate actors-within the structure.' Additionally, trust is a significant element for social capital (Fukuyama, 1995; Dasgupta and

Serageldin, 1999). High levels of social trust indicate people's ability to work together on a voluntary basis in order to achieve common goals and objectives. By all means, interpersonal trust, presupposes trust towards formal institutions related to centres of power such as the police, judiciary, education system, and political institutions to name a few. The more trust among a group, the more likely to work together for the common good. Thus, a higher social capital, will predict a stronger organisation of society against crime. However, the human agency that is required for establishing a strong civil society and elevated interpersonal trust is triggered by people's perceptions, attitudes, culture and values. To put it simple, people should believe in the idea and have confidence in the outcomes that interpersonal trust might produce for the next generations. Additionally, in order to achieve this confidence, people should have confidence in outcomes produced by long run strategies and be characterized by patience and lack of short term goals. When the culture of a social system does not support this voluntaristic approach towards social organisation, it is very likely that the agency that brings into existence this reality will also be deficient.

**Diagram 1.1** A Holistic conceptual model



Source: Author's own elaboration

## 1.5 Methodology and data


The analytical model is applied into three different criminal systems/networks involving criminal groups that are based and operate mainly in Athens that nevertheless, have international contacts and networks. In order to gather data and evaluate the strength and the explanatory power of the existing theories of organised crime, the case study method was used. A number of factors were considered for selecting this method. In particular, the case study method allows the researcher to gather data from a variety of sources and throughout different historical periods (Yin, 2003). Given that organised crime is a very secretive and relatively new phenomenon, it is very difficult to apply most of the convenient sociological research methods.

Also, Yin (2003) notes that a case study seems more appropriate a research strategy, in the case where ‘*how* or *why* questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context’ (p. 1). Indeed, organised crime is by definition a secret phenomenon that ‘precludes the use of many, if not all of the usual instruments for gathering data’ (Kelly, 1982: 220).

Additionally, an important element for the selection of the case method was its comparative nature. The case analysis allows the comparison between empirical evidence from various criminal and terrorist groups that consequently, lead to the development of stronger analytical tools and theories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). However, it is widely acknowledged that the use of case studies in the social inquiry has serious limitations, linked to the selective nature of the examples (cases). Subsequently, there is an argument in relation to the extent to which a limited number of examples can produce sound conclusions when studying complex human affairs. In defence of the case study methodology, it has been argued that the application of case studies ‘may be epistemologically in harmony with the reader’s experience and thus to that person a natural basis for

generalization' (Stake, 1978: 5). Since crime is a subjective phenomenon, constructed by the penal law, that reflects specific norms and ethics within a given legal-political system (Chambliss, 1979; Moskos, 2008), we believe that the reader's experience should also be taken into account when explanations are provided. In any case, this method has been widely used by many OC scholars (Potter, 1994; Chambliss, 1979; Thoumi, 1995; Gambeta, 1993; Varese, 2001; Hill, 2003; Tzvetkova, 2010; Allum, 2005). The criteria for selecting the case studies were the degree of visibility and exposure to the media and law enforcement interference. In Figure 1.2 we provide the rationale for selecting the cases. At the core of the figure the reader will find groups, networks and communities whose workings rarely appear in legal proceedings. In simple words the groups at the core have impunity from the law. As we move at the outer layers of the circles we encounter communities with a high level of exposure and visibility to both the penal law but also to the public and political discourse.

**Diagram 1.2** Cases and visibility circles



Source: Author's own elaboration

The selection of Greece, as the country of investigation was based on the paradoxical nature of the lack of reported native organised crime, considering that many of the neighbouring countries have developed such

illegal groupings. Historically, Greece is a country with a strong tradition in liberal/radical thinking and activism where social struggles, revolution, anarchy and disobedience to western norms and authority are widespread. The geographical, economic and cultural connectivity of the country with many non-Western, as well as Western regions, are some of the key attributes that have supported our selection of this case study. Legg and Roberts (1997) explain, for example, that:

The political history of Greece in the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century-with “revolutions”, dynastic change, and general governmental instability- set the country apart from most other western European states. More recently, the military interlude of the late 1960s and early 1970s cast doubt on the contemporary classification of Greece as “European Country”. In fact, on many economic, social and political indicators during the 1960s and 1970s, Greece looked more like the Latin America states, many of which had also gained political independence in the early nineteenth century but remained relatively underdeveloped in economic terms.

(Legg and Roberts, 1997: 3).

Although Greece is a relatively small country (11 million), its geography and location in the Balkans and the Mediterranean has been a key factor in fostering multiculturalism, and ethnic and cultural diversity. The Ottoman rule, as well as the Greece’s Orthodox heritage had a detrimental effect on people’s political culture and identity. Greece was practically isolated from the most significant world movements such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment and the French and Industrial Revolutions. It is worth noting that institutions such as localism, patronage networks, clientelistic relations, syndicalism and a general distrust against authority are very prominent characteristics of Greekness (Clogg, 2002: 3). Moreover, tax evasion and smuggling are, by

far, the most serious instances that illuminate the weakness of the Greek state to impose a cultural hegemony. Even to this regard, the laws and controlling mechanisms change each time the party in power changes. The view that organised criminality, such as social theft, piracy, smuggling and protection, is a form of primitive social movement by sub-state actors, has been adopted by a number of Greek social historians, particularly in the historical, socio-political and economic context of the previous century, indicating that Greece is a representative example (Dermentzopoulos, 2000: 85; 2001; Damianakos, 2003: 68).

Adding to this, the Greek educational system has always been struggling to achieve its goals and objectives. Synergies between political parties and teachers' syndicalist organisation as well as a poor record of public funds have contributed, to almost yearly reforms and changes in the educational level, particularly in relation to university entry examinations. Nonetheless, Greek Universities have also been greatly affected from the constant political changes, revolutions and counter-revolutions on a political level. It could be argued, that even at the present times, the Greek state is struggling to control and exercise political influence over Universities. As a result, the higher educational system is defined by three core characteristics: over-bureaucratization of activities, related to pressure and control from the state; competition in order to gain political merits and political capital rather than cultural and intellectual achievements; and introversion and isolation from its external environment (Mouzelis, 1997). Hence, the problem with the educational reform leads back to the issue of cultural norms and attitudes towards the clientalistic mentality of the public, cultivated by the political system itself.

These historical, political and socio-cultural forces and the weakness of the Greek state to achieve cultural hegemony, have contributed greatly to the formation of various counter movements within the Greek society. Since, at least, the creation of the Greek state in 1821, two interlinked manifestations of such counter-hegemonic movements have captured the public's attention

and imagination: left wing terrorist groups and social theft (Dermentzopoulos, 2000; Damianakos, 2003). The line between crime and 'terrorism' has never been clearly distinguishable. In particular, the theory that organised crime and terrorism are interlined phenomena has always been expressed by the political establishment. Furthermore, the way law-makers have legislated on these two issues also demonstrates how strong the belief, that those two are a similar or overlapping phenomena, is (Allum and Kostakos, 2010; Xenakis, 2004).

Per contra, the most recent presidential degrees against organised crime attempt to provide a more globalist perspective of the problem. The idea that organised crime is something new and imported by the forces of globalisation is evident in the following opening statement issues by the Greek Parliament, in support of the harmonisation of Greek law to international standards.

It is now common knowledge that organised crime has become a major threat to our society. Over the past years, it is commonly accepted that criminality has undergone a qualitative change. The traditional image of the 'common thief' has been replaced by the organised perpetrator, the entrepreneurial-criminal; and crime has become from a chiefly individualist behaviour to a profitable enterprise with an organised structure and with additional people each one having responsibilities within a clear division of labour. These criminal organisations are also increasingly using advanced technological methods for the growth of their activities. Usually, these criminal organisations do not operate only with national borders, but engage in cross border activities and operate as transnational corporations. Organized crime is not only a challenge to its immediate victims, but it also undermines social cohesion, erodes institutions and undermines the rule of law especially when the perpetrators escape justice.

The control of this phenomenon has captured the interest of the international community [...]. The pick of this international cooperation was the United Nations Declaration against Transnational Organized Crime, signed by 120 states in December 2000 in Palermo, Italy.

(Hellenic Parliament, 2001: 1)

The official Greek view on organised is in line with the globalist thesis, and focuses primarily on structured groups. That is to say, on groups with an organisation that can provide some degree of continuity and duration. Although, the issue of terrorism is not explicitly mentioned in the document, there has been some criticism, especially from the Communist party and other leftish parties, who voted against this decree, on the ground that it targets social movements. These issues in our view make the study of Greek organised crime exceptionally interesting, not to repeat that the existing literature on the topic is inexistent.

## **1.6 Sources and data**

A key strength of the case-study method is the relative freedom to synthesize from various sources, using a range of data collection instruments (Yin, 2003). An exhaustive list of sources has been consulted for this thesis. Yet, where does information about organised crime come from? Are there any consequences and limitations involved? Kelly (1982: 220) comments that most information about organised crime available to law enforcement agencies and academics, comes from two main sources: participants and eavesdropping devices. Here, we could probably expand this list by also considering the identity of the 'participant'. Therefore, we could also identify sources of written or oral statements that derive from: family witnesses, victims, surveillance officers, unnamed informants, paid informants, turncoats, undercover officers, journalists, ethnographers.



There are a number of implications associated with these primary sources. First, the social scientist often relies on secondary, tertiary accounts or hearsay, while it is not permissible to perform independent checks on the validity and reliability of the source data. Furthermore, official sources have internal biases. Chambliss (1971), for instance, notes the bureaucratic, legal-political and personal biases presented in police documents, distort the image of organised crime. Also, Moskos' (2009) research is indicative of the degree to which official data can be altered depending on the way crime has been policed. Moreover, a vicious circle is created that maintains these official biases, since most social scientists draw their information from the same 'primary' and secondary sources (Kelly, 1982: 221; Chambliss, 1971). Second, official investigations are anthropocentric (focus on crime and criminal) and therefore, often ignore the wider complicity of upper-world structures and networks that are not directly visible from a limited investigation. In addition to that, there are time constraints, limited resources and political interference that may have an impact on the way cases of organised crime are portrayed by the authorities (Saxionis, 2006; Cressey, 1967).

For this study the following data collection techniques were consulted: Statistical indexes (since 1928), court files, police files, phone interception transcripts, participatory observation, interviews, surveys, election results archives, newspaper archives (since 1900), historical archives, official reports, special reports. Our additional sources include, journalistic accounts, leaked documents containing personal conversation from police surveillance, police reports and other special reports. Additionally, the author conducted a number of informal and unstructured interviews with actors from both sides of the law (see appendix 1 and bibliography). More specifically, interviews were conducted with police analysts and officers from all ranks who had first-hand knowledge on the three case studies examined. Furthermore, professionals, businessmen and civilians related to the shipping and/or night economy were also interviewed. Also, a number of field visits to a prison near Athens took place, in order to interview prison

guards and inmates. In addition, interviews were conducted with people who have been directly related with such criminal activities. Moreover,, interview material from such actors was also collected from open sources, such as personal blogs, publications, and publicised interviews (see appendix 1).

Against this backdrop, a number of scholars turned to ethnography and used participatory observation as a method to gain access to fresh and original information from the 'streets'. However, Kelly (1982) argues, that the application of such methodologies, may entail significant data manipulation, especially when statements about the design of the study is 'little more than laudable sentiments disguised in the language of science' (p. 221). As a result, ideological and emotional biases become enveloped into the research effort. From this research, it was found that overt participant observation, especially in a relatively small capital, like Athens, is extremely challenging and poses security and ethical considerations. To begin with, the very notion that a criminal group will open its ranks to an external researcher seems contradictory. One will have to question the motives and the agenda of the criminal group that would allow for such collaboration. For instance, it could be the case that a criminal informant could use the researcher as a way of establishing more power and prestige. In any case, we need to consider what the 'criminal' could gain for talking and what he/she will tell (content). In short, there can be no agreement that the subject (i.e. criminal) participating in the research project would collaborate for ethical reasons only. Conversely, forming bonds of trust and friendship ties with criminal groups, could give power to the researcher, who is not only a player within a competitive academic market, but also a member of an organised crime network. Therefore, ethical and professional concerns should be examined. For instance, to what extent is the researcher willing to take a risk and facilitate or participate in criminal activities in order to gain or retain the trust of the group? This ethical issue should be considered in parallel with the ideological predisposition and emotions involved with 'open air research' (Kelly, 1982: 222).

From another point of view, covert observations seem more applicable for gaining an anecdotal perspective of the ‘inside’ reality of the matter. Spending time in places (bars, cafes, strip clubs, ghettos), where organised crime is visible, can indeed provide valuable information to the researcher. Additionally, informal conversations could provide, indirectly, fresh insight that could not emerge via conventional data gathering techniques.

## **1.7 The organisation of the thesis**

The first part of the next chapter provides an overview of the historical evolution of what can be labelled as ‘organised crime’ phenomena in Greece, starting from the early days of the ancient Greek city-states to the rise and influence of the Ottoman Empire through the Greek region. Following that, the part of the chapter will investigate the contemporary political, economic and socio-cultural environments of Greece (Chapter 2). The following three chapters are case studies of criminal communities in Greece that exhibit different levels of visibility and social power. The first case study of a criminal community to be analysed in the thesis is the ‘Godfathers of the night’. This is a castellation of a large number of sub-groups that engage in a large number of night-life activities including murder, drugs, prostitution, extortion and smuggling (Chapter 3). Due to the nature of this community, we think that their visibility and social power is neither strong nor particularly low. The second community to be analysed, the ‘Cocaine Barons’, is composed mainly by actors from the shipping community. Those actors with high social power and low visibility are mainly involved in high-level cocaine smuggling to Greece, but also participate in other smuggling activities, including large bulk transportation of cocaine from Latin America to Europe (Chapter 4). The third community/network labelled the ‘Urban Guerrillas’ consists of revolutionary organisations (terrorist groups), traditionally with high visibility and low social power, that participate in bank robberies, theft, arsons, bombings and assassinations of local and foreign figures from the

political, intellectual and business establishment (Chapter 5). Consequently, an attempt to synthesise and discuss the empirical evidence will be made, particularly on the origins, the structure, interactions and the formal control of the groups examined (Chapter 6). Finally the concluding chapter will provide a short summery of the key findings of this project and will provide recommendations for future research (Chapter 7).

## Chapter 2: Setting the scene: culture, society and the State

Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a large scale? What are criminal gangs but petty kingdoms?

St. Augustine [1467] (2003): 139

### 2.1 Introduction

The key goal in this project is to expose and understand the political facet of organised crime in Greece. The explanation put forward in this thesis is that Greek organised crime emerges from the convergence of political, cultural and social forces. Drawing on a variety of empirical sources, ranging from historical documents to public surveys and official statistics, the aim of this chapter is to provide a more detailed examination of the key socio-political and economic factors relevant for understanding the nature and political aspects of OC in the country. In the first section, the chapter provides a historical background discussion of the evolution of the Greek State. Consequently, we map out the values of the Modern Greek cultural system, and expose the deviant aspect and ‘dirty’ codes of conduct that we believe are relevant for explaining the characteristics of native organised crime. In the conclusion of this chapter we will revisit the ‘everyday’ dimensions and ‘Greekness’ organised crime that in our view apply in the case of Greece.

### 2.2 The Greek State

Organised crime is a political phenomenon and with this research we hope to expose the power relations that underpin organised crime in the case of Greece. A critical aspect in our explanation is that the formation, emancipation and development of the Greek State, instigates conflicts and opportunities for illegal activities. The weaker the ability of the State to

achieve control and monopolistic hegemony, the greater the opportunities and incentives of the people to cheat and deviate from ill-imposed norms. Moreover, the weakness of the Greek State does not only indicate that prohibition and control regimes will create opportunities and new criminal markets (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006), but it also suggests that public resources, deriving from taxation and external loans, will be misused for gaining personal political and economic benefits. For these reasons, the nature, structure and development of the state require significant attention. However, what is the origin of the Greek State?

Tracing the origin of political organization in Greece entails a number of conceptual problems regarding the periodization of the history of the Greek State. Although the modern Greek State gained *de jure* sovereignty and recognition by the international community in the 1830s, the issue of 'historical continuity' has puzzled scholars and political historians for a number of years (Clogg, 2002: 2-3). Is the modern Greek State a continuation of the ancient socio-political groupings that inhabited Hellas centuries ago? Where does the history of the Hellenic (Greek) state begin? A leading contemporary Greek historian, Kostantinos Paparrigopoulos, first sought to produce a systematic historiography, placing the birth of the modern Greek State within a single historical continuum, linking the ancient, medieval and modern periods (Clogg, 2002: 3). 'The *poleis* of classical antiquity, the states of the Hellenistic period that were under strong Hellenic influence, the Byzantine Empire and the states that came out of this empire, are all examples of state constructions which Greek romantic historiography has included in its narrative of the uninterrupted history of the Greek nation (Prevelakis, 2000: 171). Thus, as Braudel (1957) notes, 'we must go far back in time, to the beginning of a long process of political evolution, before we can achieve a valid perspective on the political reality of contemporary times. So, how this uninterrupted historiography can help us make sense of the relationship between native organised crime and the Greek State?

Wees (2009) notes that a comparison between ancient and modern mafias ‘may seem eccentric at first, but the parallels turn out to be striking’ (p. 1). He goes on to argue that such a comparison is particularly interesting ‘when one looks at Sicily and its mafia-dominated rural elites, as they emerged in the 1860s, and survived for about a century, until the rise of the urban drug trafficking *nueva mafia* in the 1960s. The similarities are striking.

Both the early Greek and transitional Sicilian regimes controlled agricultural communities; both used force and intimidation to acquire land, livestock, and other resources; both exploited labour and credit with extreme severity and provoked repeated outbreaks of social unrest. The mafia analogy casts a bleak new light on the history of archaic Greece: it helps us to make sense of the forms of oppression alluded to by ancient sources, and to explain what caused the crises which led to *coups d’etat* by tyrants all over Greece, to calls for the redistribution of land in Sparta and the reforms of Solon in Athens.

(Wees, 2009: 1)

Hence, for Wees (2009), the mafia phenomenon is a modern analogy that can be used by historians to explain in a more thorough way the political processes and events described in ancient texts. In our case the opposite logic seems to be more relevant. The political history of the Hellenic City States can be used as the starting point for the analysis of archaic forms of governance and political organization. The key lesson and principles are embedded into the history of the Hellenic and subsequently the Greek state. This principle can be summarised as an ongoing struggle to achieve a hegemonic status in economic and social affairs and control over the monopoly of violence. Here, we will briefly examine three historical eras (Ancient, Ottoman, Modern) that, according to Greek historiographers, have an impact on the contemporary formation and development of the Greek political thinking as well as the political culture and mentality.

### 2.2.1 The Ancient era: City-states and predatory ‘gangs’

A brief examination of the pre-political, pre-state societies, which constitutes a large part of political history, shows that organised crime and anti-organised crime (i.e. efforts to police and control illegal practices by sovereign political archons, rulers and leaders), have been two complimentary and accepted methods for the accumulation of power, wealth, sovereignty, and hegemony. Thus, war, piracy, theft, violence, smuggling, plundering, vendettas and kidnappings all served this purpose (Tilly, 1985; Gallant, 1999: 25; Woodiwiss, 2001: 3; Braudel, 1995a, 1995b, 2002). Subsequently, those groups who successfully applied OC as a method for achieving their political goals, sought to establish a legal-political hegemony aiming at suppressing, punishing and setting up police deviant tactics that would tip the established order and challenge their authority, hegemony and sovereignty.

This reading of the origin and history of the nation-state is a radical departure from the contemporary, polarized and 'schizophrenic' perception about the benevolent nature of the state and the malevolent role of the 'global uncivil society' in modern society (Annan, 2004). There are, however, some critical accounts produced by political scientists and social historians in particular, that resistors', by exposing the empirical and conceptual intersection between legality and illegality, debunk the myth of the state as 'crime resistors'.. Networks of armed predators, smugglers, bandits, pirates, military entrepreneur and many other actors, defined by states as 'outlaws', are not antithetical to the formation of a world order where the nation-state is the principal organisational mode or our polity. On the contrary, their role in the origin, development, diffusion and triumph of capitalism has been paramount (Tilly, 1985; Gallant, 1999: 25). Looking at the history of nation states from this prism, Woodiwiss (2001) argues that organised crime:

[Is] as old as the first systems of law and government and as international as trade. Piracy, banditry, forgery, fraud, and



trading in stolen or illegal goods and services are all ancient occupation that often involved the active participation of landowners, merchants, and government officials. More recently, corporate business interests, and public and private professionals, have also been actively involved in organized crime.

(Woodiwiss, 2001: 3)

Of course, tracing the history of the archaic forms of political and social agitation, such as organised crime, is a notoriously difficult task as it entails myriad definitional, conceptual, historical and technical difficulties (Hobsbawm, 1971: 1-5). What we know, with a high degree of certainty, is that organised crime is a modern neologism, used for the first time in the Western World during the nineteenth century and yet, even today has no fixed meaning (Woodiwiss, 2001: 3; Allum, 2004: 1-4; see Chapter 1).

Official historical records indicate that earlier references to activities/behaviours, now interpreted as ‘organised crime’, are dated back to 1838 and can be found in communication reports between state officials, regarding activities of the mafia in Italy (Paoli, 2003: 33). The powerful role of the official state view/discourse in the framing of perceptions about organised crime in absolute or dichotomous terms (us vs. them, good vs. evil), has been the topic of numerous academic debates, articles and books (Sutherland, 1940, 1945; Albini, 1971; Ianni and Ianni, 1972; Block, 1980, 1992; Block and Chambliss, date; Smith, 1975; 1985; Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Potter, 1994; Naylor, 1997). Existing research strongly indicates that conceptualizations of organised crime are determined by their context and emerge from within specific historical frames and political, economic and socio-cultural contexts.

The term ‘organised crime’, is a construct of the political and economic organisation of society, and the major shaping force in this context is surely the dominance of nation-states as the primary unit for organisation of the polity (Allum and Kostakos, 2010). Organised crime is mostly linked with

deviant groups, illicit market activities, gangsters and thugs, usually of a foreign origin and culture and, to a lesser extent, with white collar workers or any other more powerful players of the system (Woodiwiss, 2001: 3-4; Block, 1998: 2-3; Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Potter, 1994; Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009; Paoli 2002). Given that contemporary perceptions emerge in specific politico-ideological environments, we have reason to believe that such perceptions distort some of the historical manifestations of organised crime (Woodiwiss, 2001: 3).

Ideas that are relative, such as law, order, disorder, legality and illegality, have become absolute and politicized, as well as subject to manipulation according to the interest they serve (Sutherland, 1983; Cressey, 1972; Chambliss, 1988b). Yet, from a historical perspective, Chambliss (1975b) argues that, 'acts are defined as criminal because it is in the interest of the ruling class to so define them' (p. 152). It is very interesting to note that, when comparing modern organised crime with the primitive pre-political state structures as they can be found in the ancient past, one comes across with some striking similarities.

The environment captured in the narratives offered by classical writers such as Homer, Thucydides, Hesiod, and Herodotus, represent a world where mistrust, extortion, protection, revenge, plundering, cheating, honour, steeling, piracy, kidnap, violence and rape are prevalent and endemic. Moreover, a predominant theme in these writings is the struggle for the control of violence, security, policing, territories and sovereignty as well as the control of financial resources and global trade routes. The similarities between the Protostates of the Classical period and organised crime in modern times, can be attributed to the fact that both phenomena emerge in a hostile, uncertain and anarchic environment (Eckstein, 2006: 37-118; Kleemans and Van De Bunt, 1999). However, the fundamental difference between Protostates and organised crime is that, the latter emerges in a structured legal-political order founded by modern nation-states, reflecting the interest of the ruling class and expressed through state institutions. We

can, therefore, conclude that both organised crime and the state share a very intimate and endemic historical and political relationship that this study seeks to understand.

Classic texts are perhaps the first primary historical documents that make explicit reference to organised criminality. Although, the concept obviously did not exist at that time the same way it is interpreted today, we can nevertheless, identify groups and networks that engaged in criminal activities either against private/community property, or against state/church/royal property. The classical period (or classical era of classical antiquity or the Greco-Roman world), is a historical block capturing a long period of political, economic and cultural accomplishments in early history of civilizations and centered in the wider Mediterranean sea (Braudel, 2002). The Classical period was chosen because it represents a time where law and order exist in their natural conditions, or in a state of anarchy where no legal overarching authority had yet been established to manipulate the rules of the game. The nature of the system during that period is often called anarchic, due to the absence of an *archon* or authority to govern the interaction between different political units (Eckstein, 2006: 37-118).

Although the environment during that era is characterised by anarchy, we can nevertheless note that the development of culture and civilization in the wider Mediterranean region, has given presidency to a number of political units or *archons* to impose their will upon others. If one looks closely at the interaction between these early proto-states, one will note the importance of concepts such as extortion in the form of paying tributes and taxes for protection, violence, plundering, revenge killings in pursuing the accumulation of economic and political capital (see Herodotus). By looking this historical frame of the appearance of the proto-state, , we can see how the concepts of legality and illegality interact, and what has the role of organised criminality been before, or in the process of developing contemporary norms of conduct. According to few International Relations

scholars, the condition of anarchy has the following implications in the relations between states:

With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire—conflict, sometime leading to war, is bound to occur. To achieve a favourable outcome from such conflict a state has to rely on its own devices, the relative efficiency of which must be its constant concern.

(Waltz, 2001: 159)

The devices that Waltz refers to, do not only include a protection or a defence army that we often encounter in political history, but also control of illegal or shadow organisations that challenge and compete for power (either political or economic). The control and influence of organised crime, is a method or a tool used in the state formation process.

Tracing the historical routes of piracy, De Souza (1999) explains how Classic historians such as Thucydides and Herodotus present the concept. Moreover, De Souza claims that the earliest records about piracy can be found preserved in the legends maintained by Greeks. According to the historical records of ancient Greeks, Minos, who ruled Crete, was the first to acquire a navy.

It might be argued that the earliest records of piracy are the legends preserved by the Greeks and Minos, the powerful ruler of Crete. Both Herodotus and Thucydides claim that Minos ruled the seas, and the latter says of him: “It is likely that he cleared the sea of piracy as far as he was able, to improve his revenues” (Thuc., 1.4.). Herodotus also associates the Karians with Minos, saying that they were his subjects and that they

manned his ships, thus acquiring a reputation for prowess in war  
(Hdt., 1.171)

(De Souza, 1999: 15)

Organised criminality, orchestrated by competing poleis and rulers in the wider Mediterranean region, was mainly routed in maritime theft and robbery. This was, perhaps, because sea lines were the major trading routes of valuable goods. According to prehistoric sources, piracy has always existed in many shores of the Mediterranean Basin, a sea that provides good 'hunting grounds' against the affluent trading links and commerce of the time (Semple, 1916: 134, 138). A number of factors facilitated the continuing manifestation of piracy in that region. First, due to the configuration of the basin with the numerous narrow strips, trade traffic was confined to few narrow predetermined routes. The fact that trade was confined to, and restricted to fixed lines, facilitated the attacks by malevolent groups and sea hunters. Therefore, pirates and sea robbers, who were experienced mariners, had the advantage of surprise and were able to plan, premeditate and execute their attacks in a controlled environment. Of a particular interest is the part of the sea named by the pirates as the 'Golden Sea'. The 'Golden Sea', forms a straight line between Create and Peloponnesos, and it's where pirates used to attack the Oriental commerce for luxuries (Semple, 1916: 135). As noted by Thucydides, the implications of piracy and plundering had a tremendous biopolitical impact on the local populations.

'The old towns, on account of the great prevalence of piracy, were built away from the sea, whether on the islands or the continent, and still remain in their old sites. For the pirates used to plunder one another, and indeed, all coast populations whether seafaring or not'.

(Thucydides, 1910: 4)

Piracy constituted both a political act, a method of primitive warfare with the aim to extend territorial and maritime sovereignty (Tai, 2003), and an act against economic competition and market interests (Semple, 1916). One scholar explains the interaction or symbiosis between politics, trade, business interest and piracy:

It constituted [piracy] a lawless combination of naval aggression and maritime commerce, seizure and sale without the formality of purchase. The blend of piracy and trade among early Phoenicians, Greeks, and Etruscans belonged to a primitive, undeveloped period when warfare was chronic, when stranger meant enemy, and when buccaneers executed a crude form of navigation act designed to crush competition in the markets of the home sea.

(Semple, 1916: 134)

Looking at the bygone eras of piracy and archaic forms of organised deviance, it becomes apparent that the then existing, political and legal context lacks the modern institutions, norms, laws and regulations that would differentiate criminal from non-criminal activities. It will take many centuries, and the rise and fall of the Roman (Tai, 2003), Ottoman (Inalcik, 1969) and nowadays, the American (Woodiwiss, 2001) Empires for legal norms on organised criminality to finally gain a universal appeal. Indeed, the absence of a hegemonic power that could define and impose the 'rules of the game', is a problem that contemporary historians are trying to decipher.

In any case, what does it mean to talk of piracy in this period?

The scanty written sources for the history of the Mediterranean in the second millennium BC, contain no information on of piracy, because there was no such concept. Warfare and piracy had not come to be differentiated in this early period. Ormerod, and others, have taken Egyptian and Near Eastern records which

speak of groups like the Lukka and the Sea Peoples, as evidence of piracy in the fourteenth, thirteenth and twelfth centuries BC. Yet, it seems to me that, there is no distinction between piracy and warfare in these records [...]. While it is tempting to associate these references of fighting at the sea with an attempt to suppress piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean, it seems to me that the most appropriate term for this activity is warfare. It might help if some motivation could be established for these conflicts, whether there were attempts to obtain territory or just to plunder, but in general, the sources are not full enough to analyse them in such a fashion.

(De Souza, 1999: 16)

The phenomenon of Piracy dates back to the ancient times, when the World System was still characterized by a condition of anarchy and no single power, civilization, religion or Empire was able to impose the rules of the game. Piracy can be seen as a great opportunity to gain power and influence. By definition, acts of piracy against merchant ships constituted attacks against the political and economic interest of enemy or competing power centres. As already noted by Thucydides at the beginning of the section, with the case of Captain Minos of Crete, efforts to control piracy gave rise to ancient forms of policing. Accordingly, in his historical analysis, Thucydides concludes that Minos employed naval power to suppress piracy and protect his political and economic interests of his promising Empire. With the changing 'status quo' and the demise of Minos power, piracy will see a revival. The first person known to us, by tradition, as having established a navy, is Minos. What Minos managed to do, is to make himself a master of what is now called the Mediterranean sea, and rule over the Cyclades, where he set up the first colonies, expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons as governors (Thucydides, 1910: 4, 8). This was an effective effort to decrease piracy in those waters and a necessary step in order to secure the revenues for his own use.

Again, the earliest sea-fight in history was between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans; this was about two hundred and sixty years ago, dating from the same time. Planted on an isthmus, Corinth had from time out of mind been a commercial emporium; as formerly almost all communication between the Hellenes within and without Peloponnese was carried on overland, and the Corinthian territory was the highway through which it travelled. She had consequently great money resources, as is shown by the epithet “wealthy” bestowed by the old poets on the place, and this enabled her, when traffic by sea became more common, to procure her navy and put down piracy; and as she could offer a mart for both branches of the trade, she acquired for herself all the power which a large revenue affords

(Thucydides, 1910: 7)

The uncertainty and threat posed by piracy against the major economic interest of the powers in the region, led to an increase in efforts to police the sea and control piracy networks. As Thucydides notes, the accumulation of wealth was increasingly leading to Tyrannical regimes. If we may say the first power centres to the development of dependence on this accumulation of wealth,, with modern state infrastructures, including a navy force, with the primary concern being the control of organised criminality, particularly in the sea.

But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth became more an object, the revenues of the states increasing, tyrannies were by their means established almost everywhere—the old form of government being hereditary monarchy with definite prerogatives—and Hellas began to fit out fleets and apply herself more closely to the sea. It is said that the Corinthians were the first to approach the modern style of naval



architecture, and that Corinth was the first place in Hellas where galleys were built

(Thucydides, 1910: 7)

The ancient origins of the Greek State date back to a period characterized by cultural and political progress, but also anarchy and lawlessness. The lack of proper institutional structures instigated power vacuums that were filled by autonomous self-help systems of governance, often based on family and kinship networks. The accumulation of power and wealth was accomplished mainly through violent, deceitful and illegitimate means (Wees, 2009: 1). Thus, the political balance was a fragile one, based predominately on the norms of illegality, violence and deception.

### **2.2.2 The rise of territorial state in the age of Empires**

The prevalence of the city-state as the primary form of political organisation in the wider Mediterranean and Southern European periphery was challenged by a new centralized form of political organisation. The rise of the, so called, territorial State, larger and more powerful in manpower and resources from the autonomous city states, was a considerable political and structural change that tipped the balance of power in the region.

By the fifteenth century, the city-state was already losing ground; first signs of the crisis could be detected in Italy during the early years of the century. In fifty years, the map of the Peninsula was entirely redrawn, to the advantage of some cities and the detriment of others. Meanwhile, a similar crisis was becoming apparent throughout the rest of the Mediterranean. Everywhere the city-state, precarious and narrow-based, stood revealed inadequate to perform the political and financial tasks now facing it. It represented a fragile form of government, doomed to extinction, as was strikingly demonstrated by the capture of Constantinople in 1453, the fall of Barcelona in 1472

and the collapse of Granada in 1492. It was becoming clear that only the rival of the city-state, the territorial state, rich in land and manpower, would in future be able to meet the expense of modern warfare; it could maintain paid armies and afford costly artillery; it was soon to indulge in the added extravagance of the full-scale naval wars. And its advance was long to be irreversible.

(Braudel, 1995b: 657-8)

The triumph of the large territorial state reshaped the nexus and symbiosis between legality and illegality. The rise of the Roman, and later on, the Ottoman Empire, along with the political influence and control over Greek populated territories, signals a shift from ‘anarchy’ to ‘order’. Therefore, territories that were previously ruled by local gangs, clans, kinship networks and warlords were falling increasingly under the rule and political influence of a centralized governmental structure. However, the transition to institutionalized politics, under the rule of the Empires, was linear. Networks and centres of power were reformed to accommodate the needs and support the interests of the new Order. Furthermore, the previously established linkages between legality and illegality continued to play a key political role. Yet, they were adapted to the new political environment. In fact, the new political order imposed by Empires (especially by the Ottoman one), contributed greatly to the professionalization, empowerment and sophistication of illegal networks. For instance, patronage will become the norm in areas where the rule of law of the Empire could not be extended. Additionally, a critical factor in this evolution was the development of competition in a flourishing global economy, based on property rights protected by State law. As a consequence, organised crime now becomes more organised, whereas the stakes become greater.

While the ostensible objective of maritime predation is economic gain, I will argue that maritime theft should also be

understood in the context of this antagonism between land and sea as competitive interaction between political interests that seek to territorialize the sea, and commercial interests that resist this project of territorialisation. Thus, maritime theft should be understood as contention not merely over material resources, but for what I will call *political capital*: political advantage that may be utilized either to reinforce or to challenge territorial order.

(Tai, E.S. 2003: 1)

It becomes clear that control of illegal practices, such as piracy, enters into the realm of power politics. Organised crime, including piracy and smuggling, could potentially weaken or, equally, strengthen the power and dominance of the State or of the Empire. As the previous commentator notes, organised theft, in the context of political antagonism can be seen as a form of political capital. Hence, controlling organised crime is not simply a policing task aiming at stopping or reducing a specific phenomenon. In this context, the problem of 'control' has a political connotation and refers to the notion of the power a group has, so as to influence and direct these activities for its own political and economic benefit.

The unique parameters that exposed the operation of contingency in the definition of medieval maritime theft lay in the conditions of its practice among the various lordships, civic republics, and monarchies that adapted the legal formulations of the Roman imperium and the classical civitas to claim title to polity in medieval Europe. On the one hand, medieval jurists echoed the formulations of classical Roman law in terming the pirate 'hostis humani generis': ("enemy to all mankind)". Statutes enacted in the Genoese and Venetian colonies of Pera and Catara duplicated legislation promulgated at these maritime republics in assigning capital penalties to individuals who robbed indiscriminately at sea, those I will term pirates. The

piracy these sea-robbers practiced was distinct, however, from selective maritime theft, conducted at the behest of a sovereign polity against merchant shipping flying the standard of that monarch or civic republic's political and economic rivals. In medieval statutes, this practice is alternately termed *ire ad pirraticam*—to sail or go as a pirate—and *ire in cursum*—going "in cursum," from which may be derived a verb, *corsairing*, and a noun for those who undertook it, *corsairs*.

(Tai, E.S. 2003: 1-2)

Modernity is often discussed, by contemporary historians, as a historical block defined by dramatic and catalytic transformation of the global economic system. In particular, the role of a state-centered legal-political order becomes more evident. Chambliss (1989), describes the dramatic effect this transformation had, on what most people will now define as organised crime.

During the period from 1600 to 1900, capitalism was becoming firmly established as the dominant economic system of the world. The essential determinant of a nation's ability to industrialise and to protect its borders was the accumulation of capital. Not only was another nation's wealth a threat to the autonomy of neighbouring states, one nation's gain was invariably another's loss. Piracy helped to equalize the balance and reduce the tendency toward the monopolisation of capital accumulation. The need for capital accumulation does not end with the emergence of capitalism; it continues so long as the economy and a nation's military and economic strength depend on it. When piracy ceased to be a viable method for accumulating capital, other forms of illegality were employed. In today's world, there is evidence that some small city-states in the Far East (especially in Indonesia) still pursue a policy of

supporting pirates and sharing in their profits. But piracy no longer plays a major role in state-organized crime; today, the role is filled by smuggling.

(Chambliss, 1989: 188)

From a chronological perspective, the establishment of criminal networks in Greece and the larger Southern and Eastern European peripheries date back to the development of trade links and trade liberalization (Hozic, 2006; Inalcik, 1969). Of special interest is that illicit organised activities, capable of generating astronomical profits, date back to the birth of the modern Capitalist global economy. Moreover, the rise of regional and global trade during the Ottoman era (1299-1922) created informal economies, black markets and illicit trade, that flourished mainly along the Balkan trading routes and the Mediterranean region. Historians, who have devoted considerable attention to analyzing the impact of the capitalist roots of the Ottoman Empire, state that protectionism, that underlined the principles of the Ottoman economy, resulted in the criminalization of various economic transactions. From this standpoint, free trade and exports of cereals, for instance, was forbidden and highly regulated in order to avoid speculation (Inalcik, 1969: 199). This policy, historians claim, had a significant effect on the social organisation of trade. Inalcik (1969) argues that three groups of merchants operated in the Ottoman economy. He explains that:

In the mid-seventeenth century, the first of these were the shipmasters transporting cargoes in their own ships [...]. They were divided into the 'Captains of the Black Sea', numbering 2000, and the 'Captains of the Mediterranean', numbering 3000. They were Muslims or Greeks. The second group were ship-owners [...] who equipped ships for overseas trade [...]. There was a third group that chartered ships for the import of cereals. These, according to Evliya were wicked profiteers, who would buy cheaply the grain which the captains brought, store it, and

then at a times of shortage would release it onto the market little by little and so make huge profits. Profiteering and contraband deal we common, especially when the central governments was weak. The coast and islands of the Aegean were alive with smugglers, and here many Greek shipmasters made fortunes.

(Inalcik, 1969:120)

Greek merchants extended their economic interests to the financial and banking sector, often competing with the established Jews and Armenian networks. Accounts of Greek merchants and bankers, in cooperation with the local authorities (Pasha) in the Diaspora, often acquired wealth (and power) by charging 'arbitrary and excessive prices' and by dealing in foreign currencies at disproportionate rates. Noteworthy, Stoianovich (1960) cites a letter produced by an anonymous writer who criticized the Greek merchants that controlled the flow of maritime trade in some key locations. The anonymous writer says:


Every day the Greeks, and especially those of Vidin, conjointly with the Pasha, make....a true monopoly of the passage of poorly laden boats and frequently spoiled goods, increasing their cargoes at will, overloading the boats.

(Quoted in: Stoianovich, 1960: 296)

By looking through the history of the past centuries, it can be noted that actors who engage in systematic accumulation of capital and wealth cannot be distinguished from those interested in power and politics. Similarly, agitators and criminals, either at land or sea, belong to the same social networks with political and economic elites. According to Stoivanovich (1960), there is an evolutionary spectrum of historical roles that eventually will lead to the formation of the modern Capitalist nation states. More specifically, Stoianovich (1960: 312) claims that Balkan merchants passed through five stages of professional affiliation: Muleteers, peddler, or sailors,

with brigandage as a side line; commission agents or forwarders with money-lending as a side line; independent merchants; bankers with politics and political administration as a side line; and statesmen with business as a side line (Graph 2.1). The interaction between outlaw criminal groups, such as bandits and pirates, and business and politics, has not yet received the proper historical attention, although the evolutionary spectrum seems to be a reoccurring historical manifestation. Criminals struggle to gain a legitimate front and protect their economic interests by entering in the political system and politicians are looking to establish linkages with criminals for their own political and economic objectives.

**Diagram 2.1** Historical evolution of the criminal-political nexuses.



Source: author's own elaboration after Stoianovich, 1960.

Bacon (2007), for example, notes that early-organised crime groups from the Balkan, such as outlaws and bandits, are traditional. Such illegal groups have acted as a catalyst for a number of revolutions and rebellions against the Ottoman Empire and 'certainly were facilitators in the formulation of the modern Balkan states' (p. 79). Furthermore, arms trafficking and smuggling of contraband amongst Balkan states in support of the revolutionary movements, contributed to the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Bacon 2007). Something similar is recorded in Italy and, to a lesser extent,

in France and the United Kingdom (Hobsbawm, 1959). This is exactly the reason why the thesis looks closely at the Urban Guerrilla movement in Greece (see Chapter 5).

### **2.2.3 The Modern Greek nation- state (1821-2010)**

In order to gain a better understanding of the present-day context in Greece, we first need to examine and explain the stages in which the country passed through, in the process of *becoming* what it is now. Here, we focus on historical patterns of social change, continuity, transformation and revolution, taking into consideration changes in the manifestation of organised criminality. In the following section, we are interested in the codes of conduct and the Greek culture that, in our opinion, emerged from the development of the Greek polity. At this point, the focus is placed upon existing historical evidence suggesting that this trend has been with us longer than it was previously thought. Moreover, it is as old, as the first formations of political independent and sovereign political unites.

To begin with, the Modern Greek State, which is historically the first nation-state to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire, was established in 1821 (Clogg, 2002). Furthermore, geographically is situated at the far southern end of the Balkan peninsula, which in general terms, is the meeting point of the East with the West and the South with the North. This has been both a curse and a blessing. Whilst the Ottoman rule on the region created fertile conditions for the spread of trade, many regions (including parts of Greece) remained under-developed. The geography of the region with its chaotic mountain ranges and a complex system of rivers and valleys creates the impression of a land of contrasts. Referring to these characteristic features, Charles Woodspeaks of his impressions during his travel in the Peninsula:

In places the whole country appears to be perfectly European. In others the traveller passes for miles across bare country [...]. Again, as one wends his way by road or path which from the



map would appear to be centres of importance are made up of only a few houses located in the valley or halfway up some forbidding hillside. Thus, the prevailing impression left upon one's mind is that Turkish misrule has been responsible for the creation of a state of rack and ruin [...].

(Wood, 1916: 266)

A combination of geographical and morphological features, along with the political and economic reality in Greece, especially during the Ottoman rule, had a significant affect on peoples' mentality, norms, culture and way of life. As a result, the agrarian mountainous population is easily distinguished from those who lived in the valleys. Likewise, the habitants of the many islands all have different mentality. Moreover, over the past years and with the constantly changing political environment, ethnic minorities and mixed ethnic groups have appeared, chiefly in the northern borders, but also in other parts of the country. It is worth noting that some of these traditionally Christian Orthodox groups include, Vlachs, Arvanites, Pomaks, Cham Albanians, Macedo-Slavs, Aroumani and Sarakatsans (Schein, 1975). In addition, lack of satisfactory transportation and communication technologies had a great impact on social communication and interaction among the population. An attempt to shed more light on this will be made in the next chapters. However, it is important to address that, at this stage, the development of localism, the lack of effective communication, the insufficient amounts of social capital and the low levels of trust prevailed in the country. That may take some verification but, it highlights the historical reality that exists even in our time, with the establishment of large Metropolitan cities and towns throughout the country. Hence, organised crime, in its historical and contemporary forms evolved within this historical and social context. This observation, , in our view, demonstrates that we are dealing with a local phenomenon.

Theftocracy (the rule of thieves or *klephts*) is a historical era following the modern (*de jure*) establishment of the Greek State. The activities and roles played by traditional organised crime groups ranging from rural bandits, outlaw peasants, pirates, smugglers, anarchists, and plunders are not being marginalized in contemporary Greek historiography. Due to the leftish tradition, the general cultural and political norms of Greeks, or even due to the folklore influence of traditional criminality, the activities of what we may call ‘old school’ or traditional organised crime are well preserved, and constitute an integral part of Greek history and folklore tradition. However, social historians who have examined such groupings, instead of developing a linear model, opt for more a sporadic or static analysis of traditional crime groups. According to a number of Greek scholars who have systematically analysed traditional forms of criminality, the reason why such a historical continuity is not forthcoming lays in the diverge political roles that these groups have played in contemporary history. Whereas, *klephts and armatoloi* [rural bandits] became heroes in their struggle against the Ottoman Empire or in opposition to foreign occupying forces, others have remained more marginalized in their political significance. Addressing the issue of historical continuity, Damianakos notes:

Nevertheless, we should not sidetrack from real social impact of this historical continuity. Although theft and banditry operated within similar socio-economic and political conditions that could guaranty the continuity of traditional deviance [*laiki paranomia*] their social history does not conclude, as it was the case with the *klefts and armatoloi* in a single national and/or social revolution. On the contrary it is signified by ambiguity which is manifested as a fluctuation between rebellious behaviour and symbiosis with local worthies [*prouxodes*] or politicians whom for their personal effort to control their rural political cliental, they needed *bravous* [bodyguards] who know their ‘job’ very well.

(Damianakos, 2003: 70)

In his detailed analysis of social banditry, Hobsbawm, whose model seems to explain well the Greek historical record (see Dermentzopoulos 2000, 2001: 85), remarks:

For the crucial fact about the bandit's social situation is its ambiguity. He is an outsider and a rebel, a poor man who refuses to accept the normal role of poverty, and establishes his freedom by means of the only resources within reach of the poor, strength, bravery, cunning and determination. This draws him close to the poor: he is one of them. It sets him in opposition to the hierarchy of power, wealth and influence: he is not one of them. Nothing will make a peasant brigand into a 'gentleman', for in the societies in which bandits flourish the nobility and gentry are not recruited from the ranks. At the same time the bandit is, inevitably, drawn into the web of wealth and power, because, unlike other peasants, he acquires wealth and exerts power. He is 'one of us' who is constantly in the process of becoming associated with 'them'. The more successful he is as a bandit, the more he is *both* a representative and champion of the poor *and* a part of the system of the rich.

(Hobsbawm, 1969: 76)

Nevertheless, this problem is not an issue in this case. On the contrary, if we focus on the structures that are in place since the Roman Empire and guarantee the continuity of banditry or theft or any 'necessary evil', and not on the agent per se, then we immediately recognize a very familiar story.

All the Balkan Orthodox ethnic groups except the Serbs were subjected to Hellenization after the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans, although the Hellenization process did not attain intensive proportions until the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries, when Greek became the principle Balkan language of commerce and culture. By becoming “Greek” one acquired higher social status. Men of wealth thus took pride in being called “Greek” and Orthodox Albanian, Vlach, Macedo-Slav, and Bulgarian merchants of the eighteenth century normally identified themselves as such. Class-conscious Slavic peasants also applied the term “Greek” to most merchants, particularly if they considered them rogues, although a portion of the Balkan merchant class was no doubt enlightened.

(Stoianovic, 1960: 310-1)

The Hellenization of the upper social strata of the non-Greek Balkan Orthodox peoples made possible the emergence of a single, relatively united, inter-Balkan merchant class, which was of Greek, Vlach, Macedo-Slav, and Bulgarian ethnic origin, but called itself and was known to others as “Greek”. The only important group of Balkan Orthodox merchants which partly or wholly rejected identification as “Greek” was the Serbs, and even they began to undergo Hellenization before the tables were turned in 1821 and the process of the de-Hellenization began.

(Stoianovic, 1960: 311)

The Greek revolution in 1820s signalled the end of the Ottoman rule and the emergence of the Greek State, as an autonomous and sovereign entity. However, clientalism and patronage will become a core institution following the independence of Greece.

Patronage in Greek society is endemic and rooted in the pre-capitalist era when the Ottoman Empire, with its institutional arrangements, promoted this political culture in the country. The merchant class was by all means, the most beneficiary group. This was the case due to the capital they had in their hands. Furthermore, the role of the Sultan (regional ruler) was

important in establishing ties and business contacts on a national and international level.

Slavs from Cattaro (Kotor), Zara, Zagreb, Medrusa, and Ragusa, began to settle in Ancona as merchants during the second half of the fourteenth century. Fear of Turkish over-lordship, soon drove many more Slavs to Ancona, where they were in sufficient number, around the middle of the following century to form their own commune or *Universitas Slavorum*. The relentless competition of the immigrant Slavs, who were now trading with the mainland where they had come from, hurt or ruined many of the Italian merchants, but the municipality of Ancona failed in its attempt to expel them from the province in 1487. In 1514, Ancona was forced to grant special privileges to Ottoman merchants, including Greeks from Arta, Janina, and Avlona [...] Towards the middle of the century, about two hundred Greek trading houses were established in cosmopolitan Ancona.

(Stoianovic, 1960: 237)

Weingrod (1968: 379) notes that in the vocabulary of political science, 'patronage' refers to 'the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support'. Patronage and clientelism take various forms and shapes. Interestingly, Mavrogordatos (1997: 2) adopts a broader scope and contents that 'traditional clientelism refers to interpersonal patron-client relations'. The typical structural elements and characteristic building blocks form the patron-client dyad, linking two individuals or, at most, the two nuclear families that they represent. Thus, out of many such blocks, networks and pyramids are constructed with individual politicians at their apex. The finest designed political system to not only to maintain, but also reproduce such relations, is *particracy*. Again, a core notion in this system of governance is role of

family ties and nepotism. Data on Greek ministers, whose fathers or other relatives are involved in politics, indicate the extent to which family ties play a role in gaining a strong political position in the government.

**Table 2.1** Ministers whose father or other relative was involved in politics (%)

<i>Familial involvement</i>	1843-1878	1878-1910	1910-1936	1936-1941	1944-1967		1967-1974	1974-2001
					(I)	(II)		
None	22.5	41.7	63.7	67.6	62.6	47		39.8
Parent	40.1	47.9	21.3	14.7	15.6	0		2.4
Other relative	6.8	10.4	15	17.6	21.7	24		6.5
Unknown	30.6					29		51.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100		100
N	147	96	300	34	230	107		411

Source: Sotiropoulos and Bourikos, 2002: 194, Table 9. [Original source: Legg, 1969, p. 307, Table 12.5 and our own research. Postwar sample (I) covers the period 1946-1965. A dash signifies that no data are available. In the column 1843-1878, we have included participants in the War of Independence (1821-1827) in our item “Unknown” as this category had no meaning or equivalent in any historical period beyond this first one. There is no data for the cabinets of the military regime of 1967-1974. By “involved in politics”, we mean that someone had at least one term in public office, including mayorship, general secretariat and/or ministerial position. By “relative”, we mean other members of kin except parents].

Particracy is a distinct form of regime that moves away from parliamentarism and presidentialism. According to Calise (1994: 444), particracy is a ‘form of government where a party holds monopolistic control over the governmental process, just as presidents and parliaments are supposed to do within their own regimes’. Also, Giannaras (2002) takes note that the political regime in Greece, even today, can very well be defined as a particratic, or *kommatokratia*. He explains how particratic politics shape society:

The multiparty system is no longer representative, parties become autonomous from civil society by establishing a condition of oligarchy. A ruthless oligarchy of uncontrollable ‘steering centres’, which gain legitimacy in every election. In

order to 'seize' people's votes a well financed system build on modern marketing techniques and brain wash is employed with the aim to construct false impressions. In oligarchy, social and public life, serve primarily party interests. The Constitution is written, elected and revised by the parties in the absence of the people. The President of the country is elected by the parties (with shadow and secret deals). The same applies for the president of the High Courts and the top leadership of the Armed Forces. Trade unionism is partisan and serves the interests of the parties and not the interest of the workers. The local 'autonomous' authorities receive directions from the parties. Media are interwoven with parties. The appointment of University Deans and Directors of departments are decided in political circles. The steering committees of scientific groups, chambers, national theatres, research institutes and the civil community are becoming highly partisan [...]. The state does not serve the people, it serves the party in power [...]. Particracy is the root cause of today's capricious, anomic and corruption behaviour.

(Giannaras, 2002: 7-8)

There are numerous indicators of particratic politics that exist at all levels and aspects of the Greek society. Indeed, particracy has deep historical roots in the Greek society. Not only does it have the power to shape people's behaviour, but it has also the power to shape people's culture, norms, values and attitudes. Furthermore, it is in the interest of the party to promote a normative system that will not question or challenge the regime, or the norms that legitimize its presence. Over the past decades, the two-party system has dominated the politics of the country, acting as a guarantor that preserves the particracy and looks after (directly or indirectly) the powerful groups. It's worth emphasizing that whenever the two-party system is challenged by external forces, solidarity remains untouched and a

common strategy to expel the newcomers is formed instead. . In early 2007, the political arena was dominated by numerous political scandals involving both political parties. As a response to this political crisis, the electorates chose to shift their support to a fresh candidate from the Left. Within a few months, the party gathered significant attention. Therefore, from this perspective, Greek culture is highly ideological. Taken as a whole, a number of normative and cultural codes surface from this regime.

## 2.3 Greek culture

The explanation put forward to account for the Greek paradox is that organised crime in Greece, is embedded into the everyday functioning of the society and polity. As shown in the previous section, the weakness of the Greek State, is a catalytic factor in explaining this structural condition. In addition, the role of culture, shaped by the historical path taken is another correlated factor. . The history of the Greek State, as taught from generation to generation, plays a central role in the formation of world views, assumptions and orientations of the public regarding the nature of politics and the political system in Greece (see: Inglehart, 1988). Therefore, what exactly are these deep-seated, long-held values, characteristic of the Greek society? How do these values create tolerance against illegal practices?

Clogg (2002), points out that: ‘The capriciousness of Ottoman rule and the weakness of the idea of the rule of law helped to shape the underlying values of Greek society and to determine attitudes to the state and to authority that have persisted in the present’ (p. 3). As a result, informal networks of exchange and patron-client relations based on the, so called *rousfeti*<sup>2</sup>, are institutionalised practices. Adding to this, the Greek culture is also shaped heavily by *progonoplexia*<sup>3</sup> (Clogg, 2002: 2). The discourses produced by the *nouveau* nationalist *intelligencia*, have placed emphasis

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<sup>2</sup> The term *rousfeti* means a favour (see New York Times, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> *Progonoplexia* or ‘ancestoritis’ is the excessive worship of the ancestors (see Clogg, 2002: 2)



on the ‘burden of antiquity’ and are often ‘locked’ into a “great past” (Christou, 2006: 74). Consequently, even if the Greek nation-state emerged almost two millennia since the city states of Ancient Greece, the discourses produced by contemporary intellectual elites had a significant effect on the cultural life (i.e. schools, arts, literature), as well as the identity of the Greeks. The idea of autonomy of the city state remains alive in the Greek political imagination. Even now, Greek values, expressed through *localism*, create a sense of belonging in a State within the State. For instance, Spartans, Macedonians and Cretans have a strong tendency to regard their birth place as the only sovereign political unit that can, nevertheless, unite with ‘others’ in defence of the motherland. Overall, one can notice that endemic and systemic lack of trust is creating an internal need and demand for the established self-help system. Finally, the Europeanization of the Greek nation-state and the rise of *legalism* have also their share of influence on existing values and political orientation. The impact of legalism in public attitudes can be well summarised in the phrase ‘if certain behaviour is legal, then it is also ethical’.

It is well understood that measuring public attitudes towards social and political life is a valid source of information. Public surveys can provide a broad perspective on the core norms and values of the contemporary Greek cultural system. Consequently, while acknowledging the complexity of the matter, here, the focus is on perceptions of the general public on three aspects of public attitudes: interpersonal trust, institutional confidence and disregard for law.

### **2.3.1 Trust: Interpersonal and Institutional**

Lack of trust within society is a significant source of instability that nurtures a wider tendency towards illegal practices. In Italy, for instance, as well as in Russia, endemic lack of trust between people and towards institutions, are seen as the core factors for the development of extra legal protection markets (Varese, 2010). In terms of interpersonal trust and confidence to

institutions, the situation in Greece is at least similar, if not worse, that in Italy and Russia in terms of interpersonal trust and confidence to institutions. Generally, lack of trust and low social capital, leads to the formation of a negative attitude towards society, that in turn may weaken moral strength and organisation against crimes (see Sutherland, 1924). Additionally, trust is a significant element for social capital (Fukuyama, 1995; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 1999). High levels of interpersonal and institutional trust indicate an ability of people to work together on a voluntary basis in order to achieve common goals and objectives. The more trust a group has, the more likely to work together and develop social capital. In the same manner, the higher the social capital, the stronger the organisation of the system against crime is. Additionally, in an organised society where, nevertheless, people cannot trust each other or many of the public institutions, is expected that people will turn to a self-help system, as a reaction to the endemic cheating and lack of trust. Data from surveys on public values provide a significant source of information on such indicators.

**Table 2.2** Level of interpersonal trust

Question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

Values	Categories	N	%
1	most people can be trusted	305	21.4%
2	cannot be too careful	1122	78.6%
-5	other missing	0	
-4	question not asked	0	
-3	nap	0	
-2	na	37	
-1	dk	34	

Source: European values survey, 2008

The first indicator to be examined is the level of interpersonal trust, public perception on cheating as well as people's attitudes towards institutions. Table 1 shows that 78.6 per cent of Greek respondents think that people cannot be trusted, and that one needs to be careful when dealing with others. In order to acquire a comparative perspective, we note that the same

numbers for Italy and Russia are 67.4% and 70.1%, respectively (European Values Survey, 1999; 2008).<sup>4</sup>

**Table 2.3** Compatriots cheating on state benefits

Question: According to you, how many of your compatriots claim state benefits to which they are not entitled

Values	Categories	N	%
1	almost all	156	14.2%
2	many	575	52.2%
3	some	332	30.1%
4	almost none	39	3.5%
-5	missing source unknown	0	
-4	qna	0	
-3	nap	0	
-2	na	5	
-1	dk	35	

Source: European Values Survey, 1999

**Table 2.4** Compatriots cheating on tax

Question: According to you, how many of your compatriots cheat on tax if they have the chance

Values	Categories	N	%
1	almost all	400	35.4%
2	many	584	51.7%
3	some	135	12.0%
4	almost none	10	0.9%
-5	missing source unknown	0	
-4	qna	0	
-3	nap	0	
-2	na	5	
-1	dk	8	

Source: European Values Survey, 1999

Besides the issue of trust, it is very interesting to examine the perception of the Greek public towards their compatriots. As it can be seen in table 2.2, only 3.5 per cent of the respondents believe that none of their compatriots claim state benefits to which they are not entitled. The majority of the

<sup>4</sup> Data for Italy are from the 1999 survey and for Russia are from the 2008 survey

interviewees think that almost, all or many of the Greek citizens cheat when claiming state benefits.

Similar results can be noted in table 2.3, when considering the perception of the Greek public towards the level of tax evasion in the country. A very small minority of 0.9 per cent of the participants think that none of their fellow compatriots will cheat on taxes if they have the chance. On the contrary, a staggering 87% believes that almost all, or many, of their companions will cheat given that they had the opportunity to do so.

Moreover, a very large proportion of the Greek respondents, believes that their fellow citizens are willing, whenever possible, to pay cash for goods and services. Paying cash for services means that there is no paper trail and thus, the company is able to avoid paying taxes on the income generated from this transaction. Besides, paying in cash, even when buying cars or other valuable goods, is a widespread practice in Greece and apart from the issue of tax evasion, this practice facilitates money laundering from other illegal activities.

**Table 2.5** Compatriots paying cash as a strategy to avoid tax payments

Question: According to you, how many of your compatriots are paying cash for services to avoid paying taxes

Values	Categories	N	%
1	almost all	176	16.3%
2	many	504	46.5%
3	some	367	33.9%
4	almost none	36	3.3%
-5	missing source unknown	0	
-4	qna	0	
-3	nap	0	
-2	na	11	
-1	dk	48	

Source: European Values Survey, 1999

The lack of interpersonal trust is also related to a much broader negative attitude, and low levels of confidence, towards the representative political institutions and vice versa.

**Table 2.6** Confidence in Institutions (Greece)

Institution	A great deal	Quite a lot	Not very much	None at all
Armed forces	17.80	50.40	24.10	7.70
Church	14.80	40.00	32.70	12.60
Justice system	6.20	37.50	38.90	2.80
The press	3.80	27.20	44.50	24.50
Education system	3.60	25.20	48.60	22.60
United nations (UN)	3.20	15.50	36.30	45.00
The police	2.90	25.20	49.00	22.90
European Union (EU)	2.9	22.6	38.3	36.3
Parliament	2.80	21.50	48.10	27.60
Health care system	2.70	23.10	47.10	27.10
Major Companies	2.7	17.2	36	44.2
Trade unions	1.70	12.40	48.40	37.50
Social Security System	1.5	17.3	49.8	31.3
Civil Service	1.40	12.90	48.40	37.30
Nato	1.3	5.7	22.3	70.7

Source: European Values Survey, 1999-2000

In other words, it seems that lack of interpersonal trust and negative attitude towards state institutions, are interlined phenomena. In table 2, an overview of the main political and financial institutions is presented, including local, national and international organizations, responsible for performing vital functions within the modern society. Overall, scores for Greece appear to be slightly lower in comparison to other Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. Interestingly, we note that the Armed forces and the Orthodox Church score the highest levels of confidence by the Greek society. In terms of public confidence in national institutions in Greece, the

data show that trade unions, the police, the Parliament, the healthcare system, the social security system and the Civil Service, achieve the lowest percentages of public confidence. Moreover, economic and international institutions, such as multinational companies, the United Nations, and the European Union and Nato, have by far, the lowest levels of confidence among the Greek public.

As already noted, our hypothesis assumes that lack of interpersonal and institutional trust could lead to the formation of an informal self-help system. This system could eventually become the source of social capital, able to facilitate social and economic exchange within the Greek society. From the existing available data, it can be seen that family may play such a role. Evidence strongly suggests that the role of the nuclear family is central in the Greek society.

The role of the nuclear family is best highlighted when looking at the economic system and the organization of businesses in the country. In comparison to other European countries, available data on the economic organization of Greece show that 56.5 per cent of all registered companies are categorized as micro enterprises. Again, this trend is indicative of the critical role of the family in the socio-economic life of the country. Notably, countries like, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain micro enterprises are also the predominate structure of the economic organization. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the presence of a large number of small enterprises within a country, facilitates various illegal activities (Lavezzi, 2008; see also: Baken, 2005; Klima, Benen and Daele, 2009).

### **2.3.2 Respect for the rule of law**

Although Greek society seems to lack high levels of interpersonal and institutional trust, the interest in politics is comparatively higher in people's agenda. Thus, we are not referring to a society alienated from public life. In a World Values Survey conducted in 1999, a 21.1% per cent of Greeks claimed to frequently discuss politics with their friends. This is double the

percentage recorded in other European countries like France, Italy, Portugal and the U.K (WVS, 1999). Additionally, in comparison to other Europeans, Greeks seems to be ready to take strong political action in order to gain immediate results through extreme political activism. This, perhaps, reflects high levels in positive self-perception and individuality (i.e. strong desire to be agents of change). For instance, in the same cross-national survey, 8.4% of French, 7.4% of Italians, 1.1% of Portuguese and 2.7% of Spanish people, claimed to have occupied buildings or factories, whereas the percentage for Greeks was significantly higher, with a 26 per cent declaring to have undertaken political activism through the same method (WVS, 1999). This trend represents the norms and orientation of the Greek and political culture. Furthermore, the result points to the willingness of a large proportion of the population to take up extreme political activism. In fact, tolerance to extreme political activism extends to activities that go beyond the occupation of public buildings. As it can be seen in Table 2.7, many respondents justify in some way or another the use of extreme activities, including even political assassinations, for achieving radical political change. Again, when looking at public attitudes in Greece, the idea of self-help and extra-legal orientations seems to be a repeating 'justifiable norm'.

In general, public perceptions towards terrorism in Greece, as recorded by the 2009 European values survey, indicate that the public has very strong tolerance, compared to any other European country. According to the 2007 Europol report on terrorism in Europe, Greece accounted for 25 attacks in businesses, government buildings and private properties; almost half of the total terrorist attacks related to leftish groups in Europe (TE- SAT, 2007: 13).

Similarly, Table 2.8 shows that 12.3% of all respondents from Greece, who took part in the 2008 European Values Study, agree that terrorism can be a justifiable course of action under certain circumstances. This figure suggests a stronger tolerance towards anti-authoritarian ideology and political action that is indicative of the Greek cultural system.

**Table 2.7** Justifying Political assassinations

Question: Do you justify: political assassinations? Please tell me for each of the following statements, whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.

Values	Categories	N	%
1	never	689	63.9%
2		131	12.1%
3		67	6.2%
4		34	3.2%
5		65	6.0%
6		24	2.2%
7		18	1.7%
8		20	1.9%
9		8	0.7%
10	always	23	2.1%
-5	missing source unknown	3	
-4	qna	0	
-3	nap	0	
-2	na	48	
-1	dk	12	

Source: European Value Survey, 2000

**Table 2.8** Public attitudes towards terrorism in 39 European countries

Question: Terrorism is everyday news. In principle, most people are against it, but there is still room for differences of opinion. Which of these two statements do you tend to agree with?

Country	Ranking	Under certain circumstances Terrorism is justified	Terrorism must always be condemned	Neither
Greece	1	12.30%	86.90%	0.70%
Finland	2	10.90%	80.30%	8.80%
Romania	3	8.80%	89.30%	1.90%
Northern Ireland	4	8.40%	88.30%	3.40%
Cyprus	5	8.20%	87.70%	4.10%
Albania	6	7.70%	89.20%	3.10%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	7	7.40%	91.20%	1.40%



Country	Ranking	Under certain circumstances Terrorism is justified	Terrorism must always be condemned	Neither
Austria	8	7.30%	89.10%	3.60%
Slovenia	9	7.30%	90.40%	2.30%
Republic of Montenegro	10	7.20%	90.50%	2.30%
Armenia	11	7.00%	91.90%	1.00%
Netherlands	12	6.80%	91.90%	1.20%
Luxembourg	13	6.70%	90.80%	2.50%
Estonia	14	6.50%	92.20%	1.30%
Czech Republic	15	6.20%	87.10%	6.80%
Ireland	16	6.20%	83.90%	9.90%
France	17	6.10%	93.20%	0.70%
Germany	18	5.60%	91.60%	2.80%
Switzerland	19	5.50%	90.90%	3.60%
Latvia	20	5.30%	91.80%	2.90%
Hungary	21	5.20%	93.80%	0.90%
Kosovo	22	5.00%	92.50%	2.50%
Rep Of Moldova	23	5.00%	93.40%	1.60%
Poland	24	5.00%	93.20%	1.80%
Denmark	25	4.90%	93.30%	1.70%
Belgium	26	4.70%	94.50%	0.80%
Malta	27	4.20%	95.10%	0.70%
Portugal	28	4.10%	93.00%	2.80%
Georgia	29	3.70%	94.20%	2.10%
Bulgaria	30	3.50%	95.70%	0.90%
Ukraine	31	3.30%	95.50%	1.20%

Country	Ranking	Under certain circumstances Terrorism is justified	Terrorism must always be condemned	Neither
Belarus	32	2.90%	95.60%	1.50%
Lithuania	33	2.90%	93.50%	3.60%
Russian Federation	34	2.90%	95.50%	1.60%
Serbia	35	2.90%	95.50%	1.60%
Spain	36	2.70%	96.30%	1.00%
Slovak Republic	37	2.10%	95.30%	2.60%
Azerbaijan	38	1.40%	91.00%	7.70%
Cyprus Northern	39	1.40%	96.70%	1.80%

Source: World Values Survey 2008

This ideological predisposition amongst a large part of the Greek society, does not only support the surfacing of grassroots revolutionary movements, such as the student movement that struggled against the Military dictatorship, but it may also nurture an informal social control and justice system, based on revenge and retribution. One of the leaders of the notorious 'November 17' (N17) terrorist group, who claims that the activities of the '17N' were acceptable to the public, notes:

You will not have it your way; I will not enter into your logic. Our moral codes do not accept cooperation and snitching. I will not talk about my role in the activities of the Organisation [November17]. I will not attempt to convince you in which activities I had no involvement. I will not talk about my co-defendants. This is my position and I will defend it regardless of the costs. The '17N' has consistently proclaimed to be an organisation composed by proletarian fighters. It emerged from the bowels of the people, to listen to their voices, promote and

serve their interests and the Organisation [17N] will answer only to the people. Here [in the court] I will only say few simple words about the activities of our Organisation [17N], addressed to those who believed in us, supported us morally, and who felt that we were a hope and a spark [...] a relief where justice was served, something you [the judges], will never be able to provide to the ordinary people.

(Koufontinas, 2003; see also BBC Greece, 2003; Indimedia, 2007)

Finally, the idea that ‘power struggle’ is a key cultural code of the Greek normative system, can be understood when considering the opinions of Greek public regarding the idea of giving more power and respect to the authorities. Surprisingly, only 17% of the survey participants in Greece claim that it is a good thing to have greater respect for authority, when the average for all other countries is 62.4% (WVS, 1999).

## 2.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided a background reading on the political and cultural context of the current case study, so that the reader can approach the empirical case studies from a ‘Greek’ point of view. It is acknowledged that any attempt to give a convincing explanation about the presence or absence of organised crime in a specific country, entails myriad methodological and cultural obstacles (Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010). This is because the analysis, examination and presentation of the empirical data on a specific case study, is the product of the author’s own interpretation of other people’s behaviour in an ‘I think-he-thought’ manner (Asbury, 1990: xiii). Therefore, the reader is asked, in the best-case scenario, to read between the lines, based on what he or she thinks the ‘criminal’ is thinking when behaving in a certain deviant manner. Thus, this chapter aimed to introduce the reader (and the writer) to the ‘mentality’ and way of thinking of the

average Greek citizen, so as to, hopefully, approximate the mentality and way of thinking of the agents (criminals), who are the protagonists of our case studies.

In order to achieve this goal, we sought to examine the historical development of the Greek State focusing on Greek culture, values and attitudes of the present-day. To sum up, we identified and examined three key stages in the development of the Greek State. Starting from the autonomous city states of Ancient Greece, we moved on to emergence of the territorial State and the rise of the Ottoman Empire, followed by the development of the modern European Greek nation-state. Subsequently, we turned our attention on the Greek culture and the values of the Greek public. Through an analysis of the public values surveys, we attempted to isolate and expose a number of interesting cultural codes. Overall, we found that Greek society is characterized by endemic lack of interpersonal trust, low levels of confidence in political and economic institutions, and great suspicion towards outsiders. Nevertheless, we also noted that Greek society is not characterized by political apathy. On the contrary, we found strong evidence suggesting that Greeks rely heavily on the role of the nuclear family, have a very active interest towards political developments and tolerate even extreme political activism. Additionally, this lack of trust is partly complimented by other self-help informal institutions and informal network based on patron-client relations. Taken as a whole, we point out that that the Greek society exhibits strong inertia towards hierarchy and authority which, in our view, explains a much wider disregard for the rule of law and the State. Furthermore, by reviewing the political history of the country, the weakness of the Greek State and its struggle to maintain a hegemonic position within a given territory, appears to be a reoccurring theme.

# Chapter 3: Godfathers of the Night

## 3.1 Introduction

‘Godfathers of the night’ is a label often attached to the leaders and members of criminal groups that participate in both legal and illicit activities such as protection rackets, related to the nocturnal community and economy. In this chapter, we present evidence on the origin, structure and systemic interaction of such groups in Athens. First, we provide a historical overview of the origin and development of this community over the past decades. Second, we present our findings *vis-à-vis* the structure of the contemporary criminal groups that have received media and law enforcement attention. Finally, an effort is made to expose the systemic interaction of this criminal community with the wider social, political and economic system in Greece.

## 3.2 The Evolution of the Athenian Underworld

As suggested earlier in the introduction, the history of urban organised crime in Athens is coterminous with the history of the lumpen underclass and it is regarded as a ‘by-product’ of the country’s path to modernity and capitalism (Damianakos, 2003). Organised crime for the general public and for the majority of the press is mainly related to those illegal activities and dirty businesses conducted during the ‘night’ and/or related to the nocturnal community and market (thus the term Godfathers of the night). It is indicative that in Modern Greek language, the word ‘night’ (η νύχτα) is a synonymous to the term ‘underworld’.

**Table 3.1** Distribution of population in Greece

Census	Urban	%	Semi urban	%	Rural	%	Total
1928	1,913,937	31.1	899,466	14.5	3,374,281	54.4	6,204,684
1940	2,411,647	32.8	1,086,079	14.8	3,847,134	52.4	7,344,860
1951	2,879,994	37.7	1,030,188	14.8	3,622,619	47.5	7,632,801
1961	3,628,105	43.3	1,085,856	12.9	3,674,592	43.8	8,388,533
1971	4,667,489	53.2	1,019,421	11.6	3,081,731	35.2	8,768,641
1981	5,659,528	58.1	1,125,547	11.6	2,955,342	30.3	9,740,417
1991	6,038,981	58.9	1,318,427	12.8	2,902,492	28.3	10,259,900

Source: Pagkakis (2001: 166)

The origins of urban organised crime in Athens date back to the beginning of the 20th century, and run in parallel with the urbanisation and industrialisation of the country (see table 3.1). It is during these social, political and economic transformations that we also note the appearance of the first lumpen groupings (labelled by others as ‘criminal groups’) that distinguish themselves from the rest of the society (Damianakos, 2003: 115). In this context, gambling and drug use are the two main illegal activities the lumpen class will mostly be stigmatised with. However, between the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period during which general levels of criminality in Greece also began to raise substantially, new forms of organised crime become more visible. Hence, these changes created the necessary conditions for the inevitable formation of a ‘social world’ that functions as an informal institution, and supported all the necessary activities required for the operation of illegal markets. Additionally, the growth of the night market and the leisure and entertaining industry, with hundreds of *bouzoukia*<sup>5</sup>, cafes, bars and clubs, along with the improving financial condition in Athens, played a key role in the organisation of criminal activities. The social world that came out would progressively

<sup>5</sup> Night clubs in Greece playing folklore music that feature the Greek lute.

become more organised and better ‘connected’ over the years. Moreover, it would capitalise on those conduct norms embedded in the Greek culture, traditions and activities, which the state has prohibited and/or controls: gambling, drugs, guns, protection and dispute settlement.

### **3.2.1 Phase 1: Organised crime and the Lumpenproletariat**

Gambling and card playing were imported to Greece decades after the proliferation of gambling in China, during the Che Hon Dynasty in the 12th century, and the rest of the west in the 14th century. Yet, over the passage of time, they became an integral part of the leisure time of many middle-aged and elder men in Greece.

One of the earliest references on the delusion and practice of card-playing since the creation of the Greek State, is found in an essay titled “The military life in Greece”, written by an anonymous author in 1856. In this essay, the author discusses the impact of prohibition and provides valuable insight on the enforcement of the law. Moreover, the author implies that the gendarmes would often put the money in their pocket, rather than taking possession of the money on behalf of the state.

Gambling with money was banned in public places and cafes (kafenias). Gendarmes would often raid the cafes and confiscated the money of those who were betting or those who were holding money during the game.

(Anonymous author cited in Katsimardos, 2008)

Along with other leisure activities such as *tavli* (backgammon), cards have always been part of the Greek culture and tradition. Card playing in public spaces or in the *kafenion*, located in village centres, constitutes a key socialising process and an integral part of the everyday life routine. Moreover, the concept of ‘betting’, ‘winning’ and challenging other male peers reflects neatly the stereotypes attached to the traditional Greek

masculine identity. Besides, card playing, betting and gambling (with real or imaginary currency such as beans) is an extensively practiced custom for most Greek families during Christmas time and New Years Eve.

It is widely accepted that the Greek Diaspora, mariners, travellers, merchants and traders, contributed greatly to the establishment and diffusion of gambling in the Greek society. The Greeks of the Diaspora, who were involved in card playing and gambling since as late back as in the mid sixteenth century, had a reputation of cheaters (Picture 3). It is indicative that in some French and English dictionaries of the 19th century, the meaning given to *grec or Greek* also includes a metaphorical meaning of 'rook or swindler' (Roumpanis, 2008). Nevertheless, this custom will find it easy to access the Greek society, and especially in Athens that host the Pireus port, the largest port in Greece and the Balkans.

Similarly, Ange Goudar's book published in 1658, titled "*L'histoire des Grecs, ou de Ceux qui Corrigent la Fortune au Jeu*", provides a similar example. Suggesting that in a large proportion of the western European world, the adjective 'Greek' was perceived to be synonymous with the sinister and malevolent attributions of men who cheat, in order to make a fortune out of gambling. The following quote, from the introduction of this book, shows how the adjective (Greek) was used in that context, and the explicit semantic link between 'Greek' and the terms gambling, gang, network, establishment or even a mafia (*une espèce de corps*):

I begin this story not about the origin of the cheats, because it would have taken it back to the creation of the world, but the establishment of hotels & G<sup>ivres</sup> of Soissons to Paris; this period was that of their consolidation and thereafter they will lent mutual help, and formed a sort of body. It is true that the Greeks had emerge a few years ago in France, and that the most had made considerable fortunes in the game [gambling].

(Goudar, 1658: iv)



In addition, according to the French magician Jean Eugène Robert-Houdin, the reputation of Greeks is attributed to a historical figure named Apoulos, a Royal Knight of Greek origin connected to the royal circles, who became wealthy playing card games. Robert-Houdin explains:

After writing the title of this chapter it is, I believe, necessary to explain to the reader why the compatriots of Homer and Plato reputations is so compromising, and in what circumstances the word Greek has become in our language synonym for crook or swindler. Here are the facts: By the end of the reign of Louis XIV, a Knight of Greek origin, named Apoulos, was admitted to the court. He soon realized the game of profits so large, it eventually arouse suspicions about the nature of his good fortune. Despite his amazing skill, the Knight was caught cheating and sentenced to twenty years in the galleys.

(Robert-Houdin, 1863: 17-18)

Gambling and card playing in Greece gained extensive popularity in cafes, at the centre of rural villages, an image that even today constitutes a powerful stereotype of life in rural communities. With the course of urbanisation, this tradition would also become a key part in the Athenian way of living. Today, the *kafenio*, is a key social institution and a social space populated chiefly by middle age or older men. The prohibition and control of gambling, although contributed greatly to the financial revenues of the state, nevertheless, ignored the customs, culture; conduct norms and practices of a large part of the Greek population. As a result, prohibition regimes and laws became ineffective and people became tolerant to illegality and foul playing (Katsimardos, 2008).

Historically, the first law to prohibit gambling was introduced in 1833. Since the establishment of the Greek state, the rationale for controlling gambling fluctuated between prohibition regimes based on moral grounds,

as well as tax collection tactics. Therefore, on one hand, the State attempts to put in place strict prohibition regimes for card playing and gambling in general. On the other hand, efforts to regulate, control and monopolise this market in order to raise taxes and income for the State, take place. However, it seems that legalisation or semi-legalisation of gambling for tax-collection purposes is, by far, the most prevalent norm practiced by the State (Katsimardos, 2008). Additionally, the popularity gambling received within Greek society, indicates that some basic market forces were created. Reputable individualists, who were involved in that market, will slowly make an appearance in the public discourse and receive media attention. Subsequently, competition between those who provided access to illegal games and entertainment are expected to increase.

However, attempts to prohibit gambling have been met with little success, not to mention unpredictable consequences (Table 3.2). In the 31 of May 1905, the Prime Minister of Greece, Thodoros Deligianis, was assassinated by a man working as a bouncer and lookout in an Athenian illegal gambling house (*mparmpoutiera*). The man, named Kostas Gerakakis, aged 35, stabbed the PM in the stomach, causing his death. According to various newspapers of that time, the motives for the political assassination were related to the prohibition of gambling. The following passage is an original conversation between the assassin and a journalist published in the newspaper 'Empros', days after the assassination of the Greek PM.

**Gerakakis.** Do you wish to ask me anything?

**Journalist.** Yes, was it only your idea to kill the Prime Minister, or you acted on behalf of someone else?

**Gerakakis.** I acted on my own accord.

**Journalist.** What did the PM do to you and you wanted him killed?

**Gerakakis.** He is the source of all my misery. From the day he became involved with public affairs, he had constantly been

repositioning my father. In 1981, he fired him from the Customs.

**Journalist.** And is this why you had to kill him?

**Gerakakis.** I never liked him. Now, that he became Prime Minister, he prohibited gambling. I was initially betting at Mitseas' place, he [Mitseas] was aware that I didn't have much money to bet on, so he asked me to work in the door as a bouncer and that gave me 3-4 drachmas a night. And this is what I did, but now that they are combating gambling, Mitseas could not give me any more money and I couldn't provide for my family.

(Empros, 1905: 2)

The authorities speculated that the assassination was the work of a much larger and organised group. The court transcripts of the group of people involved in the assassination of the Greek MP, that were subsequently published in the press, provide extensive information on the very first criminal networks involved in the gambling market as well as information on their wealth, power, protection rackets and turf wars. The subsequent, is a conversation between the Judge who investigated the murders of Deligianis and Aimilios Drakos, and the editor of the newspaper "Xronos". The conversation shows that the Businessmen involved in Gambling had significant power and ties with the political establishment. Mitseas, who was charged in 1903, later on was also acquitted for murdering Mr. Kalfakakos (Empros, 22-3-1903: 2).

-Did Mitseas ever send people to protect your offices?

-Yes. I went to see Mr. Mitseas because I wanted his support, as Mr. Kalfakakos's people threatened us. Indeed, Mitseas sent two men to escort the General Director and I to our houses.

-Was Mr. Kostagerakakis amongst those two men who protected you?

-I remember very well that he was not amongst those who came. But I cannot know if a third person [him] came in nighttime.

-Why did you not ask protection from the police but you went to ask help from the gambling places instead?

-This depends on the perception of the General Director. Anyway, what is that the police can do?

(Empros, 1906: 23; February: 2)

The conflicts between gamblers, usually due to personal financial reasons and dispute settlement will consist a permanent feature in the Athenian society. Besides, resolving personal economic differences without the interference of the state authorities is also practiced today in various industries. In June 1912, Mitseas and Pantelakos had planned to meet in order to result their differences. When the tension between the men escalated, they started shooting at each other in the daylight. Moreover, a five years old boy, who happened to be close to that incident, was fatally wounded, triggering public and media outrage (Empros, 1912: 3).

**Table 3.2** Arrests on Gambling Charges (1957-2007)

Year	Offenders
1957	583
1967	1,340
1977	2,450
1987	4,357
1997	2,511
2007	1,838

Source: National Greek Statistics Organisation

### **3.2.2 Phase 2: Organised crime, the Athenian petty-bourgeoisie and the new-rich**

The outbreak of illegal gambling, particularly among wealthy circles, provided fertile ground for the growth and the establishment of criminal networks in Athens (Table 3.2). The money involved in illegal gambling

was astronomical. In 1983, for example, the police confiscated 28.250.000 Greece Drachmas (GRD). What is more, only in November of 1983, the police raided 71 gambling safe houses, arrested 482 individuals and confiscated 6.743.000 GRD 2.700 dollars and 300 marks. Considering that the basic wage in 1983 was about 21.000 GRD<sup>6</sup>, these numbers indicate that illegal gambling was becoming a thriving industry. Furthermore, the political stakes were also high. A large portion of those who practiced systematic illegal gambling, were well connected and respectable businessmen, traders, merchants, actors and singers.

To provide an example, in April 1981, the police raided the offices of the Cultural Association of Manufacturers. About 28 individuals were arrested and the police confiscated 454,850 GRD. According to press reports, the offices of the Association that was located in Palio Psixiko, a suburb of the Athenian petty bourgeoisie, were transformed into a 'fortress', with bars behind doors as a protection from external raids (Rizospastis, 1981a).

Consequently, the prohibition of gambling resulted in the growth of an illegal market, where some kind of protection was needed. In a way, that illegal industry created the need for a 'social world' that would provide such protection. The social network that was materialize to provide 'protection' for a market that clearly was still alive, despite the prohibition by the Greek government, was initially composed by carrier criminals, the police, businessmen and club owners. National and local politicians remain invisible, albeit logic suggests the contrary.

Police officers involved in the fight against illegal gambling, will often request from the owners of the cafes where gambling was taking place, to provide them with small, 'gifts' and 'donations', in order to postpone their inspections. For instance, in 1983 a high-ranking officer was arrested and prosecuted for requesting 40.000 GRD from a cafe owner for this reason (Rizospastis, 1983a). Moreover, another case shows the role of club owners

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<sup>6</sup> This was the lowest minimum monthly wage for skilled workers with less than 1 year working experiences and the maximum minimum monthly wage did not exceeded 26.281 GRD per month (For more details see GSEE, 1983: 3).

and businessmen in the illicit gambling. In 1981, the police raided a Vila in Palio Faliro, an affluent high-class area of Athens, owned by two well-known club owners (Rizospastis, 1981b). Two years after this raid, in 1983, the police raided again the Vila and arrested a number of people, including a businessman and a couple of traders, confiscating 1.128.400 GRD (Rizospastis, 1983b).

The improving organisation and sophistication of the first gambling networks can also be seen in the first manifestations of violence between rival groups that protected gambling houses, and other illegal enterprises. In 1982, for example, a bomb exploded destroying a gambling house and the press reported that this was an act of dispute settlement between figures of the Athenian underworld (Rizospastis, 1982). And in 1983, the reported an incident where a bouncer (bravos) murdered a “godfather” (Rizospastis, 1983c). Along with the bars and cafes that provided a safe place for gambling, small business establishments with arcades and pools attracted the interest of the majority of the youth. It is from within these semi-legal enterprises that the first serious and visible crime cabals will emerge (Informant 8, 2010).

### **3.2.3 Phase 3: The ‘control’ of the night**

The third phase in the development of the urban organised crime in Athens, is marked by a struggle to control and dominate the ‘night’ between criminal groups, as well as between criminal groups and the State. It is worth mentioning that membership, social and economic context as well as actors involved in this community, had increased. Thus, the new crowd that is now involved in the night market and the improving economic conditions and opportunities, has played a fundamental role in the transformation of the political role and the significance of the ‘night’.

### **3.3 The case of the Haidari cabal**

The goal in this section is to have a closer look at the organisation and structure of the Haidari cabal. The Haidari cabal is a group that engaged in various illegal activities in the area of Haidari, in the western parts of Athens. The group's activities have attracted much media attention. Additionally, we will examine how the Athenian underworld is organised, by focusing on the structure and organisation of the community (macro level), as manifested by the nature of the relations among its groups as well as, on a group level, by analyzing the inner group dynamics and the interpersonal relations of its members.

#### **3.3.1 Macro level: The night**

Organised crime in Athens and, Greece in general, is strongly associated with groups that provide 'protection'. Most of the criminal groups that mainly engage in protection related activities in Athens have strong local characteristics and tend to operate within specific territorial zones of interest. For instance, one gang member, when asked in the court to comment on the popularity and power of an alleged gang leader, said: 'he is a 'king'; half of the Haidari is owned by him' (3765/2006: 144).

However, police sources and other empirical evidence suggest that the so called 'turfs' of the criminal groups should be considered as 'zones of influence' rather than be rigidly divided by territory amongst the groups (Eleytherotipia, 1996). Still, territories are neither fixed nor rigidly protected turfs where specific gangs have a 'monopoly of power' and sovereignty. Thus, although the local professional, business, and social ties do play a role in defining the scope and operational arena of a group, we can observe that groups tend to exercise relative sovereignty instead of absolute sovereignty over a given territory. Special police reports and information leaked to the Greek press indicate that so far, there are twenty known groups with more than 314 people as regular members (Eleytherotipia, 1996). Furthermore,

the geographical influence of these groups is often located in more than one territory. Some groups, for example, in the wintertime will operate in one area while in the summer time they move to another. Given that a significant number of well established nightlife bars and clubs brands operate close to the centre of Athens in the winter, during the summer they migrate to the southern parts of Athens, closer to the coast line, to a great extent, this mobility is required (3765/2006).

Additionally, there is no conclusive evidence suggesting the existence of an overarching ruling body that monopolizes the night in Athens. Nevertheless, there have been some media reports, citing confidential police reports, that suggest that in two occasions, the leaders of criminal groups held meetings to discuss their zones of influence (Lampropoulos, 2000; Eleytherotipia, 1996). Besides, sensational media reports, supporting the idea that protection is monopolised by a single market, are fairly weak. For example, John who has been involved in extortion rackets in Athens, states: 'The actual number of the groups is not known. Besides, anyone can form a group' (Nesfyge and Mpailis, 2008).

Based on numerous media articles, citing special (secret) police reports and interviews with law enforcement officers working on extortionist networks, the following zones of influence can be identified.

**West Athens:** This is a region that has received considerable media and police attention. Most of the leaders of the groups of Haidari (and Eleysina) are imprisoned or killed. Moreover, it is believed that there are few remaining businesses that continue to pay money for protection, mainly because of the reputation of the established criminal groups. Also, it appears that the main group leaders have now turned to more profitable, and perhaps, less risky and visible legal and illegal activities and are no longer involved in the 'night'.

**North West Athens:** The group that operates in this zone is very active in the prostitution market, mainly at the centre of Athens. The leaders appear



to be ruthless and along with protection rackets, they are particularly interested in providing escort services through newspaper advertisements.

**Bournazi and Psiri:** The present leader of this group used to be the left hand of a renowned criminal figure, who is now dead. Newspaper sources do not reveal the identities of the members, but claim that few years ago, more than 12 members were exposed by police operations.

**Centre of Athens** (Kypseli, Sepolia, Peristeri, Kolonos): The only group that provides protection in that region is headed by a bouncer, described by media reports, as one of the last remaining godfathers who exercise control in that region. Although the centre of Athens is a hot spot for various OC related activities, mainly prostitution and drugs, it seems that those markets are not controlled or protected by any single group.

**East Athens** (Paiania-Spata-Markopoulo-Pallini): Two brothers compose the core leadership of a gang that is active in that zone. In the past, the police investigated them for arms possession and extortion.

**South-Centre Athens:** 1. The groups that engage in protection rackets in the wider Piraeus region are thought to be chiefly controlled by four individuals.

### 3.3.2 Group level: Interpersonal relations and trust

The structure of the underworld groups in Athens is disorganised and lacks hierarchy. Groups are easily dissolved and new partnerships are formed. There is a general fluidity in the number, size and scope of the native OC groups in Athens. Nevertheless, the activities in question require some form of automaticity, organisation and coordination. Therefore, perhaps this is why groups tend to develop atypical hierarchical relations among them.

Following the directions from the leading core of the group, the members were acting as collectors and participated in threats

against businessmen within the location they were controlling. The leaders of each group that controlled the businesses in the regions of Haidari and Eleysina were A.L and I.S. The modus operandi of each member was indicated by V.S. The protection rackets generated from each establishment 30.000 to 50.000 GDR per week and V.S was the final recipient.

(3765/2006: 174)

An informant who owned various bars and other businesses and had ties with various criminal figures expressed the same view. When he was questioned on the nature and structure of the criminal groups in Athens, he also noted that having an accurate estimate is next to impossible:

There are what you call ‘bosses’, who are wealthy people and have significant power in the community. These people have their crews who take care of ‘business’. If there is information that someone is looking for a crew, the leader of a crew will go and ask them if they would like to work together. It’s not what you see in the movies, things are more fluid and partnerships break up very easily.

(Informant 6., 2006)

The ideal scenario is to have your own contacts, then, no one will bother you. ‘Good’ contacts though...with the police, for example. It will cost you much less. Otherwise, you have to choose between two alternatives. Either you will pay protection, so you can go on with your business without problems...or if you make good money, you can employ few guys as stuff, and form your own crew. You will then have to spread it to the word so others will know; if they decide to come for protection money, there will be fighting and shooting.

(Eleytherotipia, 1996)

A former military officer, who had opened a bar around the Piraeus area, expressed a similar view. When he was asked about protection money, he replied:

Yes, they had come for money, but they soon found out that I was in the military, and they were not very persistent. Eventually everyone knew that the 'pilot' owns this bar, so it was kind of outside their scope. I was very well connected and had powerful friends, even before I opened this bar.

(Informant 4, 2007)

This view that organised crime in Athens lacks durability, that is, people do not adhere to a overarching hierarchy for prolonged periods of time, can also be collaborated with the view of an incarcerated professional criminal, interviewed by a researcher in the Koridallios Prisons of Athens.

How did you become involved with the 'night'?

It was my bad luck. One evening when I was 19, a friend of mine and I decided to go somewhere for a drink [...]. Even back then, I was well connected but I was not using (alcohol and drug). Anyway, the bouncers of that place would not allow us to enter. I got angry and we started fighting. I beat them...took their guns...and embarrassed them in front of everyone. I was not looking for a fight, but they were very provocative. Kalimoros and Maniabos [two well know bouncers-protectors] were also there and they showed everything...they liked me.... they said that I've got 'soul' and I don't take no crap [...]. That was it! I was immediately introduced into the world of the 'night'. I got into the group and operated in the Kypseli area. I made loads of money...Just imagine that I would make about

30.000 per night, I had to work one month in construction in order to make such money [...]. I got power...everyone respected me. But after the first phase of excitement, that comes with a sense of leadership, it becomes much more difficult to cope with the harsh reality... I soon realized that you have no friends...only snakes. Nothing counts more than money, control of clubs and cocaine. I was shot three times...by my best friend...Such were the deeds of 'my guys'...Not to mention that they also rated me to the police for murders that I have never committed. We are killing each other. This is why there is no organised crime...how can it possibly exist with so much snitching?

(Svourdakoy, 2003: 181-2)

Another person convicted for similar offences, explains how teachers of martial arts recruit their students. A process with often devastating results.

It is a vicious circle...a reoccurring pattern: They (martial art teachers) recruit 'muscle' for the 'night'. They feed their students with promises and incentives...they use them to make more money, gain power and a better foothold. This way, the leader (teacher), who is not a fighter, gains more power and influence. Leaders use their brain, they don't need to fight. They use the fighters to risk their lives and struggle every night. But at some point the fighters also want to become leaders...then like that...it becomes their goal. They get irrational...and it is at this point when the conflict and back stabbing start. They kill each other and whoever survives becomes the leader, for a short period of time, and so forth. This is why there is no organised crime. They all start together as a group and they end up alone and with many enemies and competitors.

(Svourdakoy, 2003: 172)

Overall, the evidence, in terms of the degree of hierarchy and continuity of organised crime in Athens, is contradictory. This is perhaps related to the specific type of activity under investigation. The large majority of the actors are young men, muscular and athletic, with leadership ambitions and involved in drugs trade, prostitution and whatever goods and service is required by the night economy (Svourdakoy, 2003; Court of Appeal case 3765/2006). Yet, there is a need to point out that these are only the front-runners, or those who are mostly visible to the public.

And it's not only about muscular power. They are the ones who often 'pay the prize'. They go and start troubles but at some point, they will be arrested. Those who have good protection rackets are the ones who remain invisible.

(Nesfyge and Mpailis, 2000)

**Table 3.3** Number of male and female offenders convicted for extortion (1957-2004)

<b>Date</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
1957	28	1
1995	15	0
1996	27	3
1997	25	2
1998	12	1
1999	10	1
2000	16	4
2001	11	0
2002	17	0
2003	27	1
2004	28	0

National Greek Statistics Organization

As we will also see in the following section, organised crime in Athens is linked with the police and underworld figures that have cooperated with the state officials in the past. Both economic and private interests motivate such cooperation but also it often reflects the patrimonial structure that defines the Greek political system. As a result of the protection OC groups enjoy by the police, it is very hard to rely solely on official evidence in order to provide an accurate image of the size and structure of the underworld. Hence, we expect that any information about the real extent and size of the Athenian underworld constitutes a form of silent data that either do not exist, or are not accessible to the researcher. Those groups and verification we have about the 'active' groups are gathered primarily from the press, and are linked with revenge and killings between members. Thus, we know that a criminal cabal exists, mainly from violent activities in the form of assassinations that become known to the general public.

### 3.3.3 Positions within the group

The structure of the groups is often conceptualised by the law enforcement authorities as a volatile hierarchical structure with a cluster of leaders and bosses at the top of the pyramid (graph 3.1). We have identified the following positions.

**Boss:** There are three different career paths for actors who manage to establish themselves as such, within the well-established criminal groups. First, as already mentioned by one of our informants, a boss can be anyone who has significant economic and social (as well as political) resources. Typically, entrepreneurs who participate in legal markets where protection and extra-legal persuasion is required (legitimate bar owner) in order to complete economic transactions are more likely to also become the perpetrators of protection rackets. In such cases, the boss of a group can be an independent businessman who engages in various legal economic activities, such as construction, car dealerships, bar ownership or other activities related to the public sector, and decides to make an investment in


private protection. The entrance into the night community can be in the form of financing other business structures. This can often lead the individual to become a co-owner and thus, slowly to become a player in that community with numerous bars, nightclubs and other related establishments in his control. A second possible career path, is for an actor to enter into the night community directly by investing money into new establishments. This path is motivated by a straight incentive of becoming a player into this legal lucrative market. Frequently, such incentives are driven by the easy opportunities to launder money from other economic activities. In general, the night economy in Athens is principally based on very large amounts of cash payments. Some informants, for example, claimed that rubbish bags were used at the end of every night, and the amount of cash was so great that they would not even bother to count it. Finally, another more risky and dangerous career path is for the lower members of a criminal group to gain more power and strength and subsequently, impose themselves into ownership of clubs and bars.

**Leader/Henchmen:** The leaders and their Henchmen (πρωτοπαλίκαρα) are often childhood friends or very close and trusted friends of the bosses. Additionally, the relationships between the group leaders and the boss are often based on institutionalised social relations, such as god-fatherhood (Court of Appeal case 3765/2006: 142, 140), but direct blood and family ties also play a role. Their function is to operate as wingmen and supervise the day-to-day operations of the businesses. Also, the leaders are responsible for collecting protection money and engage in intimidation and threatening tactics. Their responsibility is the most visible one, and this is why a significant number of intra-group conflicts result into (their) death.

**Bravi, Bouncers/Security:** Under the leaders of a given group, there are often young men who work either as bouncers in clubs and bars, or as security guards in a variety of establishments. The most active and dynamic ones, will often have the opportunity to participate in profitable activities,

and will undertake high-risk tasks such as intimidation, use of violence, and transportation of drugs.

**Diagram 3. 1** Advanced structure of criminal groups



Source: Author's own elaboration

### 3.4 Systemic cooperation

Organised crime, or the 'underworld', is defined as a social system that provides illegal services, protection and mobilises resources to accommodate the needs and demands of the market (Hellenic Parliament, 2001; Court of Appeal case 3765/2006). The power and wealth accumulated by the above mentioned cabal indicates that the order they serve is becoming powerful. Consequently, the upper-world has all the incentives to collaborate with the underworld and vice versa. Moreover, the links between civil society, organised crime and the state, are both based on conflict and co-operation. However, most frequently it seems that co-operation prevails. Cooperation between organised crime and the state takes various forms and shapes. Financial and personal gains are often



considered to be the prime motive. In addition, the police is, by far, the closest organism to interact with illegal acts on a daily basis. There are numerous cases that display the way the underworld interacts and co-operates with the state. Besides, indicators of cooperation between the two worlds can be seen in cases in which the police provide protection for the protectors.

I am a businessman, owner of two shops in Haidari, one restaurant and a coffee shop. My business partner gave money to someone who came to sell us protection. I believe that he [the partner] gave them 'protection money' in two occasions. The third time, my partner and I, had already made a report to the police, but they never came back to collect the protection money [...]. They were asking for money to look after the shops, just in case we 'needed something'. Money was given two times only. We received threatening phone-calls, saying that 'you will give us the money because we know your family and you have to pay', this is what they were saying [...]. First Mr. X collected the money and subsequently, threatening phone-calls began. Moreover, Mr. X said that he collected the money on behalf of Mr. L. After we went to the police and we had the bills marked, none came to ask for money anymore.

(Court of Appeal case 3765/2006: 105)

Your muscles only, cannot always help you. Those who stand against you should realize that you are not joking. I can see that the money I was making was significantly less than the leader of the group. So, I decided (I too, also had my connections) to form my own group. For eight years I've been through every place. I was interested in diverse business establishments. I managed to escape violent situations, although, I had to be

rough in many occasions. From these years of experience, I realized that when you go out you couldn't be polite. Kiosks, cantinas and corner-shops have paid protection money to me. And yes, surely they can't do anything. Where to go, to the police? Do they know to whom they are going to talk to? Don't think that there are no cops who are connected with us.

(Nesfyge and Mpailis, 2000)

Additionally, there are various incentives for acquiring protection from criminal groups. A club owner, for example, notes:

Nevertheless, I have to admit that once that I needed them, they were here within moments. A group of young people not only refused to pay, but they were also making damages. So, I called them. They were here in less than ten minutes. They restored the order. That night they stayed in all night. I didn't want any more fights in my club, so I asked them to be discrete. They followed my wish. They were behaving like they were part of my staff. This gave them freedom of movement, but also kept the police away from the club. So, this strange relationship goes on. As they say: "if you pay, you don't have to worry about a thing". I don't know if you can do differently. But, all you care about is to secure your peace, even by paying them.

(Cited in Nesfyge and Mpailis, 2000)

The recruitment of marines and coast guard officers has been recorded in diverse occasions. The professionals receive extensive training in hand-to-hand-combat, but they are also actors with considerable power, networks and access to valuable information.

I served in the Marine and, there at least, you exercise a lot. When I finished my time with the Marine, I tried to get a job as personal security guard. I didn't make it. In order to stay fit, I started going to the gym. I met different people there. At the beginning, they didn't pay attention to me. One night, five of us from the gym went for a coffee. We had coffees and other beverages and we were drinking till late. We left the place without paying the bill. None from the shop said anything. That was puzzling to me. One guy from the group explained why this is the case and he also proposed me to work with them. I didn't have many alternatives because my financial situation was very bad and my parents couldn't help me [...]. I perceived this offer as a job, and therefore, accepted. We arranged to meet the next day at 10 at night. We visited a bar at the Hilton area [in Athens]. We stayed there less than ten minutes.

(Cited in Nesfyge and Mpailis, 2000)

The most powerful member of the Haidari cabal explains his refusal to cooperate with the police and those who work with them in the nocturnal economy. Retaliation takes different forms and in this case, the offender notes how the police decided to damage his reputation by interfering with his business.

Once, I had 130 cars in the parking and 100 outside from a social event organised by the (political party) New Democracy. The police came and took all the keys and our customers had to go and take their keys back from the police station.

(Court of Appeal case 3765/2006: 141)

One of the police officers, who was involved in surveillance operations against the Haidari cabal, attributes their involvement in the investigation against this network, after the assassination of a Mr.Kala, a key member of the Hlioupoli cabal. The officer vividly describes that although they had in numerous cases reliable information about an ongoing illegal deal, mainly related to smuggling, they never had results:

After the death of Mr. Kala in June 2000, the police unit that investigates crimes, received information that a group of ‘godfathers of the night’ headed by Mr. Laki, had something to do with the murder as revenge to the killing of Mr. Papama [of the Haidari cabal], by Mr.Kala. Our task was to collect and contribute information on Mr.Laki and his group. We found out that he is associated with some other people: Mr.Ste., Mr.Papa, Mr.Chatzi and Mr.Gaba. They all hang out in nightclubs and bars [...]. I didn’t know what they were doing there. On two occasions we had intelligence from SDOE, and with the help of the Coast Guard and the EKAM, we participated in a ‘bust’ that involved smuggling activities but with no results. Every time we organised a bust for smuggling, we never had results. Once we had information about a smuggling deal taking place and we stayed in Mr. Mell’s club till 5:30 in the morning, but the deal never took place. On our way back, a car with Mr. Ste, Mr. Ska and three others [from the Haidari cabal] over-passed our car, and were waiting for as ahead on the road. When we passed them, they were waiting outside of their car with opened jackets, showing as their guns.

(3765/2006:)

According to a confession by an ex-partner of Mr. Stef., in May 2003:

‘A police officer, who works in Zefyri, accompanied Mr. Stef. with two colleagues of his, in order to find a retired prosecutor to help him with his forthcoming criminal charges. He had been both in his house and the country house of another prosecutor, to threaten them about his case. Also, I was informed that they had purchased from a well known jewellery shop expensive jewels as a bribe to three women, who were in a committee, in order to help him with a case. They were talking about clearing him from all charges.

(To Bhma, 2007)

Overall the social world in which the groups participate and supply the by-products of the nocturnal economy is ruled by violence, intimidation and hedonism. This environment however is not alien to the Greek way of life. We have already noted that the structure of the groups maybe hierarchical, but is also volatile. The following quote reveals how an insider views that environment.

-The guys who work at night, do they have a good character?

-The guys are good, but they drift easily...Whoever becomes involved with gangs cannot remain untouched. They develop a bad and violent temper with the extensive use of cocaine. In order to sell protection and use your gun, you must be aggressive, violent; and this can be achieved by using coke. They sniff and go out to work. However, when you take coke you want to have everything for yourself: money, clubs, women, guns, and cocaine. You are not fair and you have neither a clear mind nor judgment. You take forcefully clubs protected by others...and this is how fights and conflicts with other groups start. This is the beginning of the end. One kills the other, brothers rat each other and this is when you face the cold and

brutal reality. You go to prison...if you are lucky...if not, bullets give you the passport for the 'other world'.

(Svourdakoy, 2003: 239)

### **3.4.1 Organised crime and public opinion**

The popular social networking website Facebook, currently hosts a Fun Club of a renown and convicted OC figure. More than 300 Facebook users have joined this group, while there are about twenty messages (posts) left by members. Although the number of messages is fairly limited, some of these messages express in a clear manner, the support and endorsement towards this individual.

-The only thing cops know how to do well, is to smoke spleefs  
(17 February 2010, by K.S)

-That fucking whore [referring to a witness who is under the victim protection program] should be killed. The fucking cops even stay outside her house every night to protect her (15 January 2010, by E.T)

-Anyone who rats should be killed...you are very right boss (10 January 2010, by D.T)

-Happy New Year BOSS!!!! (01 January 2010, by G.D)

-OMERTA!!!! DON STEFANAKO (31 December 2009, by G.D)

-Hi Boss (30 December 2009, by E.A)

-The town of Eleusina is entirely by your side (29 December 2009, by E.T)

-Hello king of the night! (30 December 2009, by P.M)

-BRAVI FROM ALL AROUND GREECE UNITE TO MAKE  
A GOVERNMENT (11 September 2009, by N.L)

-BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU SAY.... NOT ALL ARE TRUE  
MEN...YES IN THE UNION, BUT ONLY WITH OUR  
TRUSTED LADS (13 September 2009, by F.P)

-He is simply the 'god...(11 March 2009, P.S)

(Facebook.com, Billy Stefanakos Fun Club)

This instance may be indicative of a new trend. As social networking sites become popular, 'criminals' might begin to take more and more advantage of them in order to communicate with the public and friends, even from within prisons and perhaps even for intimidating purposes. However, what it is also noteworthy is the development of groups of appreciation and fun clubs. Moreover, another figure that has allegedly cooperated with Mr. Stef. to escape from Koridalos prison using a helicopter, has also been embraced with enthusiasm in the Facebook platform. Indicatively, a group called 'Paleokostas Airlines' counts 10.6154 members (table 2).

**Table 3.4** Online discussion forums devoted to the Paleokostas Brothers

Name of Facebook Group	Number of members
Paleokostas Airlines	10,613
Palaiokostas airport: escape with security	547
Support the pilot of the hijacked helicopter of Paleokostas jail-break	545
Paleokostas: A Robin Hood	506

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Vassilis Paleokostas Fan Club	367
Paleokostas Imperial Airlines	356
Paleokostas Fun Club	288
Paleokostas.... give him Pardon from the state	246
Basilis Palaiookostas !!!!Forever!!!!	169
Paleokostas	131
Hotel Koridalos, Paleokostas line	102
Palaiookostas Check in!!!	85
Vassilis Paleokostas is a Badass	59
I was also in that Helicopter	35
Vassilis Paleokostas: The BiggestBadass	33
Paleokostas for Prime Minister	29
Paleokostas-Rizai	27
Prison Break or Paleokostas Jail Break?	11

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Source: facebook.com (data accessed May 2009)

### 3.5 Systemic Conflict

In the previous section it was suggested that cooperation between organised crime and the various sub-systems could be imminent. However, it is interesting to scrutinize the reason why, as well as the factors contributing to successful prosecutions of groups by the state. Interestingly, one of the main leaders of the Haidari cabal (Mr. Stef.), who is a well-established car dealer and owner of a number of clubs, narrates how the ‘system’ trapped him. He inclines that a woman, who was a key protection witness in one of the most significant maxi trials originally involving 44 suspects, until half of them were later acquitted, was acting in favour of the police or the system itself. According to his claims, the system tries to control the night market.



He then goes on to explain the reason why he became involved with this case, in the first place:

Nothing about my involvement in protection rackets is true [...]. The police is involved with protection rackets, they want to have control of the 'night'. I was very surprised with these charges. Maybe I will create hatred against me with these thoughts, but they wanted a big case, they had already the warrants from the prosecutor. These are contacted containers, someone had the need to climb the hierarchy and he wanted a big case. Maybe my involvement with the nightclubs has caused concern to some people. When a newcomer enters into this business [it is inevitable to create conflicts]. I dare you all, to go and see for yourselves that 'half' of the secret police is working in nightclubs. I refused to let them come and work in my clubs.

(Court of Appeal case 3765/2006: 141)

It seems that attempts to control and prosecute these groups are not very promising for a number of reasons. First, there is an obvious practical difficulty regarding the information that can be used in courts. Given the nature of these criminal activities, that entail elements of extortion, blackmail and the use of violence, victims are not likely to give statements to the police. Consequently, without such statements the police is not in position to arrest or charge the individuals involved. In some occasions, where a person is charged charges and therefore, convicted, the penalty is trivial. Thus, it seems to be in the interest of both the victims and the offenders not to co-operate with the police.

The public should know that, it's not that we don't know them [oc groups]. Indeed, we know them very well, at least most of

them, the ‘big’ names [...] Yet, we cannot arrest them because, according to the law, protection, that is to say extortion, is a crime that the police can only investigate following a report by the victim. It is the owner of a business establishment who should first come forward to make a named report and then we can start the investigation, otherwise our hands are tied. Most of the victims if not all, are intimidated to come forward and for very good reasons. From the side of the police, there is all the good will despite the problems we have within our service. But the public is not co-operating with us. We are forced to wait for the moment they start killing each other, in order to enter into the game. Indeed, we receive plenty of information, which however, cannot be sufficient if relying on the information provided by the general public only. Even when we press charges against them, most often these are on illegal use and possession of firearms, and not on extortion charges. We have proposed through our service, to change this legal framework. But above all, we need good co-operation with the victims.

(Eleytherotipia, 1996)

In the case we have examined involving a cabal from the west of Athens, the previous police officer's statement seems to also be true. Although the illegal activities of some people was known to the police and to the local communities for many years (Informant 8, 2010), the police could only start investigation the activities of this networks after the murder of a leader (T.K) of a rival network.

In 25-7-2000, Mr. T.K., who had allegedly formed a group with others in order to engage in protection rackets, was murdered in the region of Sxinias-Marathonas, in Attica. Few days following his assassination, the security service received information indicating that Mr. T.K was killed by members of a rival

criminal group, also participating in extortion rackets in the regions of west Attica (Haidari, Aspropirgos-Elefsina). Mr T.K.'s killing was an act of revenge, as he was allegedly responsible for the murder of T.P., who was a leading figure of the rival group that took place in early 2000. The information suggested that S.X, I.G, and A.K. were the main perpetrators and that V.S, A.L, I.S, S.P. and G.M. organised of the assassination. Despite the police investigation, a ruling by the Court of Appeals (1929/2004), concluded that the evidence were not sufficient to prove these accusations and this is why the investigation (for murder) was terminated. However, during the surveillance of these individuals in relation to the charges for the murder of T.K [...] the police officers had credible suspicion that the offenders [V.S, A.L, I.S, S.P. and G.M.] had formed a criminal organisation and extorted various businessmen in the region west of Attica, with the explicit aim to make economic gains. Moreover, in order to persuade the businessmen, they used intimidation and threats against them, their families and against their business establishments. However, the police could not gather sufficient confirmation to prove these suspicions. The businessmen will often admit, in personal and informal conversations with the police officers, that this criminal group extorted them, but they will not come forward to make an official accusation. By the end of May 2002, the suspicion of the police officers was further supported by more hard evidence [...]. The illegal activities of this criminal group are proven by the statements provided by the key witnesses in the civil action, the depositions of other witnesses and those provided by the police officers.

(Court of Appeal case 3765/2006: 36-37)

### **3.6 Organised crime and Terrorism nexuses**

The theory that organised crime and terrorism are ‘connected containers’ is a very old theory, often expressed by the dominant political elite in Greece (Allum and Kostakos, 2010). The theory of the connected containers stipulates that organised crime groups that participate in various illegal activities, ranging from theft, armed robbery, assassinations, extortion and money laundering, are connected with other criminal groups that also participate in illegal activities but have a much stronger ideological agenda. Reliable journalist work suggests that these links are mostly formed within prisons (Lampropoulos, 2010). Many cases indicate that there are indeed links between ordinary crime, and terrorism. Also, there are a number of imprisoned offenders who have a very strong ideological appeal and popularity amongst the rest of the inmates. Those offenders are usually segregated and are not in contact with the general prison population. Therefore, it seems that criminals with a strong political identity can act as a means for the good, as they can be used both by the prison guards and the justice system, in order to maintain some kind of order within prisons.

This particular discourse, in conjunction with the much more intense hegemonic discourse that emerged in the international community, especially after the end of the Cold War with the so called nexus between crime and terrorism and the war on terrorism, has given additional motivation and political power for the state authorities in Greece, to actively pursue policies and to pass laws against organised crime and terrorism. In fact, Greece is perhaps the only country within the EU, where there is no differentiation between organised crime and terrorism (Lambropoulou, 2005; Symeonidou-Kastanidou, 2007; Xenakis, 2004). In other words, terrorist groups are treated by both the legal system and organised crime (Hellenic Parliament, 2001). The next quote is an extract from an interview with Mr. Stef from the Haidari cabal. Police circles are trying to link him and his group with the Urban Guerrillas and this is partly a response to such claims.

Q. Are there any links between organised crime and terrorism; the theory of the 'connected containers', is it true?

A. I have seen people being terrorized by unemployment. It causes terror to the citizens when they cannot find a job, when they cannot provide the basic needs to their young children. The idea of becoming ill and not finding a free bed in the hospital generates fear. Uncertainty about the future is very fearful and modern-day slavery with the short-term employment contracts and Stage programmes is also terrorizing. Old people are also terrorized by the idea that their pensions are not secured. It is also terrifying when thugs do not hesitate to use firearms for personal financial gains. But, it is equally terrifying to see the Rambo-like figures, who are supposed to serve and protect the citizens (police officer) [...] especially when they have this weird look in their eyes and above all, the interlinked containers among the mass media, government and the opposition. Not only is this nexus terrifying, but it also deteriorates society. All these things that cause terror are generated by the system and he who causes the most terror, is the voter who maintains this system.

Q. You are not answering the question...

A. I do not accept the terms. I believe that I have given you an answer about who are the terrorists and what criminal offenses most Greeks commit, in a way that when some people talk to each other, at least in my logic, can be recorded as communication. Now, if I want to address those cheap police scenarios regarding the communication between some people with others, as the song says, when you are being forced by the conditions to be 'classified with the damned' inevitable in the

‘wet and sunless allays of the deceitful and unjust world’, you come across people with no tags and labels [...].

Q. Are you equating politicians with terrorists?

A. I would prefer to share a house with those people the police label as terrorists, because they will not hurt my children. I wouldn't like to live with cops because they would round up my children, neither with journalists because they would nose around and then distort what was said; not to mention the politicians who would steal the household budget!

Q. The word in the streets is that ‘people of the night’ supply arms to terrorists...

A. The infamous AK 47 first appeared in Eastern Europe around 1947. The state authorities have always controlled the arms industry. Therefore, it is from the hands of arm manufacturers, who are controlled by the authorities that these arms end up where they end up.

(Stefanakos, 2009)

The explanation put forward by Stefanakos, turns the crime-terror nexus theory around, suggesting more or less that such theories facilitate political and economic interests and agendas. In another occasion, during the same interview, Stefanakos states that: ‘Linked containers are probably their ‘empty heads’ and their dirty pockets. Ideas and opinions do not need pipes to communicate’. This position suggests that by looking at the political economy behind the so-called crime-terror nexus, we can begin deconstructing this modern political discourse.

## 3.7 Conclusions and Implications: Beyond Greece

In this chapter we have looked at the past and present dynamics of criminal groups in the capital of Greece, Athens. Our holist theoretical framework presented in the introductory chapter points out that there is a confluence of factors that affect the formation and evolution of organised crime (Diagram 1.1). So, how close is the theory with the empirical data and what are the implications for the existing research?

The structure of the groups that participate in the night-time economy is hierarchical, but the hedonistic environment and lack of trust renders them extremely volatile to police interference. This is in line with existing research findings that associate the *task environment* and *social organisation* with the organisation and structure of criminal enterprises (Hall and Winlow 2005; Smith, 1980, 1994, Hobbs, 1998). Additionally, social organisation seems to be a strong factor that influences the rise of some criminal activities, such as protection, dispute settlement, extortion, drug trafficking and prostitution. Thus criminal communities seem to be embedded into pre-existing social and economic structures. We have also found strong elements of symbiosis between the upperworld and the underworld. Cooperation and support by the police, civil society as well as from other businesses is forthcoming (Allum, 2010, 2006). More research is needed here to determine the nature of this symbiosis. We have also seen that the leaders of criminal groups not only adopt a more politicized defence line, but may have also established links with the Urban Guerrilla groups. This claim requires further investigation in order to established the extent and visibility of the nexus between crime and terrorist networks. Nevertheless, the key finding here is that criminal organisations tent to seek to form linkages with pre-existing structures. Organised crime in other words is not a *sui generis* phenomenon (Hill, 2003, Varese, 2005). It is an epiphenomenon of social organisation and a by-product of our everyday

life. This conclusion challenges the mainstream view that sees organised crime as an alien phenomenon closely associated with illegal migration.

Penal statistics show that Greece, which is a relatively small and highly homogenous country, has historically the highest rates of foreign prisoners in Europe. In 2006, for example, foreign prisoners (including pre-trial detainees) accounted for 58.4 per cent (58.4%) of the total prison population in the country (Council of Europe, SPACE, 2006: 35).<sup>7</sup> Therefore, official statistics on crimes committed by foreigners support the thesis that the rising rate of serious crime in Greece is caused by foreign mafias. Indeed, the perception that organised crime is an 'imported phenomenon' is prevalent in the Greek press and in the public opinion (Antonopoulos, 2009, 2010). However, the evidence gathered on the role of Greek culture provides a good critique to the alien conspiracy argument.

Culture is irrefutably an esoteric driver that enables people to behave in deviant ways (Allum and Sands, 2004). The control over territory and thus over legal, illegal and/or semi-legal enterprises often leads to violent confrontations between the groups as well as between the groups and police. Lack of trust to the Greek state as well as to institutions is also central in fostering deviant behaviour especially in terms of dispute settlement and protection rackets. The degradation of institutions and a much wider tendency to lawlessness (Varese, 2005, 2010; Gambetta, 1993, 2000) also provide opportunities for the emergence of various illegal activities in the Greek society.

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<sup>7</sup> At the European level the median was 9.8, mean was 20.3, maximum was 97.3 (Monaco) and minimum 0.1 (Albania).



# Chapter 4: Cocaine Barons

## 4.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter<sup>8</sup> is to examine a number of case studies of groups the authorities investigated for cocaine smuggling activities. Over the past years, and more specifically, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Greek criminological map was expanded with the networks that imported and trafficked large amounts of cocaine in Greece and Europe (Hellenic Parliament, 2001: 1). The key actors behind these large-scale operations are widely known to the Greek public as the ‘Cocaine Barons’. This term implies a position of power, superiority and dominance over the rest of the criminal groups that operate in the country. Based on all available sources, our goal is to reconstruct the origin of illicit networks that import in Greece or transport throughout the world, large quantities of cocaine. Additionally, the chapter looks at the structure of these groups, the way the actors are connected with each other, and the kind of labour division these groups have. Following that, will investigate the ‘extent’ and features of this particular trade in the country, placing considerable emphasis on the ‘Greek legitimate connections’; Greek nationals from the ‘upper-world’, who have been heavily involved in the particular trade in Greece (and beyond). Finally, the policing of cocaine smuggling is analysed based on the cases examined, in an effort to scrutinize the fundamental factors that have led to arrests. If we assume that the cocaine market is part of the body of knowledge widely defined as ‘organised crime’ (von Lampe, 2001), then the empirical data provided in this chapter can shed more light on the theoretical understanding of ‘organised crime’ in Greece.

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<sup>8</sup> An early version of this chapter was published in the Journal Global Crime and under a different title (see Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010). Only the work of the first author is presented in this chapter with permission by the second author of the article.

## 4.2 The origin of Smuggling in Greece

Cocaine smuggling is a lucrative enterprise and can be seen as the most prestigious position in the career path of professional drug smugglers (Pappas, 2009). Nevertheless, an accurate image of the cocaine industry-just as in any other drug industry- tumbles into a number of ‘conceptual, technical and political issues’ (Thoumi, 2005: 186-7). Furthermore, cocaine profits attract risky and shady entrepreneurs as well as other ‘interest groups’, who will often opt for an easy way out, or seek hasty and easy access to large sums of money. Therefore, legitimate businessmen and traders are extensively exposed to financial risks. Yet, they have a great technological expertise on environment tasks and, more importantly, have the ability to control, or manage risks associated with law enforcement interference. There are numerous cases suggesting that legitimate entrepreneurs enter into the cocaine smuggling business, when the survival of their legal business portfolio is at risk. From a cultural perspective, these traders and sea merchants are professionals who have been underpinned by conflicting norms, and whose morality and norms of conduct have been affected by a strong historical involvement in smuggling and deviant practices. Moreover, the Greek trader and sea merchants’ reciprocal and symbiotic relationships with the political system have been central in the development of the Modern Greek State (Close, 2002: 46, 53).

Cocaine is extracted from coca leaves, mainly cultivated in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia (UNODC, 2008). Thus, close proximity to source countries and large internal markets played a catalytic role in the expansion of the cocaine trade in the Western hemisphere. However, Europe was largely unaffected by this phenomenon, and cocaine was consumed primarily by privileged individuals. Still, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), cocaine consumption in Europe is constantly increasing, whereas retail and wholesale prices are dropping, and purity levels are improving (UNODC, 2008). The growth of the European market appears to reflect partly the changing dynamics in the American market. The decline of

the American market, which was affected by significant law enforcement efforts as well as saturation related to the nature of the product in question, is believed to have contributed to the establishment of smuggling channels in the European continent. Although not always successful, cocaine traffickers have always been keen in exporting their product across the Atlantic, in search of reliable connections and rising markets. Our investigation indicates that trans-national smuggling networks sought to establish stable connections with markets in the Middle East via the Indian Ocean. The venture was exposed in a 1961 U.N. report on the expansion of cocaine smuggling, and subsequently action was undertaken by Interpol in order to monitor smuggling channels in the Mediterranean (Taxydromos-Egypt, 1962:3).

Within the relatively new market setting for cocaine, focus is given on the cocaine market in Greece. It can be argued that the Greek case has a series of 'competitive advantages' (Zaitch, 2003: 7-17) in the development of the cocaine market in Greece and beyond. Firstly, the Greek cocaine market, although moderately small in volume, is one of a relatively long history, and one that has been quite vibrant. Our archive examination has revealed that cocaine smuggling, contains similarities in characteristics with the present moment situation, while its existence in Greece dates back to as early as the 1910s and 1920s (Skrip, 1926:1, 1929:3). Back then, interpersonal networks of professionals, legal businessmen, law enforcement agents, tourists and travellers as well as the 'high society', imported small quantities of the merchandise on a regular basis. More specifically, Western and central European markets, particularly France, where consumption of cocaine in the first decades of the 20th century was significant, constituted a fundamental transit point for cocaine destined for the Greek market. Accurate sources designate that smuggling networks used to have ties with individuals linked with the night-time economy establishments in Marseilles, Alexandria and Istanbul, which provided significant amounts of cocaine and other drugs for transportation and consumption in Greece (Skrip, 1928a: 6, 1930:1). Steamboats from France (Skrip, 1928b: 2) and

Greek yacht owners (Skrip, 1929:3) were often mentioned in cocaine smuggling. Additionally, during this 'first stage' of the cocaine market, health professionals such as pharmacists are reported to have been heavily involved (Skrip, 1928a: 6). These experts played a central role in retail distribution of cocaine (as well as other drugs). Later on, individuals of Greek nationality, primarily from the shipping industry, were among the first to facilitate the transportation of large quantities of cocaine in Europe, from 1970s onwards. Nevertheless, the aforementioned trends were heavily influenced by the relatively large and dynamic Greek Diaspora communities in the Mediterranean basin, and South America (Prevelakis, 2005: 272-5; see also: Paoli and Reuter, 2008; Zaitch, 2002a), as well as the large shipping industry and related professions. An indicative role of the mariners' past of the Greek Diaspora is the case of small East coast American town called Tampa bay. A Greek expat, called Mike Tsalickis (or Jungle Mike), a well-established businessman in the Caribbean, was involved in the largest confiscation case of cocaine smuggling in the USA in 1988 (Vick, 2009).

Secondly, a more recent political development indicates that cocaine is increasingly entering from neighbouring Balkan countries, whereas the socio-economic attributes and sophistication of the actors appear to have changed (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2007: 50-3). For instance, the restricted Europol reports maintain that cocaine smugglers in the Albanian port of Vlorë and in the town of Fieri, transport cocaine from Colombia to Montenegro, and then to Western Europe (Europol, 2001). In the same way, Bulgarian smugglers transport cocaine to western markets by ship (Eleytherotipia, 2002; Europol, 2001). Hence, reports stating a rising trend in cocaine consumption in Greece could be attributed to the fact that Greece is surrounded by many countries with porous borders (UNOCD, 2008).

Thirdly, the Greek state has been suffering from endemic corruption (Transparency International, 2009). In an interview that took place in 2009, a legitimate businessman who engages in the importation and exportation of

products vividly narrates: “In the past you needed to bribe public officials in order to ask for some kind of an illegal favour. Nowadays, you bribe them in order to be effective in their job. We are, perhaps, the only European country where you need to bribe employees in the public sector to do their job as they should” (Informant 5, 2009). The bottom line is that the general institutional crisis, and low trust in the country’s authorities, supports a widespread perception among the general public that ‘nothing works’.

Fourth, to the author's knowledge, no study has yet been conducted specifically on the social organisation of the Greek cocaine market, and/or the involvement of the Greek context in the international cocaine trade. However, there seems to be congruence among media, political and law enforcement circles in the idea of who is involved in the cocaine market, and a clear-cut view regarding the morality of the actors involved. A number of studies suggest that two sets of actors exist: the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ (van Duyne and Antonopoulos, 2009). The ‘good’ actors are usually those who ‘fall prey to drug dealers’, the authorities, who are there supposedly to protect the public, and the legal enterprises, who are victimised by their ‘underworld’ counterparts. On the other hand, the ‘bad’ actors are always those who trade the merchandise, and who actively or passively facilitate the trade: criminals, the corrupt official, the so-called ‘others’ (Antonopoulos, 2009) and anyone else who lives off law-abiding citizens in a parasitic way. This well-established view, along with the lack of knowledge on the cocaine business in the country, makes the need for research on the topic in Greece, imperative.

The increasing liberalization and internationalization of the global economy and the free movement of capital, have created a transnational framework within which a fruitful environment was created for new forms of illegal activities. This kind of activities exhibit the following characteristics: i) Hierarchical structure ii) Division of labour iii) Enterprise iv) Interpersonal networks v) Continuity vi) Transnational scope. As a consequence, many businessmen, mainly ship-owners, take advantage of the aforementioned

economic environment when dealing with huge financial debts from their shipping businesses, or when looking for super-profits, many times larger than their legitimate business activities. . Therefore, from the beginning of 1990s, they entered in criminal organisations and created a transnational network that facilitated illegal transportation of cocaine, primarily from Latin American countries to either North America, or Western Europe (Court of Appeals in Athens, case 2585, 2005: 1043).

## 4.3 The rise of the cocaine market in Greece

### 4.3.1 Context setting: Cocaine use, price and purity in Greece

Generally, even though cocaine was not widely consumed at that time, concern about (illegal) cocaine use was raised after World War I, and particularly in the 1920s (Ruggiero and South, 1995). A similar trend was noticed in Greece. More specifically, articles found in the Greek press on the use of cocaine and smuggling in the 1920s (Skrip, 1929:3), have references on the use of cocaine in Greece as early as in the 1930s. Moreover, accounts of the media, as well as the prohibited *Rebetika* songs, often celebrate the use of drugs (and smuggling). In 1932, for instance, Panagiotis Tountas' song, called 'Why I smoke cocaine', has been considered as one of the most influential songs within this tradition. Another *rebetiko* song named 'Prussa', narrates the story of an expat from Prussa, a former Greek city in the northeast part of Turkey, when boarding onto a he ship back to Greece. The lyrics go: *'I could not get away, on my way back from Prussa. I was snitched by some bravi [henchmen], and they caught me on the ship. I had sewn inside my jacket, two bags of 'black' [cannabis] and in my hollow heels, I had them filled up with heroin'.*

In general terms, Greece is a country to that has recorded relatively low levels of use of illicit drugs, compared to other countries of the European Union (EMCDDA, 2008). The trend in cocaine use among the general Greek population has remained almost identical to the trend for overall

illicit drug use in the last 20-25 years. Specifically, according to Greek REITOX Focal Point (2006), there has been a remarkable increase from 1998 onwards, followed by a decrease in 2004. It is worth mentioning that in 1998, only 1.1% of the overall Greek population consumed cocaine. The equivalent percentage among the student population was 2%. Moreover, among participants from the clubbing scene, cocaine was the most popular drug after cannabis. It is estimated that 25% of young participants (aged 15-30) that go out to nightclubs, have consumed cocaine at least once in their lifetime. The percentage for the year 1998 was only 11.9, respectively (Kathimerini, 2007). Results indicate that the percentage of the recorded cocaine users during this period has more than doubled. Interestingly, cocaine is primarily consumed by males, although evidence is inconsistent. For example, among participants in the nightlife, the percentage of cocaine as a recreational drug, was 28.6% for females and 18.8% for males, respectively (Greek REITOX Focal Point: 2008).

Recently, there has been an increase in the prevalence of cocaine use among non-Greeks. For example, in 2006, the percentage on non-Greeks who used cocaine as a primary substance, was 3.1% (Greek REITOX Focal Point, 2007). It is widely acknowledged that cocaine users have a higher educational and socio-economic level compared to other drug users. Following the example of many cases in the international jet set, many famous Greek actors, singers as well as models have been arrested for cocaine possession and use (Ethnos, 2007; Ta Nea, 2008). However, although relatively recently (since the early 2000s), the social and educational base of the cocaine clientele has been broadening (Greek REITOX Focal Point, 2004; Saxionis, 2008). Nevertheless, as some of our interviewees who have working experience in prisons in Greece have noted, the number of cocaine addicts in prison is extremely low in comparison to those addicted to other drugs such as heroin, cannabis and synthetic drugs (Kokkoris, 2009; Aravantinos, 2009; Informant 7, 2009).

As expected, the vast majority of cocaine users do not consider themselves as addicts. Consequently, only a very small proportion seeks treatment. Besides, only a small percentage of the drug users who have been in treatment, consume cocaine as a primary drug. For instance, in 2005 and 2006, the percentages of cocaine users in the total population in drug treatment were 2.4% and 2.6%, respectively. However, it is interesting to note that the number of people seeking treatment for cocaine has more than doubled from 2002 to 2005. Among this group, 25.4% reported consumption of cocaine on a daily basis, whereas among those having reported multiple drug use, 31.5% reported cocaine as the second most common, drug (Greek REITOX Focal Point, 2007).

In 2005 and 2006, there were 400 cocaine-related deaths in the European Union (Eleytherotipia, 2007). Yet, this particular substance is not responsible for a significant number of drug-related deaths in Greece. This is probably the reason why there has not been a ‘moral panic’ about it. Specifically, there have been 17 cocaine-related deaths for the period from 1993 to 2007. However, there have been cases which attracted considerable media attention, such as the death of a fourteen-year-old female student from Northern Greece in the beginning of 2008 (Tsigganas, 2008; Kantouris, 2008). Again, the numbers in relation to cocaine-related deaths may be somehow misleading. The Director for the Implementation of Rehabilitation Programs of O.KA.NA (Kokkoris, interviewed in 2009) argues that ‘given that cocaine use is more prevailing in the higher levels of society, it is very possible that for social reasons, cocaine-related deaths are registered as ‘natural deaths’ instead of ‘violent deaths’, linked to cocaine abuse’.


### **4.3.2 Official Statistics and Data on Cocaine Smuggling in Greece**

The cocaine detained in Greece is seized by the Greek Police, the Customs and the Coast Guard. Also, there is a small part of the merchandise which is



held by the Bureau for Special Inspections. From 1980 to 2006, 2,582.181 kilos of cocaine were seized by the Greek authorities (Graph 1) (SODN-EMP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; MPO, 2008; UNODC, 2008).

**Diagram 4.1. Detentions of cocaine (in kilos), in Greece (1980-2006)**




Source: SODN-EMP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; MPO, 2008; UNODC, 2008

Overall, the recorded quantities of the detained cocaine are considerably smaller to the quantities of seized cannabis, and slightly lesser than those of heroin. For example, even after 1994, when there was an increase in the amounts of cocaine seized by the Greek authorities, the quantities of cannabis and heroin consistently exceeded those of the seized cocaine. The only exception is documented in 2004, when a single bust resulted to the detention of more than a ton being (Graph 2) (SODN-EMP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; MPO, 2008), whereas the overall quantity of cannabis seized from 1999 to 2006, was more than 97.5 tons.

The available data show that there are fluctuations in the quantity of cocaine seized by the Greek authorities, specifically from 1980 to 2006. Of special interest is that in 2004, the Greek authorities held more than one ton of cocaine, whereas in 2005, the amount of cocaine seized was as small as 43 kilos. This difference constitutes a drop of about 96.3% from the previous year. However, this variation may not, of course, reflect an actual instability

in the cocaine market in Greece and the rest of European markets which are linked to Greece, but merely cases of successful operations on behalf of the authorities. In addition, it is important to note that the figures presented here are official statistics that, nevertheless, do not provide an integrated picture of the actual size of the cocaine market in the country. Hence, figures reflect only those quantities that the Greek authorities encountered and are, therefore, figures prone to ‘contextual variables’ (von Lampe, 2004), such as intensity of law enforcement in the country.

**Diagram 4.2.** Detentions of cannabis, heroin and cocaine (in kilos), in Greece, (1999-2006)



Source: SODN-EMP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; MPO, 2008; UNODC, 2008

Another important seizure-related parameter is that the Greek authorities participate in joint investigations with law enforcement agencies from other countries outside the Greek sovereignty, such as the US and Italy. It seems that this partnership is related to information about the cocaine bulk ending up in Greece. In August 2000, for instance, an investigation that involved the Greek Police, the Greek Coast Guard, and the Greek Bureau for Special Inspections, and the US Drug Enforcement Administration, which lasted nine months, ended up in the detention of 9.5 tons of cocaine off the coast of Venezuela. Still, although the quantity was destined for Greece and Greek law enforcement agents were involved in its seizure, the capture was

not included in the overall seizures of the Greek law enforcement authorities. The following table (Table 1) shows a sample of successful law enforcement operations, in which the Greek authorities were heavily involved (YEN, 2008; author's own research). However, confiscation took part in countries around the world, and therefore, the seized quantities presented here, are not attributed to the Greek authorities.

**Table 4.1 Selected** sample of International seizures of large quantities of cocaine transported by vessels registered to Greek companies

Month –Year	Kg Cocaine	Name of Vessel
December 2008	100 Kg	“Astro Saturn”
February 2007	1,500kg	“Blaus VII”
February 2007	4,000kg (estimate)	“Oct Challenger”
July 2004	5,400 Kg	“Africa I”
May 2003	3,600 Kg	“Cork”
June 2002	5,000 Kg (estimate)	“Winner”
April 2003	2,140 Kg	“Irene”
August 2000	10,000 Kg	“Suerte I”
May 1999	4,000 Kg	“China Breeze”
January 1999	4,310 Kg	“Cannes”

Source: YEN (2008); Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010; author's own research.

Finally, cases where the merchandise was thrown into the sea when law enforcement agencies approached a cocaine-transporting vessel, are also not included. For example, in June 2002, two tons of cocaine were thrown into the sea when French war ships approached a Greek ship, under the Cambodian flag, transporting cocaine (YEN, 2008). Not surprisingly, the vast majority of cocaine detained in Greek territory, is seized in the greater areas of Athens, with some exceptions. The fact that in 2001, 97% of the cocaine held in Greek sovereignty was seized in the prefecture of Attica, and specifically the port of Piraeus, highlights our estimation that the port has a central role in the cocaine business.

### 4.3.3 Sources of merchandise, transportation methods and routes

Greece is not perceived as a cocaine production country. However, during my empirical investigation I have come across one case where cocaine was

produced in the country. The Bureau for Special Inspections, with the assistance of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Greek National Intelligence Service (NIS), found and dismantled a cocaine production laboratory in Anavyssos, a community in the prefecture of Attica. There, cocaine powder was processed before being introduced into markets in Western Europe. The objective of the particular laboratory, which was described by the Greek media as ‘the first cocaine laboratory in Europe’, was to prevent the loss of merchandise during the transportation phase, since ‘coca paste’ is not easily detectable. According to the authorities, this laboratory had employed a Venezuelan chemist, and a British citizen, who supervised the production and resale of the cocaine (Bureau for Special Inspections, 2007). Nevertheless, as noted before, the cocaine produced in Greece was destined to supply various European markets, and not solely the Greek market, which relies primarily on South American merchandise.

In general, trends in cocaine smuggling into Europe, and Greece in particular, can only be fully grasped when having a broader perspective of the general routes of the cross-Atlantic maritime trade and travel patterns. Unlike heroin, which is transported mostly via land routes, cocaine is mainly smuggled into Europe via maritime routes. The task environment suggests that cocaine smuggling has a symbiotic relationship with maritime trade and tourism.

The largest volume of the merchandise originates from South America, specifically from Colombia. Aggregating statistics for a six-year period, between 2001 and 2006, show that during this period, the Greek authorities seized approximately two tons of cocaine. Furthermore, as shown in Table 2, police investigations concluded that more than 1.5 tons of cocaine originated from South America, which accounted for 78.9% of the overall quantity captured by the Greek authorities (SODN-EMP, 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007).

**Table 4.2** Origin of cocaine seized by the Greek authorities 2001-2006

Country of origin	Quantity (Kg)	(%)
South America	1,572.078	78.9
Albania	28.582	1.53
Bulgaria	1.926	
Spain	181.042	9.4
Belgium	2.222	
Holland	4.12	
Germany	0.023	
Other	202.694	10.17
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,992.687</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: SODN-EMP, 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007 and author's own elaboration.

However, the range of countries cocaine originated from, in the particular period, suggests that the cocaine market is not a monopoly of the Colombians. The same conclusion also applies to other countries in the EU (Duyne and Levi, 2005).

Overall, our analysis indicates that during a six-year period, from 2001 to 2006, on average, 24.9% of the detained cocaine was imported by land, 51.8% by sea, 3.3% by air, while 20% of the total seized cocaine, entered the country with a method unknown to the authorities (SODN/EMP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). The bulk of cocaine enters the country via the port of Piraeus, which is the largest and busiest port in the country. Moreover, two other large ports of the country, those of Thessaloniki and Patras, are increasingly becoming important transit points for cocaine. In April 2007, a large shipment of cocaine in containers was seized by the Bureau for Special Inspections in Thessaloniki. The shipment, which originated from Uruguay, was destined for Bulgaria (Kantouris, 2007). Also, in early 2009, the authorities at the same port held 280 packages of a total of 70 kg of cocaine. The packages were hidden inside a timber shipment that was destined for a Bulgarian company based in Thessaloniki (Zougla, 2009). In another case, cocaine shipped from Ecuador, destined

for Bosnia and Herzegovina via Croatia, was intercepted in Piraeus (Eleftheros Typos, 2007). Other sources suggest that cocaine is imported from Turkey into the islands of the Aegean Sea by Nigerian (Lambropoulou, 2003) or Turkish (Kathimerini, 2008) traffickers.

There are however, instances, where cocaine is transported by air from South America, the Netherlands, or other Western European countries with single passengers, known as ‘body-packers’, or individuals who hide cocaine in their luggage (Zaitch, 2003). This is especially the case during the summer months, when controls of charter flights on islands are very lax. Moreover, cocaine is transported to Greece by air, even from other Balkan countries. To state an example, in August 2008, a Bulgarian citizen planned to import 4.5 kg of cocaine into Greece in his suitcase, via Romania. By mistake, the suitcase was not loaded onto the airplane and was later found by the Romanian authorities, who contacted their Greek counterparts (Ta Nea, 2008). Adding to this, a percentage of seized cocaine is imported by land via the Greek-Albanian border in private cars and trucks. It has been suggested that Albania has been used as a warehousing point for cocaine before being distributed in Greece, and other countries of Western Europe. Thus, the role of individuals with contacts in producing-countries and Albania is of central importance. Finally, Bulgaria is also a country via which cocaine is transported into Greece.

Another confirmed route for the transportation of cocaine that from Western Europe by car/truck. For example, in April 2005, in their attempt to import 2.2 Kg of Dutch-bought cocaine into Greece via Belgium, France, Switzerland and Italy, participants of a cocaine smuggling network were arrested in Athens. Apparently, the smugglers used to follow the same transportation course almost once every two months (Kathimerini, 2005). It is not uncommon during the transportation phase for, the merchandise to be concealed in or among other legal commodities such as fish, chicken, lemons, oranges, fruit compost, rice, corn, sugar, cereals, timber, decorative candles, dog food, bottles of water, photograph frames, and clocks. In

addition, packages are often hidden in crypts. Since the beginning of the 2000s, there have been cases, known to the Greek authorities, involving the shipping of cocaine in vessels transporting undocumented migrants. Finally, small cocaine quantities are sent by mail/courier from Colombia.

Greece has turned out to be an important transit point for cocaine destined for other Balkan countries as well as Western Europe. It appears that after failure to establish ties with the Middles East (Taxydromos-Egypt, 1962), and the subsequent destabilisation of Colombian smuggling networks, in the late 1980s-early 1990s, cocaine smugglers shifted their attention to networks that were active in the Mediterranean. Therefore, successful Greek smugglers of commodities, such as arms and cannabis, who had good relations with Spanish and Colombian smuggling networks, had a strategic advantage and the technical skills to provide assistance to Colombian traffickers. The well-known case of the Greek-Colombian-Spanish network that was consolidated in the mid-1990s, was responsible for introducing over 20 tons of cocaine into the E.U. market. Following the dismantlement of this network, other Greek ship-owners replaced the gap in the transportation of multi-ton cocaine smuggling schemes. Taken as a whole, these cases show that Greece can be used as a logistical base, and illicit activities may blend easily in an environment where a large number of shipping agencies engage in millions of legal transactions with foreign partners. Supplementary factors are considered the high level of corruption that is maintained through patron-client networks, as well as the availability of schemes for laundering illegal proceeds. Moreover, Greece is a member of the EU, and therefore, it is relatively easy to use the country as a transit and entry point for Western and Central European markets. For example, on 7 January 2007, the police of FYROM seized 483 kg of cocaine at Blace, on the FYROM-Kosovo border. Most of the cocaine was of a very high quality, with smaller portions of lower quality, indicating that part of the shipment might have been collected from other producers, or that there might have been an attempt to gain the same price for lower-quality cocaine. Subsequently, the cocaine, originating from Venezuela, was offloaded at the

port of Bar in Montenegro and was destined for Piraeus, Greece. The cocaine was purchased by a Greek ship-owner who had ties with the Greek and Serbian 'underworld' (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2007).

In the cases where the merchandise remains in Greece, cocaine is destined for the Greek market, houses, apartments, and warehouses, while often, remote locations are used to store cocaine for a short period of time. Also, cars and vans are frequently rented to facilitate the transportation from the port to the storage places. The cocaine smuggling networks seem to have specific housing/storage requirements, differing in the various stages of the 'job'. Moreover, having multiple safe and discrete locations to store large quantities of cocaine is also of great importance. Furthermore, individuals who take care of the storage of the merchandise, have good knowledge of the morphological characteristics of the particular area and features of the towns and villages, that could provide natural cover against eyewitnesses, when bags with cocaine are moved from the cars into the storage places. Once these large quantities of cocaine are divided and stored, the 'product' is then divided into smaller loads and forwarded to the market.

#### **4.3.4 Retail distribution**

The perception of drug availability, as found in numerous general public and student surveys, depends on the type of the drug, with cocaine being relatively easily available. Specifically, 20.7% of the general population surveyed, considers cocaine as a drug that they can effortlessly acquire (Greek REITOX Focal Point, 2006). The perception of availability is higher in Athens. In the early 2000s, no open street market of cocaine could be observed in Greece. Our research has revealed independent traffickers in the retail level, many of which can be identified with extortion groups and bouncers. Our study also indicates that the cocaine market is 'closed', which basically means that cocaine retailers/distributors cannot openly sell their merchandise on the street or other public spaces by approaching potential customers. The reason for the absence of an 'open' market', –apart from the



law enforcement stance against illicit drugs in the country, -is that cocaine is consumed by more affluent and 'respectable' parts of the Greek society. Therefore, the demand for supply of the merchandise in a more discreet manner is more evident. . This is not of course, to suggest that distribution of cocaine does not occur on the street or in other public spaces. It simply suggests that the commercial interactions between the client and the supplier take place after a pre-arranged meeting. In many cases, famous individuals do not approach the distributor directly, but through their social circle. Hence, a good friend or a trusted person would collect the merchandise for them. Similar to other illegal markets (Antonopoulos, 2006), on some occasions, trusted clients have the merchandise delivered to them. Recently, cocaine smuggling networks have been using the services of destitute foreigners, primarily asylum seekers, in various Greek conurbations. For instance, a rudimentary settlement was established by Afghan and Kurdish asylum seekers in the areas of Agyia, next to the port and marina of Patras. Networks have been exploiting the presence of asylum seekers by providing them with quantities of cocaine (among other drugs) for distribution.

In addition, distribution of cocaine also takes place in private parties or in 'glamorous' nightclubs throughout the country, primarily in Athens and Thessaloniki, as well as in cosmopolitan and/or busy islands, especially from April to September. Moreover, cocaine is distributed at venues frequented by young people such as in schools, as the case of the dead student from Northern Greece revealed. According to Jack Stanton, the scientific director of the prevention centre of O.KA.NA, when cocaine is distributed in, or around schools, 'the distributors do not have direct contact with the students, but they use adult individuals, who could be the students' relatives or friends to approach the children' (Kathimerini, 2008). Finally, cocaine distribution takes place in hotels, primarily in the southern suburbs of Athens (coincidentally, close to the marina) by 'call-girls'. However, some smuggling networks do not use distributors. Instead, there is a tendency to work with a specific and limited clientele, which allows for a certain insularity and protection from law enforcement. The degree to which

the Greek market is decentralised and fragmented, is also reflected in the fact that cocaine can also be purchased through friends, or even through the Internet. In 2005, the tourist police of Chania in Crete, identified a website of a company based in San Francisco, in which prospective customers could place their orders for cocaine (among other drugs) and have the merchandise delivered within just 3-4 hours (Eleytherotopia, 2005). In addition, in 2006, a 25-year old was arrested for selling cocaine and cannabis for three consecutive years, through chat rooms, to under-aged (Kathimerini, 2006).

The fact that cocaine is one of the most expensive drugs in Greece, second only to ketamine ('Special K'), explains why the regular clientele has a high social standing and, therefore, is in a better financial situation (SODN/EMP, 2000-7). The retail price currently ranges from € 75-100/gram, which is higher than the equivalent price of heroin (€ 45-80/gram), cannabis (€ 5/gram) and synthetic drugs. Nevertheless, the average Greek retail price has been lower than the equivalent average European price (1990-2006 US\$ 95.3 for Greece – US\$ 105.9 for Europe). However, from 1990 to 2008, the retail price of cocaine ranged from as high as US\$ 150, in 1990, to as low as US\$ 53, in 1993 and 1998, respectively (UNOCD, 2008).

Recently, there have been indications that cocaine has been used as a currency for other illegal markets. For example, in February 2008, the Greek police was after an Albanian who was using four different surnames, and who used to exchange cocaine transported from Albania with cannabis produced in Crete (Kathimerini, 2008). There have also been references of Dutch 'entrepreneurs' paying in cash for large quantities of cocaine and cannabis produced in Crete (Kathimerini, 2007). Lastly, in one of the court cases I noted that private yachts were used to transport ecstasy from Greece to the Caribbean and cocaine from the Caribbean to Greece, respectively (Court of Appeal, case 3481/2005 & 10/2006).

## 4.4 The case of a criminal network

It is very common for the Greek media and the authorities to consider and report the entities involved in cocaine smuggling as ‘Cartels’. This has also been the case with other commodities such as cigarettes. Also, taking into account newspaper titles such as ‘The Launderette of the Greek Cartel’, the existence of similar representations of cocaine smuggling would not come as a surprise (Antonopoulos, 2008). In addition, specific individuals are highlighted in these representations (e.g. ‘Robin Cocaine’; ‘The Rise and Fall of the Greek ‘Baron’). However, a closer examination of the available evidence reveals a different picture. The structure of the smuggling chains that serve the Greek cocaine market and act as a link with other European markets comprises of a large array of ‘actors’ from different socio-economic, professional and ethnic backgrounds, who perform different functions in order to achieve their goals. Yet, the ‘coordination’ of tasks involved in different stages of the smuggling, lacks sophistication. Hence, the ‘actors’ easily adapt to unexpected circumstances and often employ improvisation and spontaneous decision-making. For instance, when interviewed, the Director of the Greek Drug Enforcement Agency noted that there have been very few cases of ‘well-organised’ groups that smuggle cocaine systematically, but the majority of the collaborations are best described as opportunistic and ad hoc (Saxionis, interviewed in 2008).

Against this background, before introducing details about the micro-division of labour’ of the cocaine market in Greece, a few words about the nature and properties of the macro-‘organisation’ are in order. The macro-typology that represents the cocaine market in Greece exhibits universal characteristics, often found in other legal and illegal marketplaces. A ubiquitous characteristic is the symbiosis of cocaine smuggling with legitimate businesses, an issue that we will be focusing on later in this thesis. There are, however, some distinguishable features that should be mentioned. Firstly, the density of the network and compartmentalisation of activities that varies according to geospatial variables. The more ‘trans-

national' the operation in scope is, the less connected actors appear to be. In essence, this places emphasis on - the importance of the locality in the cocaine business (Hobbs, 1998).

Secondly, network density and compartmentalisation of activities also vary, depending on the quantities being trafficked. The smaller the quantities, the greater the connectivity and overlap between tasks and 'actors'. A plausible explanation of these networks' attributes is that the extent of the deal is analogous to the sophistication, security and guarantees required. Furthermore, the number of people involved and, most probably, the markets destined to supply are also equivalent to the nature of the deal. However, even though large structures may exist, the fact that the cocaine business is a mosaic of small, flexible, independent and often improvising enterprises, is by no means the norm in the Greek cocaine business.

Nevertheless, large quantities of cocaine can be transported by schemes that are much simpler and have 'thinner' structures than the big cases that often draw significant media attention. In 2004, for instance, the Greek authorities apprehended members of a scheme, smuggling 1,056 kg of cocaine from Martinique to South-western Greece by sailing a boat. The smugglers were involved in all phases of the smuggling scheme, from importation to sale (Court of Appeals, case 3481/2005 & 10/2006). Still, despite the frequency of joint projects involving controlled deliveries, the Greek authorities are not willing to take such initiatives for cocaine trades. One possible justification is the lack of political will to arrest and prosecute some perpetrators when interests of power protect the particular trade.

Next, the following 'actors' appear to be involved in the cocaine smuggling business. This does not, of course, mean that these actors appear in all smuggling schemes. Offenders may have different 'roles' in different smuggling schemes, or assume more than one 'role':

**Brokers:** Brokers are individuals who bridge the gap between two parties involved in the cocaine smuggling business. These individuals usually act as

intermediaries between people who broke social capital, connections, knowledge, expertise or specialization (see also: Decker and Chapman, 2008). For instance, one of the individuals appearing in one of the trial reports was a broker between the transportation and processing networks. Also, even though brokers may have higher stakes compared to others involved in this business, in terms of financial and legal risks, they are also the ones to enjoy the highest financial returns within the circle of actors. Furthermore, they may be actively involved with the day-to-day operations of the scheme by buying and selling the merchandise, supervising the transportation of the retail, recruiting 'workers' for the business, having law enforcement agents on a payroll, or occasionally, helping a politician with his political objectives and aspirations. The broker, apart from the financial capital, possesses personal qualities and attributes that are instrumental and functional for the business, such as networking skills. A transporter (legally employed as a skipper), who was involved in a large-scale, unsuccessful scheme, describes how he perceived the social circle of brokers:

Everybody knew us in Martinique. 'X' was working for many years in the marina and he knew everybody. He was working for a company there, and he had many acquaintances and business associates. I would often give them lifts to and from the airport. Their movements never aroused any suspicion; they were very transparent and open in their meetings. The meetings often took place in the 'L' Hotel.

(Court of Appeals, case 3481/2005 and 10/2006)

Under no circumstances, do we consider brokers to be Godfather-type figures. Although social and professional ties are important, most brokers are better seen as opportunists and arbitragers. The following account of a broker involved in a case of importing cocaine from Martinique, verified this:

I met 'K' by chance, in June-July 2002 and I asked him if he had any jobs... He told me that he knew someone in Holland who wanted to buy two yachts, and that he would share the legal commission with me...I went to meet this Russian in Holland before April 2003[...] he proposed to send the yachts to the Caribbean with ecstasy tablets [...] I said neither yes nor no. In a later meeting 'K', told me that the yachts were already in the Caribbean. He asked me to bring them back with 100 kilos of cocaine and that I would be in contact with the Russian... He also said that it was urgent to find a crew. I accepted the offer. I was in a dilemma, but I had serious financial difficulties.

(Court of Appeals, case 3481/2005 and 10/2006, p.p 168, 169-170)

**Transporters:** A key characteristic of complex cocaine smuggling schemes, is the management of large quantities of cocaine that need to be transported, stored and delivered from distant locations. This suggests that actors, who are willingly involved in such activities and are exposed to law enforcement tactics, have to deal with significant problems with regards to the practicalities of transporting as well as the concealment of bulky illicit cargos. Moreover, the unregulated nature of illicit trade means that property rights and contract laws do not apply. Consequently, any individual arrested in possession of substances, is regarded as the 'rightful owner'. This indicates that transporters are usually actors who have strong financial interests in the network. Besides, transporters can be distinguished in captains and crew of vessels, and drivers. The former are responsible for the transportation of large quantities of cocaine primarily from South America. The latter, are responsible for transporting the merchandise in smaller quantities to stash houses and/or warehouses. It is very common that actors involved in the logistics and transportation of cocaine are paid in product. Again, once can notice the disorganised nature of this task.

**Couriers:** The couriers are usually those who transport smaller quantities of cocaine and involve other individuals in transporting merchandise in their luggage or in specific articles. For example, I have come across an Albanian courier transporting a small quantity of cocaine in a book. Relatively recently for the Greek context, ‘body-packers’ have appeared in the transportation of cocaine. More specifically, what ‘body-packers’ usually do, is to swallow quantities of condoms filled with cocaine. Moreover, in an effort to mislead the authorities, they frequently travel to Greece from Latin America via other European countries. ‘Body-packers’ are usually of a foreign nationality, in many cases West Africans (Nigerians, Ivorians etc.), including a large number of women. As an illustration, in July 2008, a 34-year old ‘body-packer’, was arrested in the airport of Athens, travelling from Ivory Coast to Greece via Belgium. He had swallowed 54 condoms filled with cocaine of a total weight of 718 grams (Ethnos, 2008). Similarly, in early 2009, a 38-year-old Nigerian travelling from Brussels, was arrested in the same airport, having swallowed approximately 1.2 kilos of cocaine (Espresso, 2009). Erroneously, however, couriers are many times perceived both by the authorities and the media as ‘leading members’ of cocaine smuggling schemes (Eleytheros Typos, 2007).

**‘Authorities attention diverter’ (‘ksekarfoma’):** Avoiding police detection by means of deception, is a ubiquitous tactic for most criminals. In the same way, actors who are involved in illegal markets such as that of the cocaine market, face significant legal and financial risks, and their deception tactics require a degree of sophistication. In their attempt to avoid law enforcement detection, cocaine smugglers use –primarily during the phase of transportation of the merchandise – an individual who is not only beyond suspicion, but in many circumstances, is also unaware of his involvement. . Furthermore, the selection of such an individual is based on connections with powerful individuals, as a facilitator that is able to guarantee the authorities’ diversion of attention. In one of the court cases examined, the deception tactic entailed the involvement of a female who was the daughter of a well-known and respectable journalist, associated with a popular

football club of Thessaloniki, and the niece of a top-level party member of the Greek Socialist Movement (PASOK). From the same court transcripts, it emerged that a ‘member’ of the smuggling network suggested the captain of the yacht transporting the cocaine to find a woman to accompany him in the trip, in order to ‘make this look as normal holidays’ (Court of Appeals, case 3481/2005 and 10/2006, pp. 70,133) and, consequently, avoid unwanted attention. In addition, because the particular person was well connected, the hearings of the trial, as well as the testimonies, were consumed in explaining her role in the group, whereas other serious questions loomed unanswered.

**Un-loaders:** These are usually individuals, who work legally at the port or the marinas (dockers) and unload the merchandise. Moreover, they usually are of Greek nationality, even though there have been situations where the un-loaders came from Pakistan, Italy and Albania. Whatever the case may be, un-loaders belong in the circle of facilitators of the actors involved.

**Warehouse owners:** In most situations, actors involved in the transportation and/or importation of cocaine are also responsible for the safe storage of cocaine. However, I have encountered cases where the storage was sub-contracted to an individual owner of a legal warehouse near the port facilities in Athens. The owner of the warehouse was not aware that cocaine was hidden within the container stored in his warehouse.

**Corrupt public officials:** A number of corrupt public officials are actively involved in cocaine smuggling schemes. From the court transcripts, it becomes evident that access to port and marina authorities as well as the Greek Coast Guard, is extremely functional. Similar to Zaitch’s (2002b: 253) study, “entire operations can be organised around a single contact that guarantees access to the port” and/or the marina. In the court files examined, a number of cocaine smugglers claim that night-guards in the marina who had been previously actively involved in cocaine schemes, were aware of the operation and ensured that the unloading of cocaine from the vessels to the cars/vans, was uninterrupted and without witnesses. Besides, in the court



files there are also claims about high-ranking coast guard officers accepting bribes to ‘turn a blind eye’ to smuggling operations. In one of these accounts, the broker’s acquaintances in the Martinique provided a certain degree of protection and security to the boat transporting cocaine. Finally, police officers and border guards have been reportedly involved, among the sale of other commodities, in cocaine sales. However, similar to other illegal markets (Antonopoulos, 2008), corrupt public officials are not an indispensable feature of the cocaine smuggling business.

**Distributors:** During the distribution phase, cocaine changes many hands. Therefore, it is fairly difficult to provide a detailed mapping of the ‘actors’ who participate in the retail phase. There seems to be quite a diverse background of those involved in the retail distribution of cocaine. For instance, we have come across middle-aged businessmen and teenage students as cocaine sellers.

**Lawyers:** Lawyers are only one set of the peripheral, legal actors in the cocaine business. Although, it appears that they are not involved in the wholesale, middle-level or retail parts of the cocaine market, lawyers are primarily occupied with the legal defence of brokers. Furthermore, they facilitate the laundering of money from cocaine smuggling, through offshore companies owned by other clients.

**Women:** The role of women in the cocaine business, has often escaped the radar of the authorities. Yet, spouses and partners in particular, seem to play a key function in these activities. Wives are often money couriers and perform tasks that require the trust of the main organisers. Wives can also help to avoid police attention.

In all stages of the market, from importation to retail, the schemes are characterised by the versatility of the commodities traded (and other criminal activities). For instance, there are cocaine smugglers who are highly ‘specialised’ and deal only with cocaine, and others who are also involved in several drugs as well as other commodities. For instance, there

have been documented cases, in which traffickers traded both cocaine and heroin (Astynomiki Anaskopisi, 2004: 81). In the same way, in our investigation of a Greek-Spanish-Colombian network, an involvement in migrant smuggling, amphetamine trade, environmental pollution, diamonds and gold smuggling, arms smuggling, blackmail and financial crimes, was revealed (Court of Appeals, case 2585/2005: 117, 926, 897, 122). Similarly, in the Martinique case, there were numerous references to offences ranging from violations of shipping regulations, drug smuggling, murder and arms smuggling to diamond smuggling, fraud and forgeries. To conclude, the actors of the cases I have examined are best described as *arbitragers* who deal with whatever commodity falls into their hands, as long as market ‘asymmetries’ (Passas, 1999) provide them with the opportunity to make profits.

**Table 4.3** Nationality of smugglers arrested by the Greek authorities between 2001 and 2006

Nationals	Absolute numbers	Percentage (%)
Greek	3,663	73.2
Foreign	1,339	26.2
Unknown	10	0.15
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,012</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: See Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010: 52 [Original source: SODN-EMP, 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007 and author’s own elaboration].

Furthermore, the vast majority of individuals involved in cocaine transportation into Greece (transporters and couriers) are Greeks, who often work in multi-ethnic networks. It is interesting to note that, unlike other contexts (see Pearson & Hobbs, 2001; Zaitch, 2003; Reuter, 2004; Paoli and Reuter, 2008), and despite the connotation the Colombian nationality may have in terms of cocaine smuggling for the average Greek, no references have been made either by authorities or media sources to the involvement of Colombians in cocaine smuggling in the country. As shown in Table 3, between 2001 and 2006, less than a third (26.2%) of the total arrestees for cocaine smuggling are of a foreign origin, whilst 73.2% of the arrestees are Greek. However, a significant number of foreign smugglers come from the Balkans (SODN-EMP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007).

## 4.5 Systemic Cooperation

As mentioned earlier, it is the larger quantities that are being smuggled via sea routes that cross the Atlantic. These operations are more complex and time consuming in nature. Additionally, key nodes of these networks are permanently based in source and transit countries like Venezuela, Colombia, Guinea, Guiana and Martinique. Moreover, the networks of people who are directly involved in the operations, tend to have common professional backgrounds and, most of them, are linked to the shipping industry. Reporting on the activities of a cocaine smuggling network with Greek connections, dismantled in 2008 by the French authorities in Guinea, a Greek Coast Guard report comments:

It was found out that the criminal organization in question was operating internationally in the field of drug trafficking with the assistance of people who were broadly connected to shipping including, ship-owners and third party ship-managers and ship-crews, who knowingly participated in the transportation of narcotic substances. We can also observe the essential role of people who know their way around foreign countries and who use their professional status as shipping agents, representatives of shipping companies, traders and brokers as a legal cover.

(Greek Coast Guard, Security Division, 2008: 1)

Companies that rent private yachts, marina managers, skippers, maintenance workers, marina security guards and porters are also involved. They have different, active or passive, roles in the smuggling chains. The role of marinas, as an entry point for illegal goods, is underplayed by the media and policy makers. Yet, it is a point that the people interviewed, often highlighted. A marina worker and drug dealer in a Greek island, noted:

Yes, there is drug smuggling going on here, in the marina. Every now and then, you learn about ‘deals’. The police also arrested

some guys a few months ago [for cocaine smuggling]. How is it possible for this guy, who is the manager of a marina, to buy expensive cars and make so much money in such a short period? He knows what's going on. He also must be doing some "dirty-business."

(Informant 2, 2008)

Another retired drug dealer explains the use of recreational boats for smuggling substantial quantities of drugs:

If you own, or know someone who owns a sailing boat, you can do the job very easily and with very low risk. You sail to the pick-up point (a marina or a harbor)...then store the drugs inside the mast of the boat. Even if they stop you for inspection, they will not be able to cut through the mast, since the authorities will need an official warrant for such a major structural interference with the boat.

(Informant 1, 2008)

A high ranking coast guard officer explains that such practices, are known to the authorities, but there is very little they can do:

The scheme is known. Big players in the yacht industry will give orders. When their yacht returns from the source country, usually the Caribbean, loaded with cocaine, they will declare it missing. In this way if something goes wrong they stay out of trouble, and most likely they will keep their yacht. We know...they know that we know...but no one is doing anything...no one can go against these interests. You will not find a prosecutor who will risk his/her career and will go to this guy and start investigating him for drug trafficking.

(Informant 3, 2008)

Similar concerns are expressed by Mr. Aravantinos who is a high-ranking prison guard and has served in numerous prisons though Greece. He notes:

Throughout my career as a prison guard, I have come across with at least 200-300 cocaine dealers whereas, the number of heroin pushers runs in thousands. No one touches the cocaine dealers and in those few cases in which they are arrested, they are most likely 'gifts' [for promotion] for high-ranking police officers.

(Aravantinos, 2009)

The significantly smaller number of imprisoned cocaine dealers may in fact be a result of the relative fewer dangers involved in using cocaine compared to heroin, and the subsequent diversion of resources and time, on the part of the law enforcement authorities into heroin (Kokkoris, interviewed in 2009). However, the rank prison officer's account corroborates with other sources and highlights, in our opinion, the heavy involvement of 'upperworld' actors in the trade. For instance, in 2004, the police arrested seven individuals involved in the smuggling of more than one ton of cocaine, from Martinique to a marina in Southern Greece. According to the court files reviewed for the current study, these individuals received the drugs on behalf of a third party, consisted of Greek and Kazakhstani (legal) businessmen. Their task was to supervise the operation and facilitate the safe storage of the drugs in the marina. The group that was sent to collect the drugs, was supervised by yet another individual, responsible for the communications between the Greek and Kazakhstani businessmen, and the ongoing operations. Subsequently, the skipper of the yacht, with two of his colleagues, picked up the load from a Colombian speedboat offshore of Martinique. The cocaine was later transported to a marina in the South of Greece, where the smugglers were arrested. All of the 'actors' in that particular group knew each other, or had worked jointly in previous legal projects in marinas. In addition to the highlighting of the heavy involvement

of legal entrepreneurs and enterprises in the cocaine business, this is yet another example of how legal businesses constitute an environment in which legal business relationships can be easily transformed into illegal ones (von Lampe and Johansen, 2004).

The retail levels of the cocaine market in Greece appear to be operated by actors who participate in the night-time economy, and are associated with, or actually are, nightclub bouncers (*bravi*) as well as night-time economy legal businessmen. Relevant to this, a recent study on bouncers in Greece, offers extensive interview material that supports such claims (Svourdakou, 2003). Additionally, a court file consulted for the current study, along with other interview material, indicate that some notorious individuals, euphemistically called ‘The Godfathers of the Night’, heavily involved in extortion, cigarette and oil smuggling (Antonopoulos, 2008), are also involved in heavy cocaine smuggling and use (Court of Appeal, case 3765/2006). Furthermore, bouncers, who normally transport one to two kilos of cocaine on behalf of some key players, often operate after receiving a phone call in order to ‘pick up the package’ and deliver it at specific locations. Actors associated with the legal night-time economy often narrate that:

Bravi [bouncers/bodyguards] undertake the dirty business for the boss (i.e. businessmen involved in night-time economy). They will collect protection money, distribute drugs and take care of the security in nightclubs.

(Ta Nea, 2008)

Finally, off-shore companies, tourist agencies, gyms, garment factories, small division football clubs, Greek banks, and legal gambling schemes are used as smoke-screens, and/or as ways to launder money from cocaine smuggling. A ship-owner, who was involved in the smuggling of large quantities of cocaine, used to legalise money through a scheme involving about one hundred agents of the leading legal gaming company of the

country (O.P.A.P.) in Athens, Northern Greece and Crete. This, allowed him to obtain winning bet tickets. The ship-owner would then submit those tickets to the gaming company, which would issue a letter certifying (to the Greek Revenue) that he had indeed won these amounts of money (Eleytherotypia, 2004).

The previous section examined evidence demonstrating that the ‘cocaine barons’ have continuous and collaborative relations with the economic and political systems. Also, it verified that they receive support from the civil society actors. Unlike any other illegal commodity, cocaine follows by far the most complex and sophisticated smuggling routes. As the stakes are high, planning requires time, effort and a good network. Hard evidence, and not merely hearsay, comes from two authoritative sources: i) satellite tracking devices implemented in the ship that transports the drugs, and ii) controlled deliveries. In order to secure either of these investigative techniques one needs to establish a transnational policing and intelligence network. In the absence of such network, the Greek police has no resources on its own to dismantle and prosecute the groups involved.

## **4.6 Conclusions and implications: beyond Greece**

A series of issues can be noted in relation to how the present research contributes to existing knowledge on cocaine smuggling beyond Greece. It is equally interesting to reconsider the explanatory power of the holistic conceptual model that integrates social, cultural and system forces into a single framework (Diagram 1.1).

The first one relates to the ‘entities’ involved in the business. Unlike popular depictions of ‘organised crime’, in general, and the cocaine market, in particular, no ‘cartels’ are involved. From the point the drugs are imported into the Greek market, there are horizontal and decentralised structures, as well as a constellation of individuals who conduct business on

a regular or opportunistic basis. Nonetheless, the major objective is normally the acquisition of profit. Within this context, the role of interpersonal networks remains, of course, central, similar to what used to be the case in the early stages of the Greek cocaine market in the first half of the 20th century. More specifically, the role of professional networks and the links between professional networks are vital in understanding the structure of the cocaine market in Greece. Thus, one can get a good grasp of the formation and operation of illegal networks by paying closer attention to the legitimate economic and social organisation. The degree of social embeddedness in the cocaine smuggling business in Greece is significant (Kleemans, and Van De Bunt, 1999; Hobbs, 1998). The assemblage of criminal networks forms a loose web of social relations, very similar to that illustrated by other research, which could be described as a manifestation of 'organised crime'. The core pillars of these networks are comprised of networks from the shipping community, entertainment industry, gyms and fitness centres as well as from circles linked to security, law enforcement and local politicians. Although it is relatively easy for non-Greeks to enter into this web, there are, nevertheless, considerable barriers to enter the security and business sectors that provide cover, technology and protection. If migrants enter the political and economic life in a more dynamic way, we may as well see an integration process that will alter the current cocaine market dynamics.

Another issue that arises from our presentation of the social organisation of the cocaine smuggling business in Greece, concerns the cocaine smuggler's profile. There are differences in how 'upper-level' actors on one hand, and the 'stereotypical' offenders on the other, are perceived. Often, a clear division between the 'legal' and the 'illegal' does not exist. However, the division between the upper-world and the underworld, which is deeply embedded in popular culture and frequently reinforced by the media, has been accused of providing a distorted image of the true interplay between the different socio-economic layers of society. It has been suggested that the cause of this misrepresentation derives primarily from the nature of the



collected data, followed by their treatment. This view gains additional empirical support when alternative sources of data are considered. Thus, it is not surprising that when offenders' perceptions on who the 'real criminal' is, and what constitutes a 'real crime' are considered, attention shifts to white-collar crime and the institutions, and social strata these figures represent (Magganas, Lazos and Svoudakou, 2008). The mainstream view amongst the law enforcement and political circles in Greece, that the drug user is, at least equally, if not more threatening than the dealer, cultivates a general protective shield against the upper levels of the cocaine market. Therefore, this practice has a positive effect on the symbiosis between 'organised crime', politics and business.

A number of studies on 'organised crime' have exposed the synergy between police, civil society, politicians and businessmen, as an irrevocable part of the history, origins and the development of 'organised crime' (Block and Chambliss, 1981). In light of emerging empirical data, which stand critical to established/bureaucratic perceptions, 'organised crime' is better conceptualised as a system of collaborative relationships between state, market and civil society actors. Hence, the cocaine market provides the ground for assessing the pervasiveness and embeddedness of 'organised crime' in business; something that is tied to the cultural variables contributing to cocaine smuggling, among other illegal trades. Moreover, the chapter has already emphasised the critical role played by the Greek maritime entrepreneurs. Greek ship-owners and networks tied to the worldwide shipping community, have played an important role in the facilitation of cocaine trade across the Atlantic by means of funding and transportation of bulky quantities across the Atlantic. This phenomenon is related to the traditional involvement of Greeks in international smuggling operations, and dates back to the first stages of the formation of the modern capitalist systems. For instance, historical evidence indicates that the smuggling of grains and coffee by Greeks was thriving during the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, during the French Revolution and the 'Napoleonic exclusion', Greek schooner owners and sailors defied prohibitions and were

introduced into several European ports, commodities whose prices skyrocketed (Theodoridis and Lazarou, 1981). Also, during the 20th century, Greeks were involved in cigarette smuggling, along with the smuggling of alcohol, oil, coffee, sugar and drugs. Geography, topography, merchant, shipping economy and diasporic networks, consisted essential elements in this involvement. Therefore, these historical dynamics intersect with economic variables and the formation of strong profiteering motives, as well as a normative addiction to arbitrage. Besides, such a behaviour is, promoted and cultivated by the Greek political system.

Involvement in the cocaine smuggling business can also be explained by structural-economic perspectives. These suggest that individuals become involved in cocaine smuggling because of economic limitations which prevent them from earning sufficient amounts of money from licit activities. Therefore, participation takes place in an effort to augment their (legal) income. Though not exclusively, this tactic applies primarily, to foreign individuals involved in transportation of smaller quantities of cocaine as well as distributors. However, a political economy perspective is also applicable to 'upper-level' smugglers and the legal businesses involved in the cocaine market. As was present in our thesis, the cocaine smuggling business is heavily dependent upon Greek shipping companies, Greek ship-owners and sailors who are willing to engage in the business. Therefore, they constitute what Morselli and Giguere (2006) would term as 'critical actors' of the business. These critical actors have entered an era of facing severe (for their standards) economic conditions. According to Athanassiou (2008: 11), 1,500 Greek-owned tankers, bunkers and containers faced immense pressure by the dramatic reduction in sea fares, which-along with the reduced value of the ships-has resulted in a loss of approximately US\$ 50 billion (see also Yfantis, 2009: 19). Maritime piracy is also a significant factor, as it increases the operational costs and enhances risks involved in shipping. Within such a context for the Greek shipping industry, one of the most important sectors of the country's economy, heavier involvement in

cocaine smuggling and other black markets may be seen as an option in order to secure an advantage against competitors.

We mentioned earlier that the depiction of the cocaine market, similar to depictions of illegal markets of other commodities and services, is immersed in moral dichotomies. Critically, what our description of the Greek cocaine market shows, not only is a distinction between the two groups, the 'good' and the 'bad', is impossible, but also it is the 'good' guys, who drive the market by demanding to be served by the 'bad' guys. In addition, it is important to note that individuals who 'belong' to both groups, constantly drift from legality to illegality and back, thus rendering the moral dichotomy, which has been a central theme in the depiction of the (Greek) cocaine business, as worthless.

Against this background, it is imperative to observe how the cocaine market develops in times of, an almost, stagnating global economy. The prolonged economic crisis and the general culture of individualism, profiteering and illegality, may encourage the expansion and establishment of a strong cocaine market in Europe. A number of issues require our attention: Is the nature of the cocaine market in Greece going to change? How is the shipping community and other related business communities going to recover from/compensate for the huge financial losses? What kind of business endeavours would shady entrepreneurs discover to maintain their prestigious portfolios in the business world? There are also important theoretical aspects that necessitate further exploration. Our analysis of the cocaine market in Greece suggests that a holistic approach could provide the analytical framework, for considering historical and contemporary socio-cultural, economic and institutional variables that could lead to a better understanding of 'organised crime'. We believe that such a framework can contribute greatly to existing academic debates regarding the development and transformation of 'organised crime'.

# Chapter 5: Urban Guerrillas

## 5.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters investigated two criminals communities-the “Cocaine Barons” and the “Godfathers of the night”-whose social and professional links are mainly within the shipping industry and the night-entertainment economy, respectively. There are three main differences between these two criminal networks: the level of social power, their visibility and the interaction with the criminal justice system. In the present chapter we turn our attention on the phenomenon of urban terrorist groups or otherwise, urban guerrillas. These groups are consisted of a loosely connected and a socially excluded, highly politicized community that has lowest levels of social power, in comparison to the previous two case studies. Although urban guerrilla groups are not ‘criminal organisations’, driven by economic motives, their tactics and methods are in some cases, similar to the profit-oriented organised crime groups. Moreover, revolutionaries and ordinary criminals often share the same enemies (the police and the ‘system’), and by default, their cooperation is impending (Jenkins, 1971: 10; Schmid, 1996; Makarenko, 2004). Also, politically motivated terrorist groups and profit oriented organised crime groups, are both defined and prosecuted by the Greek penal law as ‘criminal organisations’. Due to their positioning within the Greek society, we expected that left wing urban terrorist groups would have higher visibility and exposure by the criminal justice system. However, after reviewing all the available evidence, our analysis reveals a number of noteworthy anomalies.

## 5.2 The evolution of Urban Guerrilla groups

Guerrilla war has been a major security concern for the International Community, particularly for the governments of Latin America, Asia and Africa. Following the success of Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba, many analysts and political leaders anticipated a domino effect of 'Castro-style revolutions', in countries where the Communist ideology had a significant influence. Soon after, anti-Communist hysteria dominated the security and political agendas in the Western world, vividly expressed with the rise of McCarthyism in the United States (Schrecker, 2002). By the mid-1960's, many guerrilla movements had already made an appearance in Colombia, Bolivia and Guatemala. Moreover, the rising success and influence of the Communists in China and Vietnam showed the way for guerrilla movements in Malaysia, Philippines, South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Indonesia and Burma. For the most part, these revolutionary movements were mainly based in rural areas and the countryside. Radical ideologists and political leaders like Mao Tse-Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara were the driving intellectual force behind these rural revolutionary groups. However, in many cases, the tactics and strategy of rural rebels did not produce the anticipated revolutionary results. Both in Latin America and the Southeast Asia, the achievements of rural revolutionary movements could not 'boast of any success beyond survival' (Jenkins, 1971: 2). Still, new groups or radicals realized that the urban environment provides greater proximity to sympathizers (student movement), intellectuals and a larger pool of potential targets. Besides, large cities provided greater protection and opportunities for the revolutionary cause (Russell, Miller and Hildner, 1974; Clutterbuck, 1990a, 1990b).

Furthermore, the process of urbanization that took place during the past three decades, with the migration of rural populations to larger cities for economic reasons are central for understanding the emergence of urban revolutionary movements. Chronic structural crises and the resultant

political instability can be considered as forces that, in many instances, have facilitated the upsurge of revolutionary wars (Marighellas, 2006: 507). In numerous occasions, the infrastructure of cities, especially in developing countries, could not keep pace with the increasing urbanization. Moreover, the socio-economic relationships of cities and the links between the polity (politicians and businesses) and civil society (voters, students, workers' unions), was challenged as waves of newcomers made their way into the more affluent urban space, demanding a fair share of the pie. Under these conditions, dissatisfaction with the corrupted political and business elites was inevitable. The establishment of reactionary groups aimed at improving the power position of the urban population. However, the use of violent means was also expected. Along with these socio-economic and demographic changes, the presence of suppressive and dictatorial regimes, and the emergence of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-American predispositions acted as catalytic factors for the uprising of armed struggles.

The threat posed by the urban guerrilla movements in the industrialized nations of the Western world, is not straightforward. Some commentators point out that 'by 2025, two thirds of the world's population is predicted to live in cities, opposed to just over a third in 1975' (Lia, 2005: 143). This demographic shift, along with political, social and economic inequalities, could potentially provide a good 'cause' for the rise of urban guerrilla groups. However, others provide a different estimation for the future of the left-wing urban revolutionary movements. According to Martin, 'left-wing revolutionary' activism is unlikely to match the scale or scope of the past, unless there is a new ideological revolution system or movement similar to 20th-century Marxism, as a foundation. In the long term, there simply is not a large pool of new revolutionaries, and without a clear vision for the post revolutionary society, this pool will continue to be small at best' (2010: 253).

Throughout history, urban guerrilla and terrorist groups have attempted to accomplish their goals through non-traditional, illegal and often, violent

means. Moreover, urban guerrilla groups are in most countries defined and classified as terrorist groups, even though urban guerrilla fighters have some particular characteristics that distinguish them from other terrorists (Europol TE-SAT, 2007). The Brazilian Marxist revolutionary, Carlos Marighella, who is considered by many the father of urban guerrilla warfare (see: Williams, 1989), provides in his *Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla*, a detailed analysis of the organisational dynamics within guerrilla groups. In this book, he offers a detailed investigation in the profile of the actors likely to participate in such groups. Marighella explains:

The urban guerrilla is a person who fights the military dictatorship with weapons, using unconventional methods. A political revolutionary and an ardent patriot, he is a fighter for his country's liberation, a friend of the people and of freedom. The area in which the urban guerrilla operates is in the large Brazilian cities. There are also criminals or outlaws who work in the big cities. Many times, actions by criminals are taken to be actions by urban guerrillas. The urban guerrilla, however, differs radically from the criminal. The criminal benefits personally from his actions, and attacks indiscriminately without distinguishing between the exploiters and the exploited, which is why there are so many ordinary people among his victims. The urban guerrilla follows a political goal, and only attacks the government, the big businesses and the foreign imperialists [...]. To compensate for few arms, little ammunition, and poor equipment, the urban guerrilla must have initiative and be astute [...]. In spite of these limitations, the urban guerrilla boasts certain advantages over the national armed forces and police. He has the support of the masses. The nation's military and police authorities act on behalf of powerful interests and the wealthy, and against the best interests of the masses. It is they whom the masses hate. The urban guerrilla, on the other hand, defends a just cause - the cause of the masses. Where the urban guerrilla's

weapons are inferior, he gains through moral superiority. In moral superiority the urban guerrilla has undeniable superiority.

(Marighella, 1969: 3-4)

So, defining characteristics of the urban guerrilla groups are their ongoing struggle against State oppression, as well as the popular support by the masses. In other words, in the eyes of the public, crimes such as assassination, arsons and bank robbery, committed by such 'terrorist' groups against the State or against State interests, are perceived to be serving the general good. In the guerrilla terminology, a bank robbery is an "expropriation" of funds that have been stolen from the people. Thus, 'the guerrillas steal them back on behalf of the people' (Jenkins, 1971: 10). Furthermore, the rise of such a violent urban revolutionary movement is widely assumed to emerge as a response to the State's failure to mediate the different social and economic strata. Besides, although less developed countries have greater propensity in developing rebel movements within large cities, far left guerrilla groups have appeared in many industrialized nations and European countries during peacetime (Clutterbuck, 1990a; 1990b).

In Germany, for example, the Baader-Meinhof group (Red Army Faction) operated as a covert guerrilla group from 1970 to 1998, and was responsible for 34 deaths. Judging from the published manifesto and communiqués of the groups with the media, it becomes evident that the typical phraseology in the urban guerrilla lexicon derives from the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist writings, which acted as the main driving intellectual force behind the 'anti-imperialist struggle in the metropole' practiced by this group (Red Army Faction [1971] (2005) 14). Another less well-known left wing urban guerrilla community that also operated in Germany during the same period, was the autonomous group of Revolutionary Cells. The German police recorded many hundreds of politically motivated assaults and 'terrorist crimes' against State and Imperialist targets that were carried out the



autonomous Revolutionary Cells (Clutterbuck, 1990a: 51-3). Similarly, in Italy and France, terrorist groups engaged in armed struggles against the state and imperialist targets. In many cases the authorities dismantled these groups, and their supporters remained inactive.

In Greece, the urban guerrillas do not have an international reputation. However, they continue to be fairly active, organizing violent campaigns against the establishment and state targets. Since the 1970s, when the first urban revolutionary organisations began rising in the country (mainly in Athens), there have been hundreds of well organised and high-impact terrorist attacks including mortar assaults, drive-by shootings, bombing, arsons and assassinations (Mihas, 2001; Eleytherotipia, 2007). Adding to this, less organised terrorist incidents, such as arsons with gas canisters and petrol bombs against national and international private and public property, have become a daily routine. The evolution of the urban guerrilla movement in Greece has gone through three phases, starting from the early days of the military Junta in the 70s, to the present moment. The first generation of armed struggle is widely seen as a reaction to the military Junta imposed by the Colonels in April 1967. Once democracy was restored, many of those actors and underground organisations that practiced in the anti-dictatorial struggle through terrorist activities, entered eventually into mainstream politics. Then the second generation of terrorist groups was formed by hardliners and revolutionary groups that remained underground and continued guerrilla warfare, even after Parliamentary democracy was established in the country. Thus, followers and sympathizers of armed struggle formed new groups and continued their violent tactics against State and imperialist targets. However, by 2004, the core of the second generation of terrorist groups was dismantled in the end, and a large number of guerrilla fighters were put on trial. Finally, following the riots that took place in December 2008, new groups were formed and a new wave of bombings, assassinations and kidnappings against State, businesses and political targets begun. The scenario that the third generation of terrorist groups is linked with ordinary criminal and 'gangsters', is increasingly

gaining popularity in law enforcement circles of the country (Xrysochoidis, 2009).

### **5.3 The First Generation (1967-1975)**

Many contemporary historians and political analysts express the view that the Military Junta, that lasted for almost seven years, from 1967 to 1974, had detrimental consequences to the radicalization of youth and student movements. The prohibition and harsh control of most of the social and political life during the dictatorship by the Colonels contributed greatly to the formation of the revolutionary political culture in the post-Junta period. The coup of the 21 April signified the dissolution of political parties, the prohibition of all forms of political activity, and the silencing of the press and media communication (Yannopoulos, 1972: 164). The struggle against the ultra right wing Dictatorship had many consequences. For instance, old grievances from the Greek Civil war, remerged in the public consciousness. Therefore, a violent struggle was again, a very possible path to resist the Junta. Furthermore, a large number of political organisations from the left and the radical left, decided that the only way towards liberation was to take up arms against the authoritarian rulers. Moreover, many believed that the Greek Colonels were backed up by the US Government. As a consequence, the violent struggle was soon directed against both the Military Dictatorship and the Imperialist forces. This mixture of events was catalytic for the formation of an urban guerrilla movement. What is perhaps more interesting, is that many of the actors who led the guerrilla movement during the anti-dictatorial struggle, will later on become the elite of the country (Agrafiotis, 2003).

The first anti-dictatorial groups were born simultaneously with the Military coup in 21 April 1967. The majority of these groups were active, well-organised and democratic political organizations, even before the junta was imposed.

### **5.3.1 Panhellenic Liberation Movement (Panellio Apeleytherotiko Kenima)**

From the first day the martial law was imposed in Greece, Andreas Papandrou (later on the leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, PASOK) was arrested and imprisoned, along with many other political prisoners. Soon after, Papandrou went into exile to France and Sweden. In 1968, he established a revolutionary organization called the Panhellenic Liberation Movement. Then, he toured around the world to gain the support of foreign governments against the US backed Military Dictatorship in Greece. Thus, the Panhellenic Liberation Movement operated abroad and in Greece at the same time, and a large number of organizations were created and assimilated under the umbrella of the Movement. These groups engaged in propaganda activities (newspapers, periodicals and flyers), and in violent attacks and bombings against the Dictatorship (see: Historical Archives of Georgios Anomeritis; Autonomous Citizens' Action, 1983). At that time, a pocket size manual was published by the PLM. The manual circulated to all its members in Greece, addressing the main goals and objectives of the movement. Also, it included information on the *modus operandi* of covert operations, and techniques for avoiding detection by the authorities (Toutountzh, 2007).

### **5.3.2 Democratic defence (Democratiki Amyna)**

Few years before the military junta was imposed in Greece, a number of scholars and intellectuals from the wider centre and centre-left political spectrum, established the group 'Alexander Papanastasiou'. The aim of this group was to 'systematically study key social and economic problems facing the Greek society and to take decisive action towards their solutions'. In 1967, the group was evolved into an anti-dictatorial organisation called the "Democratic Defence" (Simitis, 2007). The organization was officially established in May 1967, and was initially involved in propaganda activities, distributing flyers and brochures against the dictatorship in

Athens and Thessaloniki, the largest cities in Greece. Additionally, in cooperation with units from the Navy, members of the Democratic Defence executed a series of bombings and terrorist attacks against selected targets. Interviews with intellectuals, who participated in the anti-dictatorial struggle, indicate that the membership of the groups was fairly diverse, including people from various professions such as taxi drivers, doctors, students, military officers and university professors (Magkakhs, 2005). Besides, many sources note that, Kostas Simitis, who was the leader of the Democratic Union and at the end of the 90s served as a Prime Minister, ultimately joined forces with Andreas Papandreou in the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (Politi, 1996; Katsoridas, 2004).

### **5.3.3 The ‘October 20 movement’**

The revolutionary movement of ‘20 October’, was established in 20 October 1969 in Paris. The movement was established by former members of the ‘Democratic Defence’ and ‘PAK’, as well as by people (civilians) who were at the time not involved in any revolutionary organisation. Amongst those who participated in the group, there were people who participated in the second generation of terrorist groups (ELA and Christos Kassimis). The main ideological project of the group was to oust the military dictatorship in Greece, with all the available violent means. It is worth noting that the group trained many Greek political activists who shortly after, became prominent figures in Greek politics. Although, very little is known regarding the funding and organisation of these groups, the following interview by Petros Eythimiou (currently the President of the OECD Assembly), provides a glimpse into the logistical support and training received by Greek anti-dictatorial organisations.

A. I was in the middle-left and moved towards the revolutionary left during the Dictatorship [...]. In 1967, I was member of a group called “Rigas Fereos” and in 1969, I entered organisations that supported the armed struggle against the dictatorship.

Q. Did you participate in any real revolutionary activities besides intellectual debates during the dictatorship?

A. It was the best years of my life. We started in “Rigas Fereos” with brochures and newspapers...

Q. Bombings?

A. For six years I lived an intense life [...]. It was by chance that we came out of this alive. In the summer of 1971, I went in Paris and was thoroughly trained in guns and explosives [...].

Q. Why did you go to Paris to receive training on urban conflict?

A. This is where the ‘October 20 movement’ could provide training for the rest of us.

(Cited in Theodorakis, 2001)

Recently emerged CIA documents indicate that American Banks (as well as other foreign governments) provided financial support and political patronage to the leaders of the anti-dictatorial struggle (Hardavelas, 2010). Those who were labelled as ‘terrorist’ during the dictatorship subsequently became heroes and assumed control of the key political institutions of the country: politics, education, media and music/entertainment.

## **5.4 The Second Generation (1975-2002)**

During the seven years of military dictatorship, the political climate in Greece, facilitated the emergence of a large number of revolutionary and anti-authoritarian organizations. The use of terrorism, as a tool against the authoritarian regime, was embraced by a large number of political figures and intellectuals from the left and the centre-left of the political spectrum.

This was a period where violence, terror and chaos dominated the political and social life in many Greek cities. At that time, the political question was how would the country come out from this political turmoil. Leading political figures from the resistance movement, such as Andreas Papandreou, supported the view that ‘once the dictatorship was overthrown, these organisations [urban guerrillas] should be dismantled and replaced by democratic political parties that would eventually compete with each other in order to gain the popular vote’ (Mpalioti, 2005). His intention was that the PAK would eventually be transformed into a legal political party. Indeed, many activists joined the ranks of the socialist party PASOK, formed by Andreas Papandreou in September 1974. Others were assimilated by the Communist Party (KKE) and by other left-wing political parties.

Although the overthrow of the military junta, in 1974, produced a democratic constitution, several remaining radical organizations that had taken part in the armed struggle during the dictatorship, decided to continue their struggle against the newly born political system. The ideological program of those organizations, continued to fight the system in the post-junta period, influenced by the works of left-wing revolutionists like Marx, Lenin, Mao, Trotsky and Che Guevara. However, the transformation of radical left-wing, anti-authoritarian organizations, that in the eyes of the general public were fighting for a great cause and for the restoration of democracy, was not a simple process. In particular, the different ideological programs and the available on the table action plans for the future of urban guerrillas in Greece produced significant differences and conflicts amongst the remaining hard-liners (Papachelas and Telloglou, 2003: 54-64). Nevertheless, the two main organizations in the post junta period, the ‘Revolutionary Popular Struggle’ (ELA) and the ‘Revolutionary Organisation November 17’, that could have provided a solid structure for the growth of a second generation of urban guerrillas, had very different visions regarding the use of terrorism as a political tool in the new political context (Agrafiotis, 2003; Nikolakopoulos, 2002).

The second generation of urban guerrilla groups emerged in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the junta, between 1974 and 1975. Even after the fall of the military dictatorship, the role of leftish discourse and rhetoric was fundamental for the encouragement and support of new forms of armed struggle. In any case, the political parties that gained power (politicians, intellectuals, businesses and the media) in the post-junta era, were actors, who in some way or another, supported and participated in unconventional political tactics (i.e. terrorism) for achieving their goals. Moreover, there were still a number of former members of the military junta, mostly police officers and foreign operatives in the country that could potentially provide 'legitimate' targets for those radical groups who had decided to continue the armed struggle (Ios, 2005; Revolutionary Organisation 17 November, 1975a, 1975b, 1976, 1977).

The post junta period was marked by high levels of social unrest and violence. Within such a fragile political environment, the Greek State was struggling to exercise power and impose the rule of law. Thus, the second generation of revolutionary groups would then have to remain underground and out of sight in order to avoid detection. In contrast to other groups, the second generation of terrorist groups will not have the means and resources to 'tour Europe' and the rest of the world in order to get support by foreign intellectuals and governments. After democracy was restored, the first generation of revolutionaries assumed prominent positions in the economic, political, social, and cultural systems of the country. In reality, the oppressive regimes imposed by the newly born democratic State, meant that the second-generation urban guerrillas would have to operate in the same milieu with common professional criminals. Hence, the third generation of terrorists, as we will see later on, eventually shared the same prison cells, funding sources and modus operandi. Additionally, they ultimately shared the same suppliers of ammunition and the same circles of friends as well as enemies.

In the early 1980s, we see the consolidation of networks between urban gangs of young males, based mainly in Athens, and professional criminals. Drug dealing and property crime seem to be the main activities that bind these two different worlds together. The press during that time remarks:

Organised gangs are gaining a foothold in the Greek society. Many are operating openly, like the “iron fist of fascism”. There are, however others that operate covertly. These gangs are even more sinister. Here, the butts and the iron chains are being replaced with guns. Guns circulate relatively freely among criminals, who will not hesitate to use them against the popular movement. The para-state and the underworld can be seen in perfect unity in these illegal gangs [...]. The meeting place for those people [gang members], is the Cyprus Square, in Kallithea. The network includes far-right fascists, anarchists, drug dealers, thieves and muggers. They have all been united under one chapter: drugs and money [...]. In effect, the activities of the gangs in Cyprus Square, differ very little from those from the Ampelokipoi and Kolonakiou Squares.

(Nikolakopoulos, 1983)

As noted before, after the end of the junta, the Greek society was in turmoil. Thus, criminality, deviance and the problem with law and order became common themes of the newly democratically elected socialist government. As it is demonstrated in table 4.1, the total number of convictions in courts for all recorded crimes in the post junta period, increased steadily through the 80s. A young man who was involved in these gangs explains:


Many of us had taken part in the riots for the anniversary of the end of Junta. Some had been arrested. They were the hoodies that smashed shop windows and put fires. Lefties and neo-Nazi acted in unison at that time. They also co-operated closely in the distribution and use of drugs.



(Quoted in Nikolakopoulos, 1983)

About 500 bombings and a large number of violent assaults have been attributed to the second generation of urban guerrilla groups. Although official statistics from the police authorities responsible for investigating the activities of terrorist groups in the post-junta period, have not been made public, journalistic sources claim that 12 revolutionary groups have been fairly active in the country in the periods between 1975 and 2000 (To Bhma, 2002).

**Diagram 5.1** Total number of people convicted in court (1926-2004)



Source: National Greek Statistics Organization

According to the same sources, some of these twelve revolutionary organizations had close associations with each other, and formed a loosely connected network of about 120 individuals who collaborated with each other on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, the majority of these individuals participated in two or more of these organizations. However, the Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA), that achieved more than 300 terrorist attacks between 1975 and 1995, is considered by many, the 'mother' of all organizations (Nikolakopoulos, 2002).


### 5.4.1 Case 1: Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)

From 1975 to approximately the mid 1990s, the Revolutionary People's Struggle was one of the most active (along with the 17N group) and well-organised terrorist groups operating in Greece. Furthermore, the organisation is considered as the core organisation that would later on assist, cooperate, train and inspire the materialization of a large number of smaller, armed revolutionary organizations that operated mainly in Athens and Thessaloniki. According to the official political manifesto of ELA that was published in October 20, 1986 in the Greek newspaper Eleytherotypia, the organisation was created during the summer of 1974. This was the so called 'hot summer' of the post Junta period that, according to various political commentators, played a catalytic role in the history of contemporary armed struggle in Greece. During the twenty years of its existence,, ELA was involved in three assassinations, 180 explosions and more than 80 arson attacks against public buildings, Multinational Corporations, police departments, publicly owned beaches, cinemas, private and public cars, transport infrastructure and night clubs and bars (Kyriakopoulos, 2004).

Official operations began in April 1975, with simultaneous arson attacks against diplomatic vehicles (see table 4.1). Analysts believe that ELA was a working class organization that inspired many other groups to take part in the post-junta urban guerrilla movement in Athens. The Revolutionary People's Struggle was formed by Christos Kassimis, a member of the anti-dictatorial revolutionary organization "20 October" (Nikolakopoulos, 2002). The size and scope of ELA is grasped when considering the large number of publications the organization achieved during its operations. Although many of these publications are not in circulation any more, some sources note that ELA published more that 100 documents involving propaganda, political analyses and manuals on guerrilla warfare (Indimedia, 2004). According to judicial sources, from May 1975 to February 1982, the organisation printed 44 issues of a political magazine called "*Anti-plirosforisi*"(see image 4.1).

The recorded terrorist incidences involving ELA and other organizations, believed to be closely associated with ELA, is presented in Table 4.1.

**Image 4.1** An original copy of the magazine *Anti-plirosforisi* by the Revolutionary People's Struggle with the red framed star and the words 'ΕΛΑ' (ELA), impressed at the centre of the document.



**Table 5.1** Attacks by ELA and ELA affiliated group (1975-1987)

Date	Method	Target	Location
<b>Attacks by ELA (1975-1987)</b>			
9.4.1975	Arson	USA cars	Athens (Eleysina)
20.7.1975	Arson	Public Beach	Athens (Voula and Vouliagmeni)
10.11.76	Explosion	American Army Supermarket (PX)	Athens (Siggrou Avenue)
29.01.76	Vandalism	Electric Chain Store	Athens
27.02.1976	Explosions	US Banks (American Express & Manhattan)	Athens

6.3.1976	Arson	Public transport busses (6)	Athens
2.4.1976	Explosion	Central Branch of American Express	Athens (Syntagma)
10.9.1976	Explosion	Hellenic Federation of Enterprises	Athens (Syntagma)
11.09.1976	Explosion	Skalistiri' Enterprises	Athens
14.08.1976	Explosion	Two Siemens offices	Athens (Ilisia and Kifisos)
13.11.1976	Explosion	Buildings of Special Police Forces (MAT)	Athens (Kesariani)
13.11.1976	Explosions	US companies and PX	Athens (Eliniko)
15.01.1977	Explosions	Cinema Atticon	Athens
12.02.1977	Vandalism	Cinema Kallithea	Athens
20.02.1977	Explosions	Warehouse owned by Stasinopoulos Enterprise	Athens (Pireos)
22.02.1977	Vandalism	Shop owned by MNC	Athens (Ilisia)
30.03.1977	Arson	15 US cars	Athens
2.05.1977	Vandalism and Arson	Skalistiri' Enterprises & Bodosakis Enterprises	Athens (Amalias)
14.07.1977	Explosion	American Express	Athens
14.07.1977	Arson	American Express	Athens
09.10.1977	Explosion	American Army Base	Athens ( Eliniko)
20.11.1977	Explosion	Boss Corporation	Athens (Iera Odo)
30.07.1978	Arson	Public Beach	Athens (Alimos)
02.08.1978	Explosion	Public transport busses (4)	Athens
13.01.1979	Explosion	Police car	Athens
30.01.1979	Explosion	Public busses (5)	Athens

12.03.1979	Arson	Public transport busses (2)	Athens
19.03.1979	Arson	Busses owned by Mazda	Athens (Acharnon)
17.04.1979	Explosion	Hellenic Federation of Enterprises	Athens (Syntagma)
27.04.1979	Explosion	Hellenic Internal Revenue Service	Athens (Nea Ionia)
22.05.1979	Explosion	Court of First Instance of Athens	Athens (Ononia)
08.07.1979	Explosion	Hellenic Tobacco Association	Athens (Kaliithea)
12.07.1979	Explosion	Airport Management Company	Athens (Ag. Dimitrios)
26.07.1979	Explosion	Ministry of Education	Athens
10.10.1979	Explosion	Public Transport Company	Athens (Exarchia)
09.05.1980	Explosions	22 US cars	Athens
18.07.1980	Explosions	Four private cargo tracks (Marinopoulos Supermarket)	Athens
03.08.1980	Explosions	Two Private tracks	Athens (Eleysina)
28.08.1980	Explosions	Hellenic Organisation for Tourism	Athens (Syntagma)
18.10.1980	Explosion	Social Insurance Institute (IKA)	Athens (Omonia)
30.10.1980	Explosion	Electricity supply hub	Athens
12.11.1980	Explosions	Supermarket 'Dhmitra' and 'Marinopoulos'	Athens (Eleysina)
17.04.1981	Explosion	Foreign Businessman	Athens (illisia)
05.05.1981	Explosion	US Diplomatic Car	Athens (Kononaki)
08.05.1981	Explosions	Four police stations	Athens

01.04.1982	Explosions	Home of US Ambassador	Athens
26.04.1982	Explosions	Offices of IBM	Athens
27.04.1982	Explosions	Car of US embassy and CIA Officer	Athens (Kolonaki)
02.06.1982	Arson.Explosions	US cars and Companies	Athens
03.06.1982	Explosions	Three US Banks	Athens
02.07.1982	Explosions	Five Israeli and American targets	Athens
31.07.1982	Explosion	Offices of the Union of Greek Shipowners	Athens
30.09.1984	Explosions	Ministry of Industry and Employment & General Confederation of Greek Workers	Athens
01.07.1985	Explosions	Hotel Appolon Palace and US camp	Athens (Kavouri & nea Makri)
18.03.1986	Explosions	Hellenic-American Union	Athens (kolonaki)
01.07.1986	Explosions	Ministry of Planing (YPEXODE)	Athens
26.07.1986	Explosions	Greek Bank, Skalistiri Enterprise,	Athens
12.08.1986	Arson	Citybank	Athens (P. Faliro)
01.10.1986	Explosions	Government targets	Athens
11.10.1986	Explosions	Athens City Council & Public transportation Infrastructures	Athens
20.10.1986	Explosions	Police Station	Athens (Kononaki)

12.02.1987	Explosion	Ministry of Finance (Tax collection agency)	Athens
29.04.1987	Explosions	Ministry of Finance (Tax collection agency) & US Company	Athens
14.05.1987	Explosions	Ministry of Agriculture	Athens
19.08.1987	Explosion	Ministry of Finance	Athens (Eleysina)
27.11.1987	Explosions	American Army Supermarket (PX)	Athens (Syggrou)
27.04.1988	Explosion	Tax Collection agency & Police station	Thessaloniki
21.05.1988	Explosions	Police station; Cafe Bar & Disco bar	Athens (Pereus)
05.07.1988	Explosions	Industrial targets	Athens
02.12.1988	Explosions	European Bank; Offices of the European Union	Athens
26.05.1989	Explosions	Ministry of Social Care	Athens and Thessaloniki
01.07.1989	Explosion	Ministry of Justice	Athens
07.07.1989	Letter Explosions (warnings)	Journalists	Athens
14.07.1989	Explosions	Ministry of Interior; Internal Revenue; School of Public Administration	Athens
02.11.1989	Explosions	Home of Chief of the Hellenic Police	Athens
08.12.1989	Explosion	Police station	Athens (Tzitzifies)

<b>Attacks by 1 May (1987-1989)</b>			
29.06.1987	Assassination (attempted)	Director of the General Confederation of Greek Workers	Athens (Agia Paraskeyh)
23.01.1989	Assassination	Prosecutor	Athens
10.04.1989	Explosion	President of Court of the Appeals	Athens (neo Psychico)
<b>Attacks by ELA and 1 May (1990-1995)</b>			
03.04.1990	Explosions	Offices of the General Confederation of Greek Workers; Ministry of Finance; Hellenic Federation of Enterprises	Athens and Thessaloniki
30.03.1991	Explosions	Citibank	Athens (Kypsil and Ampelokipi)
03.04.1991	Explosions-arson	French embassy cars	Athens (Kolonaki)
03.04.1991	Explosion	United Nations Offices	Athens
24.06.1991	Side road Explosion	Police officers	Athens
16.07.1991	Explosions	Insurance Companies (4)	Athens
17.11.1991	Explosions	National Electric Company, Social Insurance Institute(IKA)	Athens
21.02.1992	Explosion	Night Club (Can-Can)	Athens
26.07.1992	Explosion (remote controlled)	Special Police Force bus (MAT)	Athens
17.03.1992	Explosions	European Unin cars and Bank	Athens
20.03.1992	Explosion	State weaknesses	Athens (Thisis and Melissia)



29.03.1992	Explosion	Night Club (Can-Can)	
30.03.1992	Explosions	Court Buildings	Thessaloniki
15.02.1993	Explosion	Shipping Company	Athens (Eleysina)
24.02.1993	Explosions	ETBA Bank	Athens
23.03.1993	Explosions	Ministry of Trade	Athens
09.04.1993	Explosions	Seven Explosions against public transports	Athens
01.10.1993	Explosions	Two Explosions against Public Transpiration Company	Athens
03.02.1994	Explosions	Goethe Institute	Athens
16.03.1994	Explosions	Hellenic Center for European Studies; French Institute	Athens
17.04.1994	Arsons	Financial Director of French Academy; Employee of French Academy; Employee of the Dutch Embassy	Athens
24.04.1994	Explosion	United Nations Offices	Athens (Skoufa)
25.04.1994	Explosion	United Nations Offices	Athens
07.06.1994	Explosion	Belgian Embassy	Athens
24.06.1994	Explosion	European Union Offices	Athens
11.06.1994	Explosion	German Insurance Company	Athens
19.11.1994	Explosion	Police Officers	Athens (Ampelokipi)
06.12.1994	Explosion	Internal Revenue Agency	Athens (Pereus)

24.01.1995	Explosion	Athens University of Economics and Business	Athens
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Source: Author's own research.

#### 5.4.2 Case 2: Revolutionary Organisation 17 November

The leaders of ELA were often accused for adopting a 'softly-softly approach'. Political activists, and the remaining radicals who did not enter the political system after the end of junta, had a different vision of the future of urban conflict in Greece. The 'November 17' (17N), an organization closely associated with the leadership of ELA (see image 4.2), especially in the first years of the transition to democracy, is by far the deadliest group in the history of urban terrorism in Greece (Papachelas and Telloglou, 2004: 73-5). Whereas ELA, and many other terrorist groups, focused on sabotage, arsons and bombings, 17N, as shown from the number of terrorist attacks (Table 4.2), focused heavily on associations and fundraising through bank robberies.

Nevertheless, the group was dismantled in 2002, after a faulty bomb detonator caused an explosion while being transported by a member of the terrorist organisation. Police investigations revealed that eight members composed the core of the group. It is indicative that most of the members, never arose the suspicion of the law enforces authorities. Instead, they had always maintained a low profile (Lampropoulos, 2002). Moreover, the group had a very rigid organisational structure. Judicial evidence suggests that each member had a clearly defined role in the group. In addition to the assassination of high ranking national and foreign figures, that in a way guaranteed high levels of visibility for the group, N 17 was also known for its mastery in the planning and execution of a large number of bank robberies. Besides, ammunition and firepower was often acquired and stolen from police stations and military camps. Nevertheless, the case of the 17N is unique in that it is, perhaps, the first time in the history of urban guerrilla warfare, where financial resources and funding of such groups become

public. Indeed, looking at the record of the group in executing bank robberies, many have proposed the theory that the 17N was a renegade terrorist group that was transformed into an organised crime group, driven mainly by economic motives.

**Image 4.2** An original copy of a communiqué by the Revolutionary Organisation November 17 with the red-framed start and the letters '17 N' printed at the centre of the document



The structure and wider connections of Greek terrorist remain an intriguing puzzle. All evidence we have on the composition of radical leftish groups, derive from the confessions of former 17N members. Two conflicting views on the structure of the revolutionary groups are most prevalent. The first pertains to the widespread belief, especially amongst official and law enforcement circles, that terrorist groups are linked with each other as well as with others groups that engage mainly in criminal activities, with non-ideological objectives.

Brady Kiesling, an American Diplomat formerly stationed in Greece, who has done numerous investigations on the terrorist groups in Greece, summarizes the inner workings of the 17N, as follows:

Throughout the active operational period [of the 17N group], its membership never exceeded the 15 or maximum 17 individuals, organised in small groups that often had family elements. The safe houses at any case, ranged from 6 to 17, while four or five members received each month about 100.000 (GRD)-at the beginning, and 150.000 (GRD) later on-in order to pay the rent, electricity bills and expenses. Moreover, every Christmas and Easter, bonuses were given to all the members in order to go on holidays.[...]. Furthermore, the organisation was not receiving intelligence from secret sources, as the Greek society believed. On contrast, information was gathered through newspaper articles and from hearsay by its members, who were regularly going out for coffees in Kolonaki.

(Cited in Aggelioforos, 2009)

However, the official view of the structure of terrorism in Greece was highly challenged by one of the alleged chiefs of the 17N group. In an interview he remarks:

Q. From the first moment you were arrested, you rejected the claims that you have been the leader of 17N. You refuted all the charges by the police, although there is evidence, such as your personal hand written notes and your fingerprints. Are you still supporting the same position?

A. Absolutely. The position of the 'leader' is a police construction. Whoever reads carefully the confessions of the alleged members of the 17N, will understand that what they describe is an organisation with autonomous nuclei that decide

only for those activities they are carried out by themselves, and act independently from each other. History shows that similar small organisations don't have a leader, simply because the so-called leader will not have the mechanism to insert his power, since monitoring the everyday life of the members is impossible. The opposite happens only in rural guerrilla groups, where the leader can exercise authority. Yet, the police mind-frame, national or foreign, cannot conceive an organisation without a leader.

(Giotopoulos, interviewed in: Alexandris, 2002)

Indeed, it is indicative that the initial confessions of the 17N arrested members, seem to have been elaborated by the authorities, in a way so as to reflect the 'needs' of the law, according to which a terrorist organisation has specific roles and divisions of labour.

The following sections will try to highlight some of the core aspects of the November 17 organisation, as well as the roles and function of its members. More specifically, we will examine social relations between the affiliates, the source of funding, the supply of arms and weapons, the operational capabilities, and the division of labour.

Generally, terrorist groups such as the November 17, have a very secretive and elaborative structure, taking sophisticated measures against police interference. Moreover, recruitment takes place within specific ideological circles and the anarchist community. Yet, family ties seem to be preferred. In the case of the 17N group, for example, we encounter first and second degree family relations. The following passage is the confessions of Vassilis Xiros, the youngest of the three brothers involved in 17N:

Q. How do you know [...] that your brother and the other person with the name Luke were members of the Revolutionary Organisation 17 November?

A. I know all this because I also, have participated in these activities during different phases of the organisation. In 1992, in particular, when I finished my military service and returned to my hometown in Thessaloniki to stay with my parents. Three years later, if I remember correctly, in 1995-1996, I visited Athens to see my brother Sabbas [...]. I stayed with him for about 2-3 months, and then returned to Thessaloniki. Six months after that, I went back to Athens [...]. This time, I stayed 1-2 weeks. During that period, we had few general discussions about how the powerful people in the country are trying to 'suck our blood', and that the Americans, having the power and wealth, destroy the world. Although I was not politically active at that time, I agreed with these views. Also, Sabbas told me that there are a couple of friends who resisted this situation through various activities, and he asked me whether I too, would like to help them. I agreed to try and see if I can help. So, in the following days I met in a cafe', with my brother Sabbas, a person that was introduced to me by my brother, as Luke. [...]. In this meeting, Luke suggested to plant a 'basket', a code name for bomb [...].

(Xiros, 2002)

From the statements provided by the apprehended members of the 17N groups, it can be assumed that bank robberies had been the main source of income and funding of the group. Here, Sabbas Xiros, one of the captured core members of the 17N group narrates:

The second bank robbery organised by the '17 November' took place in 1989, at the Ergasias Bank in Patisia. In that robbery, besides Luke, Stamatis, two others, and myself that I cannot recall also participated. We took about 23.000.000 (GRD). Then, the next robbery took place in 1990, at the Ergasias Bank

in Peristeri. I went there with Stamatis and Xristodoulos and few others that I cannot recall. From there, we took about 45.000.000 (GRD). In 1992, I remember [in another robbery], Georgatos, Xristodoulos, Luke dressed up as a police officer, Apostolis, the 'Turk', I, and another one, whose name I cannot recall...from that robbery we took 395.000.000. In 1997, myself, my brother Vassilis, Luke and another one, on behalf of '17N' we robbed the Post Office in Bironas, and after breaking down the door with a iron cutter we took 100.000.000 (GDR). Also, in 1998, me, Vassilis and Xristodoulos, we robbed the ETE in Pagrati. I forced the door with a hammer. We took about 110.000.000 (GDR). In 2001, myself, Vassilis and Luke, robbed a armoured truck [...] we took about 80.000.000. Our last robbery was this year with the same amount of money mission [...] and we took 230.000 EURO.

(Cited in Eleytherotypia 2002)

### 5.4.3 Case 3: Revolutionary Struggle (RS)

The group Revolutionary Struggle is the most noticeable organisation in the post 17N era. The group made its debut on the 6th of September 2003, with a double bombing of a court in Athens. Six months later, the group sticks again and targets Citibank. In May 2004, and only a hundred days before the Olympic Games, the group gains international recognition and visibility, as the international media publishes stories on a possible terrorist attack during the Olympic Games. Moreover, the group seems to follow a mixture of tactics similar to that of both the November 17 and the Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA). The Revolutionary struggle has under its belt few, high profile and symbolic attacks, like the RPG attack against the American Embassy in Athens, and the bombing of the Stock Exchange, as well as a large number of attacks against police forces state buildings. Interestingly, journalist and police sources claim that some of the members of the

Revolutionary Struggle had frequent communications with some of the imprisoned members of the November 17 group (Bradelis, 2010).

#### **5.4.4 Splinter cells and other affiliated organisations**

As already noted in the previous section, ideological and logistical differences between and within terrorist groups, resulted in the formation of ad hoc groups, and/or splinter cells, with the aim to embark in more violent activities, such as assassinations. In fact, police sources believe that ELA and 17N were initially a single group that later on, due to ideological differences, was separated. Hence, the community of revolutionaries that made an appearance after the end of the junta, acted as a pond for the recruitment of members and political activists who were willing to participate in the armed struggle movement. Based on journalist accounts, the following groups were shaped:

##### ***May 1***

The organisation 'May 1', makes its first appearance in June 1987. The attempted murder against George Raytopoulos, the then president of the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) was their first act. A year after, in 23 January 1989, the group assassinated Theodoros Bernardo, who was a public prosecutor of the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal Law. Subsequently, the group collaborated with ELA. Thereafter, it remained inactive (To Bhma, 2002).

##### ***June 78***

The only direct activity of this group was the assassination of Mpampali. Later on, it was discovered that the organisation was established by the members of the ELA, in order to carry out exclusively this attack (To Bhma, 2002).



***The Revolutionary group of Internationalist Solidarity Xristos Kassimis (1977-1985)***

This group makes an entry into the urban guerrilla scene of Athens with a number of small scale attacks between 1975 and 1982. The organisation engages mainly in bombings and arsons against state and imperialist targets. It is of special interest to mention that the name 'Christos Kassimis' had been used by a large number of anarchist organizations in the past. More specifically, Kassimis was an anarchist who participated in the anti-dictatorial organizations 'Democrat Defence' and '20 October', the first 'casualty' of the post junta urban guerrilla movement. Many believe that Kassimis, as well as the new organisations that emerged after his death, have very close ties with ELA (Kyriakopoulos and Chatzigeorgiou, 2003; To Bhma, 2002)

***The Popular revolutionary Struggle (LEA) (1975-1982)***

The 'Popular Revolutionary Struggle', is one of the few organizations that largely operated in Thessaloniki. The group was responsible for a number of arsons and bombings against the offices of political parties and organizations. Also, LEA was in charge for explosions in police departments and numerous banks. It is widely believed that the group was initially formed by members of the November 17. (To Bhma, 2002)

***The Revolutionary Organisation October '80 (1980-1981)***

This group orchestrated only six attacks, between 1980 and 1981. The targets of the group were diverging, ranging from arsons in shopping centres, electric companies and cars owned by foreign companies. It is indicative that some of these terrorist attacks created conflicts between the various groups of the urban guerrilla community in Athens, as some of these targets (mainly against the shopping centre that left many workers unemployed), were seen as counter-revolutionary acts.

***The Revolutionary Popular Solidarity Group (OELA) (Ομάδα Επαναστατικής Λαϊκής Αλληλεγγύης).***

In April 1983, a remotely detonated bomb nearly kills the Saudi Arabian Ambassador, in Athens. Interestingly, this attack was the very first terrorist incident, involving high technology explosive mechanisms in Greece. The group for the 'Revolutionary Popular Solidarity' (OELA) takes responsibility for the action. Moreover, the group claims responsibility for the bombing of the 'Oscar' bar, famous among US soldiers stationed in Athens. Further evidence from the 'Stasi files suggests that four of the OELA group had collaborated with the notorious international terrorist Carlos in the past. Finally, analysts suggest that OELA was an ad hoc splitter cell of the 'Revolutionary People Struggle' (ELA).

***Anti-state Struggle***

The 'Anti-state Struggle' was a splinter group from ELA, under the leadership of Christos Tsoutsouvis, a member of PAK during the Junta, and possibly Dimitris Koufontinas, from 17N. In April 1985, the group assassinated a prosecutor and, a month later, killed two security couriers working for the Sklavenitis super market chain. In the end, Christos Tsoutsouvis was gunned down by police officers in a random police search. Police forces searched his apartment in Athens and discovered many detonators, a typing machine where he used to write communiqués and declarations, and an original draft of the proclamation, which circulated in the media soon after the assassination of the prosecutor. (Eleytherotypia, 2003)

***The revolutionary Nuclear (1997-1999)***

The group emerged in May 1997, with a terrorist attack against the Coast Guard offices in Piraeus. The 'Revolutionary Nuclear' participated in more than 13 bombings against banks, businesses and political targets. However, an explosion at the Intercontinental Hotel in Athens, where two workers were killed, was the last terrorist incident claimed by the group. It is

estimated that the negative publicity received from these deaths forced the members of the group to discontinue from further activities.

## **5.5 The Third generation (2002-present)**

The second generation of the Greek urban guerrilla movement arrived to a closure, with the arrest and dismantling of leading groups such as the ELA, and 17N. In early 2010, the police managed to capture and imprison most, if not all, of the members of the 'Revolutionary Struggle' that was formed shortly after the arrest of the 17N and ELA. However, the demise of the 'old school' of urban guerrilla groups signified the beginning of a new circle of armed strugglers. Concerns may rest regarding the incentive for the appearance of a third circle of terrorism that these arrests created. Also it is evident that the 'rules of the game' have now changed. In particular, the two previous generations had first-hand experience of the dictatorship, and were either incapacitated or assimilated by the system. However, the post-17N era, the third generation of terrorist groups, represents a new phase of terrorism, with new characteristics in terms of intensity of the tacks and the symbolism of the targets. Moreover, the increase in terrorist incidences was also prominent by the international media and security forces. The annual report on terrorism by the US State department makes note of these dramatic changes.

Domestic terrorism in Greece increased significantly in 2009, following large-scale rioting in December 2008. In 2009, there were more than 430 security incidents—defined to include incendiary and explosive attacks, as well as attacks involving small arms, grenades, and other infantry-style weaponry—far more than those recorded in each of the previous 20 years.

(US State Department, 2010: 82)

The “boiling pot” exploded once again in December 2008, with mass riots through the capital of Greece, Athens, following the shooting of a 17 years old school-boy by a police officer. The country was thrown into a short period of chaos, looting, lawlessness and disorder. Nevertheless, this murder was only the trigger to a new social explosion, routed in numerous political and socio-economic factors. For many months, the political system was overwhelmed by political and financial scandals, whilst the government seemed to be unwilling, or incapable, of taking firm action against their protagonists. Groups from street gangs, mainly composed by young pupils and students, evolved to more violent groups. Furthermore, their tactics and modus operandi became more sophisticated, as improvised explosive devices began emerging. Noteworthy, the political developments in Greece also played a major role in the radicalization of the youth, who had no previous knowledge or first had experience of the Junta. Adding to this, political scandals, corruption and police brutality, coupled with the deterioration of the economic situation in the country, creating a fertile ground for the dissemination of revolutionary propaganda and radicalization (Moroy, 2009; Karousis, 2010).

The new groups have very little in common with the second generation of terrorist groups. Many analysts point out the ‘archaic nature’ of these groups, that resembles more to the anarchist groups of the Spanish civil war, than the Marxist revolutionary groups, like the Italian Red Brigades or the German urban guerrilla groups (Karousis, 2010). Besides, the targets and agenda of these new groups is much wider, perhaps partly reflecting the endemic lack of trust within the Greek society, fuelled by the continuing political instability in the country. Additionally, third generation groups are more likely to establish partnerships with criminal groups and the wider underworld community. Whereas ELA and 17N gained their ammunitions and supplies by extrapolating resources either by police stations or from military bases, new groups are more willing to form linkages and a chain of supply with criminal groups. Also, the second generation was very cautious, selecting symbolic targets that would produce the minimum condemnation

by the Greek society. In other words, they deeply cared about the public image of the revolutionary movement. Respectively, the new groups find symbolism in 'easy' targets (common police officers or journalists), which consist symbols of authority but at the same time, may also have a negative effect on public perceptions. The use of blind violence and lack of planning are the key characteristics of the new generation of terrorists in the Greek scene.

Although it is quite early to pass any judgment on the nature of the new form of terrorism that is currently emerging in Greece, it appears that one essential variable that may have an impact on the ruthlessness of the new groups, is disorganization. As depicted by the legacy of the first and second generation of terrorist groups, the traditional Marxist organisational model for urban guerrillas was fairly successful. Hence, every activity was planned and executed with precision, with its own ideological symbolism. However, the third generation has a new vision for the continuation of the urban conflict in Greece. The hierarchical or semi-hierarchical model, adopted by groups like ELA and 17N, have become rather the exception to the rule. The third generation is using the more flexible network model and in organisational terms become closer to the way criminal groups are also organised.

## **5.6 Conclusions and implications: beyond Greece**

Greek terrorism has undergone through three core historical phases. Each of these phases is tied to ongoing systemic changes that took place in the country over the past decades. Moreover, culture and social organisation appear to be as important as the systemic factors. The Greek value system is marked by a long lasting tradition of disobedience, lawlessness and struggles that gives legitimacy to action undertaken by extremist political groupings (Damianakos, 2003; Giannaras, 2002). The Greek State (and

any other form of political representation) is perceived by the people as criminal and corrupted acting against the interest of the general public (Halpern, 2001, see also: World Values Survey, 1999). Revolutionary groups have capitalised on pre-existing social and political structures both home and abroad to further their goals. Thus, it seems that a convergence of cultural, systemic, and social organisational forces can help us better understand the problem of terrorism in Greece.

To begin with, the first generation of revolutionaries was mainly radicalized in response to the military junta. Political activists, who participated in terrorist activities against the dictatorship in the early 70s, found support within the international community. Their international ties with governments and political parties from around the world were central in achieving their revolutionary objectives. Thus, the key actors of the anti-dictatorial struggle took over the power of the country shortly after the collapse of the military junta. After parliamentary democracy in Greece was restored, the second generation of terrorism was born. Compared to the first generation, this one was characterized by a more radical and revolutionary agenda and ideology. Groups, such as 'ELA' and '17N', to a great extent, reflected the international political environment, while they organised themselves under the urban guerrilla model exported by Latin America (Marighella, 2006, 1969). Moreover, some members of these groups developed ties with other international terrorists, and received training and support from them. The second generation reached to an end after strong pressure from both the state and the police authorities. Most of the members are now imprisoned, dead, or assimilated by the system.

Finally, the third generation represents a new form of terrorism. This generation seems to have more ideological and strategic similarities with Islamic fundamentalist groups, in terms of the exercise of violence and tactics used in their operation. Also, the organisation of these groups appears to be more spontaneous and disorganised than the former ones. The lack of training and available resources as well as previous imprisonments,

are indicative of the tendency of these groups to form bonds with common criminals, and vice versa.

# Chapter 6: Discussion

I will not say anything about this indictment because *innocence* and *guilt* are relative to the standpoint each one has chosen to adopt. If for the cops, journalists, politicians, bankers and the judges some people are guilty in the name of constitutional democracy, all those that I just mentioned are guilty in the name of popular justice.

(Koresis 2010: lines 36-39)<sup>9</sup>

## 6.1 Introduction

The political, economic and cultural environment in Greece indicates that the country should, in theory, be up against a serious endogenous organised crime problem. However, few people consider Greek organised crime to be a serious social problem (Eurobarometer, 2009, see also OCTA-SE, 2009; Europol TE-SAT, 2007; Europol, 2008; European Union, 2007; European Commission, 2005, UN General Assembly 2005). The lack of information about Greek organised crime is an anomaly that requires further research. We have labelled this anomaly, the ‘Greek paradox’ and it is the research puzzle tackled in the present work.

It is common knowledge that the activities and the people involved in ‘organised crime’ cannot be easily detected. Traditional research methods can be applied with great difficulty (Kelly, 1982; Cressey, 1967) and data are often created ‘by reasoning from the known to the inaccessible’ (Hinson, 2010: 830). Thus, scholars researching OC borrow techniques from archaeologist, geologist and physicists ‘who manufacture data by reasoning that knowledge about inaccessible affairs can be obtained from considering affairs that are accessible to study’ (Cressey, 1967: 101, 110, 112). According to Cressey (1967), the fact that OC cannot be studied with conventional research methods raises the following four reasonable

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<sup>9</sup> Koresis was arrested and imprisoned in 2010 for participating in the Greek terrorist groups “Revolutionary Struggle” (Epanastatikos Agonas).



alternative conclusions when the researcher is trying to expose an ‘organised crime’ problem:

- 1) An organization of “organised criminals” does not exist
- 2) An organization of “organised criminals” exists, but it is so secret that we cannot learn anything about it that law-enforcement personnel do not already know
- 3) Any organization of “organized criminals” that exists must not be much of a social problem or we would know more about it
- 4) an organization of “organized criminals” exists, but it must be studied by methods not ordinary utilized by social scientists

(Cressey 1967: 102)

The explanation put forward in this study is that Greek OC exists, but it not considered to be a social problem because it is also regarded as a normal phenomenon embedded into the everyday life and functioning of the cultural, social and political systems of the country. We have already presented and discussed in some length the extent to which the holist model relates back to the empirical data gathered during this project. Additionally, the second chapter deals extensively with the Greekness of Greek organised crime. In abstract terms, we point out that the visibility, publicity, exposure and construction of an organised crime ‘problem’ depends on the embeddedness (connectivity) and social power of the communities, interest groups and networks involved in illegal activities (see for example: Vold et al 2002: 227-247). In practical terms, there seems to be an inverse relationship between power, visibility and official arrests: the higher the embeddedness and power a group/activity, the less visible the group it becomes. And visa versa.

So in addition to the four conclusions proposed by Cressey (1967: 102), we can add the following fifth plausible deduction: an ‘organisation’ of ‘organized criminals’ exists, but we do not know much about it because society does not perceive its activities as a threat. This view transforms OC from a law enforcement and security problem, to a matter of social and political perception. So the problem one needs to consider is not necessarily *how much* organised crime there is in a particular country, but rather, a more fruitful approach is to examine why, how and if organised crime has been established in the public discourse and consciousness as a social problem? Is there the political will to fight serious forms of organized criminality? Does an anti-organised crime agenda serves the interest of the powerful? And of course, how do powerful policy making and policy shaping circles define “organised crime” in the first instance? Whose narrative prevails and why? These questions, in our view, address the real nature of organised crime in its everyday context.

Having these theoretical concerns at the back of our mind, the primary aim in this concluding chapter is to discuss and synthesize the empirical evidence gathered on the three criminal communities (case studies) in Greece and to present the general themes that emerge from the data. We have identified a number of ‘rules of thumb’ and hope this discussion will contribute to the ongoing debated that interests both academics and practitioners regarding the structure of criminal and terrorist groups as well to the debate on the causes, and interaction of OC with the social system (Morselli, Giguere and Petit 2007; Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004, Armao, 2003, Allum, 2006, 2010). Although most of the data derive form the Greek experience, we think the patterns that emerge can also be applied to different countries.

## 6.2 General principles

This section briefly highlights the general themes, principles or ‘rules of thumb’ that emerge when comparing the three case studies and subsequently

the following sections will provide an in-depth discussion. We remind the reader that the three cases examined here, varied in the degree of social power and visibility each group or community has. Additionally, each empirical chapter presented an account on the origin, structure and systemic interaction of the groups examined. A cross-case comparison can bring new insight that can improve our understanding of the phenomena under investigation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1978; Yin, 2003).

Overall, a key outcome of this work is the realisation that criminal groups can be placed in a spectrum of visibility (graph 6.1). We think that this spectrum is an analytical tool that can shed more light on a number of puzzling questions regarding serious forms of organised crime. In the one extreme of this spectrum we can place groups whose activities and existence are tolerated and the general visibility of the actors to the general public and law enforcement authorities is low. In other words, actors enjoy an unbefitting degree of impunity from the law. On the other extreme, groups and actors have a high degree of visibility, that reaches the point of mass hysteria. Between the two extremes, we can also identify groups and criminal communities with low and medium exposure to the media, public perception, law enforcement and criminal justice system. Existing research tackles these manifestation of OC, but to our knowledge, none has united them under a common analytical framework. The originality and contribution of the present research to the existing literature on OC is based on this effort to fuse previously unconnected concepts.

**Diagram. 6.1 Spectrum of visibility**



Source: Author's own elaboration

The examination of different groups along this spectrum allows us to deduct a number of general principles on the everyday manifestations and working

of organised crime in Greece. In particular the analytical power of this spectrum becomes apparent when the researcher questions *who* is doing *what*; and *where* these actors or groups can be positioned on the spectrum of visibility. We think that these principles say something about the nature of organised crime in Greece, but could also apply to other illegal groups, networks and communities around the world. The following general themes emerge from data examined.

First, the proceeding chapters indicate that the groups involved in criminal activities are susceptible to material and ideational contradictions, struggles, prohibitions and conflicts. Conflict in other words is a dynamic that explains why some actors from within specific communities behave in the way they do (Chambliss 1989, 1988b, 1975a, Chambliss and Mankoff, 1976; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, Nadelmann, 1989, 1990, 1988, Tilly: 1985, 1992; Gallant 1999). More specifically, the three empirical cases suggest that conflict takes place in various levels and our goal is to develop a typology that will clarify all instances of conflict that have emerged in the three cases studies. So how can the spectrum of visibility helps us interpret this observation?

The available empirical data support the view that the origin of organised crime in Greece is routed in conflict, but we think that the nature and form of this conflict is contingent to the visibility, power and exposure by the legal system. As we move along the spectrum of visibility, we expect to see that the causes/origin, organisation and systemic interaction assume different shapes and forms (see graph 6.1). A very interesting conclusion is that criminal groups or communities with medium and high exposure and visibility have a more ideological language whereas the low visibility communities produce a more rational and economic rhetoric. The documents that we have examined in this work, obtained from the Greek courts as well as information from interviews with offenders, allow us to expose this ideological preference in the language and rhetoric used by the criminals.

Second, the structure of the groups in all three cases is best conceptualized as a loose network where family relations and trusted friendship ties (mainly dyads) play a central role in the organization of crime (von Lampe and Johansen, 2004, Albin, 1971; 1975; Cressey, 1972; Ianni and Ianni, 1972; Smith, 1980; 1994; 1978). The organisational structure of the groups varies, depending on the task environment. Recruitment of new members takes place from within the respective legal communities. However, we have identified in all the cases, the presence of a high density leadership cluster or clique which is isolated from the main network. Again the organization of the groups should be examined against the social power and exposure of the group or criminal community. One interesting conclusion that emerges with regards the structure and social organization of the groups is that, high visibility groups tend to rely more on trusted ties (blood, family and marriage) whereas low visibility groups are more willing to trust old friends and business colleagues and form bonds based on profits and economic gains.

Third, we demonstrated the presence of strong links and cooperation between the state, businesses and civil society (Armao, 2003: 29; Allum 2010, Chambliss, 1971; Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010; Court of Appeal case 3481/2005 & 10/2006; Court of Appeal case 3765/2006; Court of Appeals case 2585/2005, Aravantinos, 2009; Kampanakis, 2007; Saxionis, 2008; Informant 3, 2008; Informant 2, 2008). Such links make it very difficult for a social problem (crime or terrorism) to be condemned by the society. Systemic cooperation is facilitated by social, economic, cultural and political forces. It ranges from direct protection of illegal interests to the Greek value system that 'protects' and normalizes some forms of illegal behaviour. It is interesting to see the extent to which social power is a modifying variable in this observation. Here the conclusion that emerges from the case studies is that direct systemic cooperation decreases when the visibility of a criminal group increases. Groups with low visibility have very strong and symbiotic ties with the rest of the systems. Groups with higher visibility and exposure to the Greek criminal justice system have indirect

ties that take the form of ideological and normative support especially by the civil society and by some parts of the political and economic system.

### **6.3 The origin of organised crime**

The data examined in the previous chapters shows that organised crime and other forms of criminal behaviour could be interpreted as the product of conflict. The term 'conflict' is vague and it is very often used by political scientist, IR scholars and criminologists in various ways and in different contexts (cultural, political and economic). Conflict is ubiquitous to every culture and can be found in all aspects of social life. Bartos and Wehr (2002) for example note that: 'Homo sapiens has been learning about conflict throughout its development. That knowledge is spread across humanity, residing wherever human live, work, and play. It is folk knowledge, used continuously in everyday life - in commerce, family relations, government, sports, child rearing' (2002: 1). So what types of conflicts could give rise to serious forms of criminality?

In the three cases examined in this work, it appears that the forms of organised crime activities examined derive from economic competition, ideological struggle and also from wider conflicts between different power groups. This conclusion is in line with existing research findings indicating that conflict has a criminogenic potential (Selling, 1938; Sutherland, 1940; 1941; 1945; 1983; Coleman, 1987: 414-420; Chambliss and Mankoff, 1976). Furthermore, the case studies show that the conflicts can be categorized into three main types.

- Type 1 conflicts are confrontations and tensions that take place at the micro level and within communities. Dispute settlement, economic competition as well as personal and cultural predispositions towards 'rivals' are all forms of micro level conflicts (Quinney, 1964; Sutherland, 1983; Vold et al 2002: 227-266).

- Type 2 are macro conflicts and more sociological and political in nature. These are often clashes and confrontations that take place between larger systems, but nevertheless confined within a finite territory or a country. Avoiding prohibition regimes is a typical example of a macro conflict where a group supplies a good or a service the state-law is prohibiting (Sellin, 1938; Gambetta, 1993; Varese, 2005).
- Type 3 conflicts are global conflicts defined by strong international and transnational characteristics. These conflicts emerge from international control regimes, imperialism, foreign policy goals and the distribution of global power. Global conflicts are in essence macro conflicts with transnational characteristics that cannot be managed effectively by a single state. In our case studies such conflicts can be observed between the state and the communities that engage primarily in transnational illegal practices, such as groups that engage in transnational cocaine smuggling and are being investigated by the Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) and/or other global policing forces. The Urban terrorist groups also have these characteristics since the Greek state receives significant pressure by foreign countries to confront these groups (Thoumi, 1995; Woodiwiss, 2001; Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; Nadelmann 1988; 1989; 1990).

So, is there a pattern or a general rule that emerges with regards to the type of conflict that takes place across cases with different social power? Again the spectrum of visibility can be employed as an analytical platform for this task (Table 6.1).

The short answer is yes, although, further research is needed in order to come to a more reliable conclusion. Both visibility and power are correlated to the level (micro, macro, global) in which tensions and conflicts emerge. We have recorded that conflicts between state and criminal communities clearly take place at the macro level and their impact is much more visible to the

public whereas intra community conflicts are more localized and therefore more difficult to be detect and prosecute. Additionally, we noticed that in some cases macro and micro conflicts are overlapping and could both take place at the same time. Macro conflict, that is to say, between the state and non-state actors emerge from prohibition regimes, but also take the form of ideological struggle. The core difference between these the two types of conflict is that the former is pure economical and based on material gains whereas the later has strong ideological and ideational components. In the case of the cocaine Barons, a social group that holds political and economic power, conflict is also at the macro level (i.e. importation of a prohibited good like, narcotics). However, their visibility remains low. This is an anomaly because we have already argued that macro conflicts often draw more the attention of the authorities and thus become more visible.

**Table 6.1** Typology of conflicts

Cases	Power/visibility	Origin	Type of conflict
Case 1 Cocaine Barons	High/low	Competition, prohibition	Type 1 and type 2
Case 2 Godfathers of the Night	Medium	Prohibition, competition, struggle	Type 2 and type 1
Case 3 Urban Guerrilla groups	Low/high	Struggle	Type 2 and type 3

Source: Author's own elaboration

We can explain this anomaly on the grounds that cocaine smugglers do not engage in cocaine smuggling in Greece on a systematic basis. In other words, the smuggling of cocaine is not driven solely by market asymmetries an the dynamics between demand, state prohibition and supply (see for example: Passas, 1993;1994 and 1998). Smuggling of cocaine in Greece is opportunistic. High competition and the risky environment of the Greek shipping industry is also a significant push factor (Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010). Put is simply, when an entrepreneur who is involved



in the shipping industry, has serious economic difficulties, is very likely to organise one or two 'jobs' in order to avoid financial ruin. Subsequently, when the crisis is gone, these actors tend to return to their legitimate and semi-legitimate activities. Their deviation to cocaine smuggling is a temporary carrier path and may provide some benefits to the Greek state and state officials, such as bribes, intelligence, networking and diplomacy.

In the event were the Greek Cocaine barons turn into the cocaine business on a permanent basis, then it is very likely that the macro conflict will assume very strong ideological components. But, at the moment, the smuggling networks and the Greek state do not have particularly strong antagonistic relations. The same logic applies for the other two communities examined in this thesis. The more systematic and 'organised' they become, the more antagonistic their relationships with the state, and thus the conflict tends to intensify.

Clearly there is more work to be done in this context in developing a more robust typology of the different states and escalation of macro-level conflict. More specifically it is interesting to find the extent to which ad hoc smuggling of prohibited goods that takes places within strategic industries (i.e. shipping) serves any personal or national interests. There are strong historical links between strategic industries, states power and organised forms of smuggling that requires further research (Tilly, 1985; Chambliss 1989). Nevertheless, we can still provide a preliminary analysis on the three types of conflict that appear in our cases studies.

First, prohibition seems to be a significant source of conflict between social groups and the state. Through a historical analysis of the origin of the 'Godfathers of the night' as well as of the 'Cocaine Barons we note that taxation and prohibition of gambling, drugs, prostitution and other state efforts to control of various activities have given a reason to groups and networks willing to challenge these policies. On the one hand state policy attempts, for various economic and political/ideological reasons to dominate and control a specific market whereas such efforts, that often go against the

economic and ideological interests of various communities generate confrontation and conflict. The emergence of revolutionary groups is also routed in very similar conflict dynamics, although the ideological drivers seem to be stronger than the material-economic. Similarly, the rise of cocaine smuggling networks in Greece are also routed in conflicts generated by various prohibitions and controls that serve state interest, but nevertheless go against the interests of various social groupings involved in legal and illegal markets.

Second, the evidence on all three communities examined, suggest that organised crime also is caused by intra-community dynamics, antagonism, competition and conflicts. When such conflicts emerge, the role of the state is indirect and less significant, although prohibition regimes and the weakness of the state to insert its authority and hegemony does play a role in their manifestation. A general weakness (normative and practical) to enforce the rule of law, increases the probability that disputes, antagonism and competition could be solved by resulting to the use extra-legal means (i.e. use of violence, threat and intimidation). We have recorded at least two sub categories of intra-community conflicts (type 1 conflicts) that we think are relevant for this analysis. First depute settlement, extortion and the threat or use of violence between members of a community is an illustrative example were such conflicts are being manifested. In the case of the 'Godfathers', such conflicts are indeed very visible. Although the source of turf wars may be complex and divergent, we believe that in the final analysis, it demonstrates, if only symbolically, a manifestation of a struggle to control and dominate a given legal or illegal market (Court of Appeal case 3765/2006). The role of the state is not very clear in these inter-community struggles. This is not to say that the state, and more specifically the law enforcement is just a bystander. On the contrary, we have collected oral and written evidence (court cases, news papers, interviews with offenders) suggesting that the law enforcement (police, Coast Guards and Marines) plays a significant role 'behind the scenes'. We have not been able to establish the motives of the police involvement in these conflicts, but it is

indeed a very common tactic for the law enforcement to ask undercover agents to infiltrating criminal groups and then manipulate the relations between groups either by providing information or by controlling members of criminal groups.

In the case of the revolutionary groups, conflicts are very rare and we have not seen any evidence suggesting the opposite. Competition between ideologically driven criminal groups takes place only at the production of propaganda and political discourse. Second, competition and antagonism within legal markets is also criminogenic. In the case of the Cocaine Barons, for instance, we can observe that actors turn to illegal activities (smuggling, fraud and other activities) when they have economic difficulties. Competition and risk are very strong and therefore we believe that actors who wish to maintain their power position within such markets, are more likely to participate in serious criminal activities. An additional reason can be that their legal profession and experience ( this is also true for the night economy as well as the shipping community) gives them a competitive advantage and the necessary technology and skill to organize and execute such complex plans (see: Zaitch, 2002b; 2003; Fijnaut et al. 1998; Kleemans and Bunt, 1999, 2008)

Third, when looking at the causes and origin of organised crime, it becomes clear that a third type of conflict emerges. The second type of conflict which is a confrontation between the state and a specific criminal groups or illicit market. We notice for example that the fight against smuggling in Greece is closely related to International norms about tax evasion and protection of economic interests. In fact, when we trace the history of the public discourse against smuggling in Greece, we see that the prohibition and control of certain goods is linked with the demands of foreign creditors. So from a historical perspective, the pursuit of anti-organised policies is linked to the global financial governance. Firm actions and strong institutional arrangements against smuggling, provides an guaranties to the lenders that

the loans will be repaid by securing high revenues via taxation (Scrip, 1989: 1-2; Scrip, 1909).

Our own conceptualization of the origin of organised crime shares some similarities with Sellin's (1938) typology of culture conflicts. Sellin notes that in homogenous societies norms that are enacted into laws are upheld by most of the members of society because they represent a consensual viewpoint. In heterogeneous societies however, it is very difficult to derive to this consensus and cultural conflicts therefore lead to patterns of criminal behaviour. Sellin also makes a reference to two types of conflicts: primary and secondary. Primary conflicts are between societies and can be induced by territorial proximity and through migration. Secondary conflicts, Sellin argues, are conflicts between sub-cultures who have fundamentally different world views, norms and values (1938: 98-9). Our conclusions however, show that the position of the power group in the social system does not play a determinant role in the manifestation of conflict. In other words, the perspective seems to apply to actors from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds as well as to those from more powerful communities.

The comparative research design allows us to derive some general conclusion regarding the nature and causes of organised crime with regards the previous argument. Although, illegality is the stronger variable that links these three communities together, there are also many other variables that differentiate them. The Urban Guerrilla groups have a much stronger ideological agenda and come from the base of the society; cocaine smuggling is organised by privileged upper society actors; and the cabals of the "Godfathers" are defined by diversity as well as some working class characteristics. Despite these socio-economic and political differences it appear that the prediction of the conflict perspective can be verified in all cases. Cocaine smugglers are usually entrepreneurs from the shipping community who have various economic problems (shipping is anyway a very risky industry) and who engage in illicit activities in order to 'stay in the game'. The conclusion we can deduct from this analysis is that criminal

behaviour is not solely the behaviour of ‘minority power groups’ (Vold et al 2002: 230). The notion that culture, ethnicity and economic status play a role in facilitating criminal associations has been very central in the theoretical discussion of organised crime (Fijnaut, Bovenkerk, Bruinsma, and Van de Bunt, 1998; Bovenkerk, Siegel, and Zaitch, 2003; Bovenkerk, 1998). Our analysis indicates that these variables are important, but may differ from country to country and from case to case. The cultural divergent is so great, that may lead to the conclusion that mafias are *sui generis* phenomena, thus making generalisations by comparison extremely problematic (Gambetta, 1996: 97; Hill, 2003: 2; Mayntz, 2004). Rich and powerful also commit serious crimes, and the basis of this behaviour is the same with those of poor and powerless. In other words it seems that individual attributes such as ethnicity, and economic and social status are not as significant as we previously thought, especially when the role of conflict is taken into account.

### **6.3.1 Language, visibility and ideology**

A close investigation on the defence line of those accused by the state for participating in a criminal organisation, exposes an ideology which is not often reported in mainstream research (Schulte-Bockholt, 2001). This language is in our view a strong indicator that criminals also develop ideological motives. The greater the exposure to law enforcement and criminal justice system, the stronger the political and ideological motives become.

The following is an extract from an interview with Vassilis Stefanakos, the so called ‘boss of all Godfathers’, who has been sentenced for various offenses, including, participating into a criminal organisation, smuggling, kidnapping and murder.

Q. The authorities have charged you with participation in organised crime and they are also saying that organised crime is controlled from people within prisons.

A. There is no 'organised crime' as defined by the authorities. How could organised crime go to prison? Being 'organised' means that you make sure you have immunity or that you receive pardons for your offenses. Organised crime doesn't go to prison. No more needs to be said...

(Stefanakos, 2009: para. 18-19)

In the previous quote, Stefanakos implies that the 'real' organised crime enjoys the political protection and total impunity. Although his view lacks an organisational description of the concept in question, we can only assume that his comment refers to the Greek politicians who are never put on trial. Nevertheless, a convicted member of the Revolutionary Organisation 17 November provides a more detail overview of the real Greek Organised Crime. His definition seems to include a large array of offenses perpetrated by the legal-political system and the Greek political and economic establishment. He explains:

Organised crime in Greece, is not only under the protection of the powerful, it is the state itself and its various gangs and syndicates are simply collaborative associations, fronts ect. And when we talk about the organised crimes of the state we do not only mean the official theft, such as, theft via taxation, kick backs from public expenditure, plundering of public funds, the dismantling [privatization] and the rake-offs from the Olympic [airlines], OSE, OTE, ports, airports, and many more. We do not mean only that, there are also other activities by state 'organisations' which differ very little from the practices of the Mafiosi and Cocaine Barons. From where to begin and where to end: a) Assassinations by para-state gangs or state officials only the last year: Isidoropoulos, Koumis, Kanellopoulou, Temponeras, Kaltezas, Grigoropoulos, but also there are cases of criminal neglect: Samina shipwreck, the forest fires in 2007,

the Pipe works in Corinth, accidents in Perama and many others. b) Abductions - Hostage taking either directly mafia-like kidnappings, like the case with the Pakistanis or for revenge purposes like in our case [Revolutionary Organisation 17 November] in the summer of 2002 that today tends to become the dominant norm [...]. c) Prostitution-drugs-protection rackets: Hellenic Police-Magistrates-Politicians ect. d) 'Exploitation' of public land ect: Church, ministers, arsonists. e) Major construction projects: Constructors: Ministers, constructor tycoons, media owners, publishers f) Money laundering: Ministers, Prime Ministers, Parliament, Justice System, Mass Media and so on.

(Xyros 2009: para. 19-26)

Another vivid example of how ideology shapes people's definition of OC, is provided by Mr. Georgiadis who was charged in 2009 for participating in a criminal organisation and for the kidnapping of Mr. Mylonas who was the president of the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece. Georgiadis provides an alternative narrative of what OC is all about, but also on the notions of continuity and criminal association:

Unfortunately for the exponents of legality, the facts are concrete: a handful of capitalists have organised a criminal gang and kidnapped proletarians demanding as ransom, their labour force, the commercialization of their human activity, their time (converted to cash) their very existence. Wage slavery is a continuing crime against human dignity. Not only the "accidents" in the workplace, the "collateral damage" of a class conflict. Not only the millions of dead, wounded and mutilated, by occupational "accidents" but also from diseases related to the nature of the work or the workplace. Not only the existence of strawberry fields, demonstrating that slave-merchants never

eclipsed. Not only the sacrificed workers (natives and immigrants, "expensive" and "cheap" manpower) in the name of every "American Dream" or "Greek miracle". It is the very existence of waged labour that constitutes a continuing crime! And the criminals, kidnappers, blackmailers are all like Mylonas. Even though the media represent Mylonas who is the 'Boss of all Bosses' (leader of the gang of the thieves of the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece) as an "innocent" victim, as a misunderstood neoliberal Christian child, who struggles day and night for the common good.

(Georgiadis 2008: lines 17- 34)

The opinions and view about the nature of organised crime as expressed by the offenders is very often ignored in the academic accounts of this phenomenon (Paoli, 2003: 14-5). Ethnographic research and participatory observation, techniques that allow the research to gain the everyday perspective from those directly involved in organised crime, can provide fruitful theoretical insights. As Chambliss notes: 'the theories of law and of crime that dominate the academic study of crime (as contrasted with the street knowledge of crime) are in my view almost entirely misleading' (Chambliss 1988: 8). By studying closer the language and narratives produced by the offenders, we have been able to clarify the link between economic and political motives, considering that visibility and exposure is an intervening factor. In all cases and irrespectively of the social power of the actors, visibility seems to lead to the politicization of the offence.

## 6.4 The structure of the groups

A wealth of sources and empirical evidence consulted for this project, strongly indicate that the groups examined are loosely organised network of 'cabals' (see Chambliss 1972) composed by actors from the police, the security services, lawyers, public officials, bankers, bouncers, gym



owners/athletes, club owners, professional criminals, carrier criminals, politicians and businessmen. Each one of these cabals or communities collectively form a 'social world' which has rapidly evolved, in response to national and international prohibition regimes, intra-community competition and ideological struggle, into a disorganised and rather powerful and wealthy structure.

There are some reoccurring patterns in the membership and structure of the groups, across the three criminal communities we have examined. We have come across four major types of interpersonal ties that include: blood ties, entrepreneurial ties, social and friendship ties (table, 6.2). The available empirical evidence suggest that entrepreneurial networks such as those found in the shipping communities are more likely to develop ad hoc relations. Respectively, the Godfathers operate on different dynamics and principles. Economic motives are important, but it appears that profit is not the sole determinant of their organisation. Reputation, trust and rivalry are also some of the principles with an ordering power over the nature and structure of these groups. Fear or retaliation and double crossing is putting additional pressure to the members of these groups to give additional attention on their links and ties. Investing on trust is as good as investing on a job that will later on generate profits.

What we often see in these criminal groupings is that interpersonal relations, social ties and other personal characteristics play a central role (3765/2006: 168). Moreover, the dynamics within the illegal cabal or community that engages in cocaine smuggling are not very competitive. Violence is mostly applied for intergroup dispute settlements and it is rather the exception to the rule. The simple explanation is that the cocaine trade in Greece is not organised and systematic. Thus, we do not see the emergence of conflicts between groups.

**Table 6.2** Typology of the structure of Groups

Cases	Power	Structure
Case 1 Cocaine Barons	High	Entrepreneurial, ad hoc, friendship and some family ties
Case 2 Godfathers of the Night	Medium	Friendship, family and local ties
Case 3 Urban Guerrilla groups	Low	Family and strong friendship ties

The structure of the groups with medium power and visibility (The godfathers) is different. It can be argued that the combination of a degree of hedonism, consumptionism and greediness acts as a stopping power for forging strong group ties. Social bonds and ties in other words are based on short terms and individualist sentiments. Research has shows that such sentiments are central in the forging of friendship ties in the nocturnal economy. Thus, ties and connections are shaped in relation to changes in the lifestyle of the members.

It's now clear that the 'nocturnal economy', with its peculiar mix of hedonism and conspicuous consumption, is becoming a crucial cultural site for young people seeking companionship and forging their identities. For most of our respondents, the establishment and maintenance of close personal relationships were synonymous with 'going out', and many voiced the belief that without 'going out' there would be no 'friendship' at all. Of course friendships have been changing across the individual's life-course for some generations, but what becomes important here is the culturo-economic context in which these fragile relations are enacted and maintained, where the long-term mutuality, reciprocity and loyalty that were core properties of traditional friendships are being rapidly eroded by the prevailing neo-liberal ethos of self-interest. Although some of our

respondents talked about the depth of their affections for friends, in most cases they were mindful of the inherent instability of these attachments from the moment they were established. The 'close relationship' seems to have become a rare bonus rather than an everyday normative end in itself, a luxury that is always contingent on the utility that it provides for the achievement of personal occupational and lifestyle ambitions. Many current youth friendships do not seem to be generating the deep personal knowledge of each other's lives that was such a palpable feature of traditional working class communities. As traditional community and the ethos of mutuality declines, labour markets become increasingly diverse and friendships become cantered around lifestyle ambitions, individuals are now often unaware of their friends' work, family, politics or inner emotions because they have no regular contact in these dimensions of life. An unwritten agreement appears to exist that the anticipated hedonism and abandon of a night out should not be spoiled by talk of them.

(Hall and Winlow 2005: 34-35)

Also, in all three case studies we have examined, a reoccurring pattern in the way groups are organised has emerged. It seems that these groups have developed an informal hierarchical structure, although, we should stress that their principal organisational dynamic is horizontal and network-like. Nevertheless, some degree of specialisation and division of labour according to the power, authority and perhaps experience of the offender exists. In particular we noted a three-layer division of labour that in organisational terms resembles a pyramid. At the bottom of that pyramid are members who have a marginal role in the illegal activities, albeit they undertake important peripheral tasks. At the middle we see a cast of people who perform duties of middle management and often work as intermediaries between the top and the lower parts of the pyramid. Finally at the top we see

the leading members and the acting 'head' or 'boss' of the groups who take executing decisions and often remain invisible and not related to the everyday activities that can incriminate them.

We noted that the more hedonist the task environment is the less likely this structure to be effective and to preserve through time. Members at the bottom of the pyramid will try to climb a the top and thereby creating conflict between the group. When the task environment is more opportunistic and profit-driven (Cocaine barons), this structure seems more appropriate, since it is formed on an ad hoc basis. Finally, the most durable seems to be the structure adopted by the revolutionary groups. Here, blood ties and family ties are very strong and guaranty that attempts of back stabbing as well as cooperation with the law enforcement will be limited.

## 6.5 Systems: cooperation and conflict

The interaction between the state, businesses and civil society is primarily based on the notion of cooperation. From our three case studies it emerges that cooperation between these subsystems is forthcoming when certain norms are prohibited or when a specific behaviour lacks the support and legitimacy of the major political actor in society, the state. It was demonstrated that illegal groupings emerge due to various restrictions, prohibitions and conflicts. So, it can be argued that groups from all segments of society resolve to illegal means as an alternative way of accumulating power and wealth.

Cooperation between the main sub-systems of society in illegal means is the dominant norms since, the weak state attempts to aggregate more power and social control through what appears to be poorly sustained prohibition policies. In simple rational terms, this interaction is well explained via the systems approach. Parsons (1965) expertly provides the following analysis:

As a formal analytical point of reference, *primacy of orientation to the attainment of a specific goal* is used as the defining

characteristic of an organization which distinguishes it from other types of social systems. This criterion has implications for both the external relations and the internal structure of the system referred to here as an organization. The attainment of a goal is defined as a *relation* between a system (in this case a social systems) and the relevant parts of the external situation in which it acts or operates. This relation can be conceived as the maximization, relative to the relevant conditions such as costs and obstacles, of some category of *output* of the system to objects or systems in the external situation. These considerations yield a further important criterion of an organization. An organisation is a system which, as the attainment of its goal, “produces” an identifiable something which can be utilized in some way by another system that is, the output of the organization is, for some other system, an input. In the case of an organization with economic primacy, this output may be a class of goods or services which are either consumable or serve as instruments for a further phase of the production process by other organisations. In the case of a government agency the output may be a class of regulatory decisions; in that of an educational organisation it may be a certain type of “trained capacity” on the part of the students who have been subjected to its influence. In any of these cases there must be a set of consequences of the processes which go on within the organisation, which make a difference to the functioning of some other sub-system of the society; that is, without the production of certain goods the consuming unit must behave differently, i.e., suffer a “deprivation”.

(Parsons 1965: 64)

By applying the previous analytical framework to the study of organised crime, we can deduct a number of plausible instances were the output of a

sub-system can be used as a valuable input for another. There is existing literature that elaborates on the symbiosis of the social systems, exposing the role of organised crime groups as functional parts within society (Allum, 2006; Allum and Siebert, 2003; Armao, 2003; Sabetti, 2002; Allum, 2010). Nevertheless, we think that the visibility spectrum can improve the existing research on the functional attributes of organised crime. In Table 6.1 we provide an overview of the instances and nature of cooperation we have identified in the cases studies. As we can see, there is an inverse relationship between systemic cooperation and visibility. Groups with low visibility tend to be more connected, whereas those with high visibility are in theory marginalised. The paradox here is that there is another very interesting correlation between visibility and normative/ideational symbiosis. There seems to be a positive relationship between the levels of visibility and the level of normative support. In other words, activities which are broadly condemned and do not have strong normative support by society tend to receive more help, whereas activities with stronger normative justification tend to remain marginalised.

**Table 6.3** Typology of systemic interaction

Cases	Power	Systemic interaction
Case 1 Cocaine Barons	High	Strong systemic relations, weak normative support
Case 2 Godfathers of the Night	Medium	Strong systemic relations, fair normative support
Case 3 Urban Guerrilla groups	Low	Weak systemic relations, strong normative support

Cooperation however, is not the only norm in this systemic interaction. In particular, we argued that when the laws are applied, that is, when groups are prosecuted and individuals are imprisoned, we have a conflicting relationship. The question that we tried to address in the previous chapter, concerned with the conditions that facilitated this conflict. Organised crime

can be seen as an activity that is protected from powerful actors and therefore, it is by definition very difficult to study the inner-workings of this secretive and hidden phenomenon. So an interesting puzzle is why some groups are prosecuted whilst others remain undetected. By far the major variable is the involvement of foreign security services such as the CIA, MI5, the US DEA and other European partners. So it appears that pressure for results, that derives from foreign powers is a significant factor that undermines the norm of cooperation that underpins the systemic relationship.

## 6.6 Gangster Politics

The present work examines a specific empirical facet of organised crime and terrorism manifested in Greece. The conclusions are clearly a reflection of the situation in Greece. However, the argument presented in this work also has an impact on much wider debates and ‘grand narratives’ with regards the nature of organised crime in other countries as well as the nature of the political system overall. In the introductory chapter, four metaphors were used in order to simplify and better understand how scholars have interpreted an abstract and contested concept such as ‘organised crime’. In this section we will briefly touch upon these issues hoping to add a new metaphor into the existing debate.

Criminal behaviour and the control of crime have political readings (Chambliss, 1968, 1975b; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). Why should the legal-political system criminalise some forms of behaviour? Why some people, groups and crimes have systematically a higher degree of exposure, whilst other people, groups and crimes remain unpunished? Who benefits from the order the legal system creates?

The political implications of these questions become even more prominent, bearing in mind that controlling some forms of criminal behaviour, such as organised crime and terrorism has a global appeal that can mobilise the

International community of states. There is an ongoing debate over the political implications of globalisation and the rise of Global Governance and we think that the study of transnational crime should not be excluded from this discourse (Edwards and Gill, 2002; Gootenberg, 2009; Hobbs, 1998; Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009; Sheptycki. 1995; 1998). We can learn a great deal about politics by looking closely on the working of organised crime. The political theories and conceptualisations of 'power' and the 'state' developed by Marx and Engels (orthodox Marxism) and later on by Gramsci (neo-Marxism) will provide a reference point for such discussion.

The orthodox Marxist explanation of social life is underlined by the assumption that relations are antagonistic and conflictual. This conflict is interpreted as 'the attempt to dominate others and to avoid being dominated' (Babble 2010: 36). Thus, political power according to Marx and Engels (1888) is 'merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another' (p. 21). Within this framework of analysis (historical materialism) the State emerges as a 'superior power' in order to mediate these conflicts, but becomes merely a tool of economic exploitation and domination of the powerful over the powerless. Engels provides the following explanation of the origins and nature of the State that illustrates this point:

But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power seemingly standing above society that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of "order"; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state. [...] Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus



acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus, the state of antiquity was above all the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital.

(Engels 2004: 157, 159)

Overall, there are three core characteristics that define the State from the perspective of orthodox Marxism: territorial division, control of violence (public power) and economic exploitation via taxation. The confluence of these three characteristics according to Engels (2004: 158) make the State organs of society 'above society'. Tracing the genesis of the State in the political context of the Ancient Athens, Engels explains:

As distinct from the old gentile order, the state, first, divides its subjects according to territory. [...] The second distinguishing feature is the establishment of a public power which no longer directly coincides with the population organising itself as an armed force. This special public power is necessary because a self-acting armed organisation of the population has become impossible since the split into classes. [...] In order to maintain this public power, contributions from the citizens become necessary — taxes. [...] As civilisation advances, these taxes become inadequate; the state makes drafts on the future, contracts loans, public debts.

(Engels 2004: 157-8).

Consequently, the main notions that derive from the orthodox Marxian analysis is that the State maintains 'order' by serving the interests of the powerful and exercises control over society through violence and political

and economic coercion. However, the idea that norms and ideology are also the means of indirect source of power remained analytically underdeveloped in the orthodox Marxist writings (Curtis 1997).

Gramsci sought to extend this line of analysis, by arguing that ideological and cultural hegemony is also relevant in the analysis of power relations. Gramsci's major contribution to political philosophy that continues to shape our understanding and analysis of political change even today (see for example the works of Noam Chomsky), derives from his emphasis on the crucial role of intellectuals in the legitimisation of power and/or in the creation of 'new relations with power' (Martin 2002: 171). Gramsci show a crucial analytical distinction between hegemony (*agemonia*) and domination (*dominio*) that can be found in the traditional (Marxist) notion of historical materialism. The later is based on coercive force of the *Repressive State Apparatus* (Althusser 1970) that required the monopoly of violence involving the formal governmental power and can be translated in strategic terms as a 'War of Manoeuvre'. Hegemony on the other hand, refers to an indirect cultural and ideological struggle between competing groups and it is a struggle that resembles in Gramsci's own words a 'War of Position' (Gramsci 2003). The hegemonic power of the dominant group is exercised indirectly, by what Althusser calls (1970) the *Ideological State Apparatuses*, including civil and political institutions such as schools, legal professions, church, media and trade unions. Gramsci theorized that the dominant group maintained its power position through a mixture of coercion and force (employed by the state/political society) with the consensual participation of the subordinate groups, through consent (cultural hegemony via propaganda). The dominant group will resolve to the use of violence only when attempts to manufacture consent fail (Gramsci 2003). Consequently, cultural and ideological hegemony, Gramsci contended 'is synonymous with the study of political power' (Martin, 2002: 171).

The neo-Marxist perspective allows us to expand the definition of power and to including additional variables in our analysis of organised crime,

such as ideological, normative and cultural characteristics. Organised crime and the State do not stand at opposite trenches simply because they both seek to monopolize the use of violence over a given territory and with the final goal being the provision a tangible public commodity such as *protection* (Gambetta 1993: 1-2). In other words, the struggle between OC and the State is not simply a 'War of Manoeuvre' and should not only be treated as such. Taking the Gramscian definition of power as the starting point, it can be argued that the struggle between OC and the State is a 'War of Position' and the commodity that it is really at stake is a *cultural product*. Violence by either side is of secondary importance, since as the theory suggests, it is only used when *voluntary consent* fails (Gramsci 2003). The collection of taxes for example, suggests how important the role of consent is. There are also implications of territorial integrity and to more traditional power issues. Tilly (1992) for instance explains that smuggling, that is, the evasion of internal or external custom duties, 'became a crime precisely to the extent that European states attempted to define and defend their boundaries' (p. 88).

Thus, organised crime is a counter hegemonic force, a 'mentality' or a cultural institution that challenges the ability of *Ideological State Apparatuses* (Althusser 1970) to impose the norms of the dominant group and establish the 'rules of the game'. What follows logically from these syllogisms is that the current securitisation and militarization of policing, does not addresses the cultural and normative asymmetries, but rather focus on the issue of force, coercion and violence. There is very little doubt that international policing has over the past few decades rapidly changed its powers, aims and scope. This change can be very well defined as a contemporary political revolution; a drastic response to the criminal neoplasms that have emerged in the global environment. Kuhn for example notes that:

Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing

institutions have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment that they have in part created.

(Kuhn 1996: 92).

However, one could argue that the paradigm shift (in relation to international policing) instigated by the political elite, forces the International Community to integrate the fight against organised crime and terrorism into what Rupert Smith have called: 'War amongst the people' (Smith: 2008). These are 'fights' involving constant adaptation to new tactics and weapons by both sides and in general terms do not rely on a general strategy. The weakness to establish a general strategy and a vision about the desired results, often leads to a paradoxical combination of military (or police) success and political failure.

Placing the proceeding analysis into a broader and more solid historical context, the origin of organised crime can be summarised as follows: The domestication of *homo sapiens* and the subsequent imposition of well defined norms that are now being globally adhered by most 'advanced' social systems, have had a tremendous impact on the notions of *social piece*, *security* and *order*. Humans who have over the past millennia preyed upon other humans as a means of guaranteeing their survival, are now up against the 'new society' governed and ruled by a capitalist legal-political order that promotes and protects a set of narrowly and politically defined norms, such as private property and democracy, and punishes on a mass scale those perceived to pose a threat to that normative order. The 'rules of the game' have changed radically. Norms have become institutionalized and 'civilized'. The character and attitude of the players have also adapted to this reality. It is indicative that some anthropologists and philosophers argue that, if the name of our species was given in accordance to behavioural patterns and not on the grounds of biology and anatomy, 'man would be called *Homo domesticus*' (Ayres 1921: 600). Anarchy is no longer the overarching ordering principle that rules our reasoning and the material life


within societies. Deviance, violence and force no longer represent a politically, legally and socially acceptable tactic for achieving personal and/or collective goals. Tradition and archaic norms are being replaced by modernity and the constitutional capitalist democracy. Yet, this is an ongoing struggle as we are far from the ideal society proposed in the dominant narrative of liberal democracy.

Those tactics remain under the absolute control and/or supervision of the few hegemonic and powerful legal-political organisations and nation-states, that currently control the national and international normative, social, political and economic spheres. Many socialist critics for instance, will point out that the essence of the capitalist system is a form of ‘social theft, class exploitation and a priory social injustice’ (Eldred 2008: 121). Thus, in phlegmatic times, a number of puzzling questions about the true power the people keep resurfacing: What is social justice? Whose norms? Whose law? What order? (Chambliss and Mankoff, 1976). The system that determines the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ has become attached to this institutionalization of power. The inequalities and cleavages generated by this modern ‘tyrannic’ system of governance, fuels an inevitable and continuing struggle between competing normative orders (tradition/modernity, archaic/liberal) and their representative interest groups. The outcome of this clash generates a plethora of social problems that scholars have tried to address: war, ethnic conflict, revolution, social unrest, racial and gender discrimination, poverty, violence, terrorism and crime to name a few. Organised crime is also a phenomenon that emerges from the clash between the modern normative order of the ‘new society’ against a more ‘primitive’ order of an *anti-society* that adheres to different and often ‘archaic’ values, norms and practices that continue to exist, even if, only in peoples’ reasoning, imagination, history, tradition and ideology.

## 6.7 Conclusion: How ‘Greek’ is Greek Organised Crime?

Since the end of the cold war, organised crime has been a persistent phenomenon in most countries of the world. A number of explanations or metaphors have been put forward to make sense of the persistent nature of organised crime in both sides of the Atlantic. At the begging of this thesis we provided an overview of the four major thesis/explanations/metaphors that appear in the academic and professional literature. Clearly each metaphor tents to overemphasize some variable more than others. Our own approach was a more holistic one, considering multiple factors into our explanation (see Diagram 6.1).

**Diagram 6.2** A Holistic conceptual model



Source: Author's own elaboration

Organisational approaches focus on the criminal capabilities of shadow and complex criminal organisations (Council of Europe 1998, United Nations 2004, Cressey 1969); structural explanations stress the symbiotic links between criminal groups with the social system and communities (Blok 1974; Block 1983; Block and Chambliss 1981; Chambliss 1971; 1988b; Potter 1994; Allum, 2010) economic and entrepreneurial models look at the

rational-economic incentives that create market dynamics for dispute settlement and other illegal goods and services (Gambetta 1993, Smith 1980, 1978, 1994); cultural and functional models emphasize the role of 'alien' and deviant culture (Ianni and Ianni 1972, Lupsha 2006); political explanations examine the role of weak institutions in facilitating the growth of organised crime in weak states; and hybrid models draw their analytical tools from two or more of the previous approaches (Allum 2006, Williams and Godson 2002). The perspective proposed in this work exposes the political nature and 'normality' of organised crime. Emphasizing the group nature of society and the competitive relations between power groups, it is argued that organised crime can also be understood as an everyday phenomenon.

The starting point of this thesis/metaphor, is based on a rather cynical view of social life, suggesting that power groups and communities within society will maintain their status and position through all means available; lawful and illicit. Consequently, the development and enforcement of laws as well as the process of lawbreaking are vested into these fundamental struggles between groups for power and control (Chambliss 1975b, 1989, Vold 1958, Vold et al 2002: 227-247). From this perspective, the main theme of this work was to study and analyse organised crime as an epiphenomenon of everyday life; it is perceived as a proto-revolutionary effort for accumulating power and wealth employed by various groups and communities with society, including states. Indeed when looking deeper into the history of political organisation, one sees the explicit linkages of concepts such as organised crime, protection, extortion and war with the birth of the nation state (Tilly, 1985, 1992). From this angle, as Hobbs notes, organised crime appears to be a *glocal* phenomenon (Hobbs, 1998). Although western norms, values and institutions may have helped to erase these memories, the Greek reality is fairly different, making organised crime a normal epiphenomenon of Greek life.

In order to empirically assess the strength and weaknesses of this approach, the previous chapters investigated three criminal communities in Greece. Greece was selected as a *typical* case, given that most of the available historical, social and political indicators suggest that up to the present moment, the country manifests significant conflicts demonstrated through contentious social agitation and unrest (see Diagram 1.2). Moreover, there is what we have called ‘the Greek paradox’. All the indicators suggest the presence of an organised crime problem, yet public and academic discourse is insignificant. It is indeed very likely that Greece may be suffering from a ‘black hole syndrome’, a condition that comes into sight when deviance is embedded into the everyday life and functioning of the society (see: Makarenko, 2004). Subsequently, the decision to select the three criminal communities was based on their high degree of visibility in the mass media, as well as, their frequent interaction with the Greek criminal justice system; a claim also supported by the research that was undertaken for this research.



# Chapter 7: Conclusions, Implications and Future Work

## 7.1 General Conclusions

The general thrust of this work evolves around the visibility of organised crime in the everyday context. In this work, we have tried to contribute to the sparse body of empirical and theoretical research about Greek organised crime, but in a way that can provide comparable results and fresh analytical tools to practitioners and academics who have an interest on the topic. The main body of the thesis examined three criminal communities in Greece, congregating empirical evidence from a variety of sources. Each case study had every aspect related to the notion of ‘organised crime’ similar whilst the social power and visibility of the groups involved was in each case different. First, all groups engaged in illegal activities and operated in a structured group defined by the Greek law as ‘organised crime’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2001a). Second, all three networks examined have received final court verdict and its members have received lengthy prison sentences for participating in a criminal organisation as defined in the Greek law. Third, the level of power and visibility for each case was different. Subsequently, the results were comparatively discussed, utilising the visibility spectrum as an analytical point of reference. Overall we can provide the following conclusions that we think could also apply in other cases within Greece, but also in other countries.

1. Criminal groups have both economic and ideological motives. However, the line is not as blurring as previously thought. The notions of *visibility* and *exposure* can shed fresh light into this dynamic. Criminal groups with high visibility and lower social power develop a stronger ideological

- rhetoric. This applies to both Urban Guerrillas who have mainly political goals, but also to the ‘Godfather of the night’ who do not have a political agenda per se. Very recently, new evidence suggests that professional criminals linked with the ‘Godfathers of the night’ are also involved in terrorist financing. In our view this crime-terror link can be explained on the grounds that the criminal justice system has put ‘unfair’ pressure and exposure to the workings of the professional criminals and/or professional criminals collaborate with terrorist groups as a way of retaliating to police interference to their own affairs. Economic motives are also strong, but it seems that reputation and trust is also something that high visibility groups value more. Respectively, low visibility groups have predominately a rational and economic rhetoric.
2. Criminal groups with high visibility rely more on blood, marriage and strong friendship ties. This can be observed at all levels of their organisation. Trust seems to be more important than economic gains. Low visibility groups also use blood and family ties, but mainly for the most critical parts of the organisation that often involved the management, storage and transportation of cash. Economic motives in low visibility groups are stronger than reputation and trust.
  3. Criminal groups with high visibility are less likely to develop systemic ties with the wider society. Also popular support is stronger. In the low visibility groups we notice the opposite dynamic. Material links with the systems are widespread, but popular support is non-existent. This polarised behaviour is particularly stronger when we compare the Cocaine Barons with the Urban Guerrilla groups. It appears that in the former, society agrees with the principles, norms and ideas expressed by the acts of the groups (i.e. there is strong popular support), but not willing to provide direct help. In the former case, society (especially the political system) provides direct assistance, but people do not openly ‘agree’ with the principles expressed via their activities.

## 7.2 Future work

Due to space and time constraints the present work did not allow the author to investigate in depth a number of issues that remain marginalised in the academic literature. The present provides a good reference point for other research projects that will seek to examine the political and ideological dimensions of organised crime in addition to the role of visibility, social construction, the role of criminal justice and global policing.

First, the history of organised crime in Greece is an issue future work should explore. Here we have shown that it is possible to link the current notion of “transnational organised crime” with other historical form of “organised criminality”. Greece is a good case study for studying the parallel histories of state and gang formation because it offers a historical continuity. Our own historical analysis shows that legal and illegal activities and groups, like, piracy, smuggling, trade, states, businesses, terrorist groups and violent gangs can be place in the same spectrum (see also Tilly: 1985,1992). So this research can challenge current official definitions and perceptions of “organised crime” that often lack a historical perspective. Organised crime is not a phenomenon that emerged after the end of the Cold war as the Globalist thesis puts it, neither it is simply an economic problem that rises in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. A historical perspective shows that organised crime has a timeless character and it is as old as political organisation (see Woodiwiss, 2001). Future research should pay more attention into the history of political violence, prohibition and state power utilising existing historical research methods and tools. Archives, libraries, state records and secondary historical sources could unravel new perspectives about the historical forms of organised crime. Such research could revitalize moral relativism which is a declining normative position in an area were fundamentalism seems to have gained a foothold in all the major civilisation.

The three case studies examined in this work are considered to be normal examples in terms of their position on the spectrum of visibility. Future

work should examine the two extreme cases, that is to say, groups with impunity and groups that provoke mass hysteria, in order to provide a more complete picture of the role of social power and visibility. Two possible communities that may fit these examples are the political system and the immigrant community in Greece. By doing so future research could test the validity of the present research. In short, the following questions should be addressed: Is the language used by offenders in line with the observation that the more visible the community is the more ideological it becomes and visa versa? Is the structure of the group contingent to the visibility and social power of the community? We have noticed that low visibility groups tend to overemphasise profit and underemphasise trust, whereas high visibility groups value trust more than profits. Could this principle perhaps explain why alien criminal groups (such as Albanians in Greece) tend to rely heavily on family ties? Also, can this be a plausible explanation in cases where politicians and businessmen who lack strong family ties become bedfellows in corrupt practices?

Second, political scientists and especially those interested in political ethics, culture, morality and philosophy can use the case of organised crime as their empirical field for developing new and critical perspectives on the nature of the nation-state. There is still some room to contribute on state theory, development theory, as well as on criminological and criminal justice perspectives. Third, the interaction between the sub-social systems in Greece requires further research and analysis. The illegal or semi-legal interaction between the state, business and civil society may take different forms and shapes and it is an issue that has not yet been explored.

Finally, the two core variables, social power and visibility require further analytical scrutiny. Although an ethnographic and bibliographical research can point out that some groups have a greater visibility than others, further research should develop a more robust methodology for measuring them. Developing appropriate and holistic tools for this task is essential for comparing between large number of cases and across countries.

Indicatively, we note that visibility can be measured by considering a combination of the following indicators: level of violence, type of violence, officially recorded crimes, court records, media mentions (local and international), police funding (time and resources spent), public perceptions, police perceptions and offenders perceptions. Respectively, for measuring social power, future research could focus on the social, political and economic aspects of the offenders, the crime committed as well as the wider social milieu and community that can be relevant in decoding levels of power involved. A practical tool for measuring this variable is to use the existing power structure within a given country and assess the extent to which some activities and actors are connected to that power structure. This tool could be helpful when comparing countries with the same systems, but there are also many practical issues that may emerge when the comparison takes place between countries with different legal-political systems (for example between Democracies and Dictatorships) or when the comparison takes place between different epochs.

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# Appendix A

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## 1. Data and sources

A large number of sources were used and data were combined from different sources. In this appendix we include a more detail presentation of the sources and what type of data were used.

### 1.1. Official Statistics

The majority of quantitative indicators used in this study derive from Hellenic National Statistics Agency (ΕΣΥΕ). Some of the sources were available and accessed from online databases. Also, a number of visits in the National Statistics were conducted (see final section in Appendix). The structural indicators reflect primary the economic system and the organisation of the Greek economy and the educational sector. Also, statistics from reports and online databases published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)<sup>10</sup> were used in conjunction with statistical information obtained from the Greek Police, the Central Anti-drug Coordination Unit — National Intelligence Unit (SODN-EMP)<sup>11</sup>, the Greek Coast Guard and Bureau for Special Inspections (Yp.E.E, formerly SDOE)<sup>12</sup>. The aforementioned sources allowed us to have a picture of the seized quantities of cocaine from 1980 to 2006, as well as longitudinal data on retail and wholesale prices for cocaine and other illegal drugs in Greece.

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<sup>10</sup> UNODC (2008)

<sup>11</sup> SODN/EMP, *Ekthesi gia ta Narkotika sthn Ellada Etous 2001* (Athens: Typografeio ELAS, 2002); SODN/EMP, *Ekthesi gia ta Narkotika sthn Ellada Etous 2002* (Athens: Typografeio ELAS, 2003); SODN/EMP, *Ekthesi gia ta Narkotika sthn Ellada Etous 2003* (Athens: Typografeio ELAS, 2004); SODN/EMP, *Ekthesi gia ta Narkotika sthn Ellada Etous 2004* (Athens: Typografeio ELAS, 2005); SODN/EMP, *Ekthesi gia ta Narkotika sthn Ellada Etous 2005* (Athens: Typografeio ELAS: 2006); SODN/EMP, *Ekthesi gia ta Narkotika sthn Ellada Etous 2006* (Athens: Typografeio ELAS: 2007).

<sup>12</sup> Data accessed via the Bureau's website: <http://www.ypee.gr/gr/enhmerosi.htm>

## 1.2 Public Opinion Surveys

Data on values, public attitudes and perceptions were accessed through various online databases containing survey results conducted by both National and International public and private organisations. The results of the World values survey and those of the European values survey were also accessed from their online database. Public surveys are very helpful in capturing issues related to trust in the state and the police as well as other cultural variables related to crime and deviance and political culture.

Also, a number of online discussion forums were used (Facebook). Online blobs and forums can provide some indication of how people react to some forms of illegal social groupings.

## 1.2 Court Files

In 2007 I was granted permission<sup>13</sup> to conduct an investigation into the archives of the Court of Appeal in Athens. The investigation lasted approximately 30 days and a large number of court cases (Αποφάσεις) were photocopied. Only cases prosecuted for offences related to the formation and participation in ‘criminal organisation’ and with a final judgement past on them were retrieved, copied and used for the purposes of this study. Additionally, a small number of court cases on OC related activities have been leaked into the press were also consulted.

## 1.3 Police Files

We collected a number of case summaries from various law enforcement agencies related to cocaine trafficking, drug trafficking, protection and assassinations. Unlike the bulky court decisions that provide exclusive details to the operations, composition and structure of cocaine smuggling

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<sup>13</sup> The 13841/24.10.07 permission by the Court of Appeal in Athens and the 6658/2.10.2007 permission by the Greek Data Protection Authority were given to the author to conduct investigation and reproduce hard copies of court files.

schemes, case summaries are significantly shorter in length (1-4 pages) and, therefore, allowed a larger study of cases. Thus, we were able to cover a broad range of ‘actors’ and groups, and identify patterns of social organisation across a large number of cases.

## **1.4 Telephone Interceptions**

Following the kidnapping of a prominent Greek businessman and shipowner in the summer of 2009, the Greek Police dismantled what appears to be a criminal network, which is part of the so called Godfathers so of the night. The network was dismantled following extensive telephone interceptions and monitoring and analysis of the conversations its members. Audio and text (transcribed) files from these interceptions were linked to the press.

## **1.5 Newspapers and historical documents**

A number of national newspaper articles are used in this study. Articles from nationally and locally circulated newspapers published from 1996 to September 2008 were selected. A number of articles from historical newspapers such as Skrip were accessed from the online database of the National Library of Greece.<sup>14</sup> In addition, a number of financial newspapers were used. Again, we used these articles to obtain information on ‘actors’ and their practices as well as, on issuer linked to the origin and structure of the criminal groups. In particular older newspaper were a valuable source of both qualitative information as well as accounts on the origin, description of activities and organisation of criminal groups. The aforementioned media reports were complemented by press releases from the Ministry of Mercantile Marine and the Bureau for Special Inspections.

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<sup>14</sup> National Library of Greece and e-library database, <http://www.nlg.gr/digitalnewspapers/ns/main.html>



## 1.6 Police Reports

We have also utilised the Annual Reports on Organised Crime for the years 1999, 2003, 2004 and 2005 published by the Greek Ministry of Public Order (MPO)<sup>15</sup>. These reports are based on the compilation of information and data on ‘organised crime’ by various Greek law enforcement agencies. There have been serious reservations expressed as to the validity of the annual reports on ‘organised crime’ as well as their capacity to effectively identify ‘organised crime’ cases. Our investigation of archived court cases in the Court of Appeal, for instance, revealed significant flaws in the methodology followed by the Greek police. We regard these flaws to be related to a lack of communication between the courts and the police as well as poor archiving. In this article we use the annual reports only to triangulate statistical data obtained from other sources as well as to collect part of the information about sources, methods and routes of transportation of cocaine. Also, a number of EU, UN and Europol reports were used.

## 1.7 Interviews

A number of interviews were conducted with law enforcement officers at all ranks, senior and junior analysts, civil servants working in drug treatment programmes (such as of the Greek Organisation Against Drugs – O.K.A.NA), guards and civil personnel working in the Judicial Prison of Korydallos and the Juvenile Prison of Avlonas, as well as with a well-known, knowledgeable Greek MP, in order to identify key trends of cocaine smuggling and protection rackets in Greece and to receive further clarification on the structure of the markets. After consulting our sources, it became evident that the role of legal entrepreneurs and networks linked to the shipping industry were central when considering large-scale smuggling

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<sup>15</sup> MPO, *Etisia Ekthesi gia to Organomeno Eglima stin Ellada, 1999* (Athens: MPO, 2000); MPO, *Etisia Ekthesi gia to Organomeno Eglima stin Ellada, 2003* (Athens: MPO, 2004); MPO, *Etisia Ekthesi gia to Organomeno Eglima stin Ellada, 2004* (Athens: MPO, 2005); MPO, *Etisia Ekthesi Perigrafis gia to Organomeno Eglima stin Ellada, Etous 2005* (Athens: MPO, 2006).

schemes. The same conclusion applies to the groups involved in the night-life economy.

Also, participants from the shipping industry and the wider 'port community' of a major port in Greece and several islands were interviewed to gain their perspective on the cocaine business. The form of these interviews was unstructured and informal. The professional occupation and social networks of the actors interviewed gave them the ability to provide in-depth and detailed information on the motives of smugglers as well as the structures that facilitate or even protect this illicit trade. From these encounters it was sensed that there is a general lack of morality in these professional circles that often serve strong profiteering motives. Our general feeling is that much of what is happening in the 'ports' receives no publicity and that court cases and official statistics provide only a partial picture of the extent of the problem. In numerous occasions we were told stories about cocaine busts, amongst other activities, by reliable sources; busts and activities that did not appear in media sources. The following is a list of all the professionals and informants interviewed for this study:

Mrs. Gouli, Prosecutor on Human Trafficking; Mr. Kampanakis, head of crime intelligence Unit; Mr. Maspero, Senior analyst in the crime intelligence Unit; Mr. Saxionis, Head of Drug enforcement agency; Mr. G.X, Head of Intelligence, people smuggling unit, Greek Coast Guard. ; Mr. Aravadinis, head of Avlonas prison Guards, former convict; Mr. Koubelis, MP with left/liberal Party (SIRIZA), criminal lawyer; Mr. Kokkoris, Director of drug rehabilitation program; Informant on smuggling/shipping (P); Informant on smuggling/shipping (B); Customs Officers, Port of Durres, Albania; Head of Customs, Port of Durres, Albania; Head of security, Port of Durres, Albania; Middle rank Greek drug dealer-pusher (Nio); Greek Bar/restaurant owner, Athens (ALBA); High ranking officer (Rt.d), Hellenic Police, anti-terrorist unit; Greek Police Officers from Europol and Interpol.

## 1.8 Field Trips

A number of field trips were conducted over the past years in search of information and informants for this study. Besides the actual information gathered from these visits, the observation of the working habitat of my informants was crucial in gaining a better perspective on my topic.

### 1.8.1 Avlonas Juvenile Prison - Summer of 2009

A visit in the Juvenile prison of Avlonas (Αβλωνας) took place in the summer of 2009, which is situated close to Athens. The particular prison was selected because the main jail (Korydallos) which is situated near Athens and has a much larger population arrested and convicted for more serious crimes, refused access to prisoners. The visit to Avlonas lasted about 6 hours and I had the chance to talk to male inmates (in their cells or in the main yard) as well as with prison guards. What also attracted my interest in visiting the Avlonas prison is also the fact that the head of the prison guards Mr. Aravadinos, who has also served as the head of prison guards in Korydallos, was accused, imprisoned and later acquitted for assisting an inmate (convicted for drug trafficking) to fraud his early released papers. My visit to Avlonas however, was more about observing the 'habitat' provided by the political system for offenders as well as observing their daily routines. This was very helpful in understanding the political role of the prison.

### 1.8.2 Police Headquarters

A number of visits at the unit of criminal analysts in Athens were carried out between 2006-2010. The purpose of these visits was to conduct interviews with the officers in charge of the OC unit but most importantly to observe how analysis is conducted, how information is stored and how a case is put together. Given that the police is a bureaucracy with very limited resources, it is very interesting to see how these resources are been allocated and what

crimes receive more attentions and why. I was also able to have a much better and objective view on what data are available for analysis, how the different police agencies cooperated with each other and other factors that may affect the work of law enforce in the case of organised crime. Observations were supplemented by views expressed by those in-charge of the analysis. My visits in the analysis Unit in the Police headquarters on a frequent bases, allowed me to observe how the mode of analysis changes with the introduction of new analytical skills and long interviews and group discussions with the analysts also allowed me to observe how changing perceptions and definition of OC have real results in terms of who is been prosecuted and why.

### **1.8.3 National statistics Archives**

A detail search in the National Statistics Archives was conducted in the summers of 2008 and 2009 in order to access information that was not available online. Three sets of data were copied from the library with the use of digital camera, totalling about 700 photographs (one page per frame). The three electronic archives generated contain indexes on crimes recorded from 1928-1990; election results 1926-2004; and economic values for the construction industry, public spending and volume of the number of building registered over the past twenty years. Subsequently, all the photos were organised in an electronic folder and managed using the appropriate computer software (iphoto).